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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION
ON THE ENVIRONMENT
Bilgesu C¸etinkaya
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ays¸egu¨l Toptal
January, 2014
Emission regulating mechanisms have been proposed by the policy makers to
reduce the carbon emissions resulting from the industrial activities. We study
the channel coordination problem of a two-level supply chain (i.e., a buyer and
a vendor) under emission regulations. We first analyze a two-echelon chain that
operates to meet the deterministic demand of a single product in the infinite
horizon using a lot-for-lot policy under cap and trade, carbon tax and carbon
cap policies. We analytically show and numerically illustrate that the average
annual emissions of the system do not necessarily decrease when the buyer and
the vendor make coordinated decisions. This implies coordination may not be
good for the environment in terms of emissions related performance measures.
We further extend our analysis under the emission regulating mechanisms men-
tioned above for a two-level supply chain in which the buyer operates to meet
the stochastic demand of a single product. In both deterministic and stochastic
demand settings, we propose coordination mechanisms including quantity dis-
counts, fixed payments, carbon-credit sharing and carbon-credit price discounts
that compensate the buyer’s loss when the system’s costs are minimized or profits
are maximized.
Keywords: Environmental responsibility, environmental regulations, supply chain
coordination.
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O¨ZET
TEDARI˙K ZI˙NCI˙RI˙ KOORDI˙NASYONUNUN C¸EVRE
U¨ZERI˙NE ETKI˙SI˙
Bilgesu C¸etinkaya
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yard. Doc¸. Dr. Ays¸egu¨l Toptal
Ocak, 2014
Emisyon kontrol sistemleri endu¨striyel faaliyetlerden kaynaklanan karbon
salınımlarını azaltmak amacı ile tasarlanmıs¸tır. Bu tezde bir satıcı ve bir per-
akendeciden olus¸an iki basamaklı bir tedarik zincirindeki koordinasyon prob-
lemi emisyon du¨zenlemeleri altında c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. I˙lk olarak bir u¨ru¨nu¨n belirgin
talebinin kars¸ılanmaya c¸alıs¸ıldıg˘ı iki basamaklı bir tedarik zinciri, emisyon u¨st
sınırı ve ticareti, karbon vergisi ve karbon u¨st sınırı politikaları altında analiz
edilmis¸tir. Bu tedarik zincirinin sonsuz c¸evrende faaliyet go¨sterdig˘i ve satıcı
ve perakendecinin bir siparis¸teki siparis¸ miktarlarının es¸it oldug˘u varsayılmıs¸tır.
Sistemin yıllık ortalama emisyonlarının satıcı ve perakendecinin koordine karar
verdig˘i her durumda azalmadıg˘ı analitik ve numerik olarak go¨sterilmis¸tir. Bu du-
rum tedarik zinciri koordinasyonunun karbon emisyonları ile ilgili o¨lc¸u¨tler altında
iyi performans go¨stermeyebileceg˘ine is¸aret etmektedir. I˙ki basamaklı bir tedarik
zincirinde yukarıda belirtilen emisyon kontrol sistemleri altında yapılan analiz
perakendecinin rassal talep ile kars¸ılas¸tıg˘ı durum ic¸in genis¸letilmis¸tir. Belirgin
ve rassal talep durumlarının c¸alıs¸ıldıg˘ı modellerde satıcı-perakendeci sisteminin
en iyi performansı istendig˘inde, miktar indirimi, sabit o¨denti, karbon kredisi
paylas¸ımı ve karbon kredisi fiyat indiriminin de ic¸inde bulundug˘u koordinasyon
mekanizmaları tasarlanmıs¸tır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : C¸evresel sorumluluk, c¸evresel du¨zenlemeler, tedarik zinciri
koordinasyonu.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have increased due to human
activities since the Industrial Revolution [1]. The World Meteorological Organi-
zation (WMO) [2] reported that the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse
gases exhibited an upward and accelerating trend and reached a new record high
in 2012. More specifically, the increase in the level of CO2 was higher than its
average increase over the past ten years [2]. The greenhouse gases slow or prevent
the loss of heat to space, which makes the Earth warmer (i.e., the greenhouse ef-
fect) [3]. The greenhouse effect leads to an increase in the temperature of Earth’s
surface, which is known as the global warming [3]. It is reported that the mea-
sures of the climate warming effect increased by 32% between 1990-2012 [2]. Also,
the global average temperature had risen by 0.6◦C over the 20th century due to
increasing amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere [4].
According to European Environment Agency [5], the main sources of the
greenhouse gases are fossil fuel burning (for electricity generation, transporta-
tion, industrial and household uses), agriculture, deforestation and land filling
of waste in the member states of the European Union (EU). Also, the green-
house gases are emitted mainly as a result of the activities of energy industries,
transportation, residential and commercial uses, manufacturing, construction, in-
dustrial processes and agriculture in EU countries [5]. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is
the main greenhouse gas that is emitted as a result of the human activities [4].
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Hence, it is responsible for 80% of the increase in the measures of the climate
warming effect [2]. CO2 is followed by methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)
[4].
In order to decrease the greenhouse gas (particularly CO2) emissions, policy
makers and international organizations have proposed agreements and regula-
tions. In United States, guidelines provided by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) led to new regulations that put strict limits on the amount of
carbon pollution generated by the power plants [6]. Also, additional regulations
are proposed by EPA [7]. For instance, new regulations are proposed to reduce
air pollution resulting from the activities of natural gas and oil industry [7]. Fur-
thermore, transportation fuel must contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel
due to the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program [7]. Similarly, in Europe,
the European Commission proposed that at least 20% of the EU’s budget for
2014-2020 should be spent on climate-relevant measures [8]. Moreover, the EU
adopted new legislation in 2009, which sets compulsory emission reduction targets
for new cars [9].
Apart from agreements and regulations, emission regulating mechanisms are
proposed by policy makers. In this thesis, we consider three emission regulat-
ing mechanisms; emission trading system (i.e., cap-and-trade), carbon taxes and
carbon caps. Under the cap-and-trade mechanism, the government sets a fixed
quantity of emissions for each period (i.e., the cap) and firms are free to buy
or sell allowances up to the level of the cap [10]. Currently, the emission trad-
ing systems (ETSs) are implemented in EU (EU ETS), Australia, New Zealand
(NZ ETS), Northeastern United States, California (CA ETS), Que´bec and Tokyo
(Tokyo ETS) [11]. ETSs are going to be implemented in Republic of Korea in
2015 and they are under development in countries including Brazil, China, India,
Kazakhstan and Mexico [11]. The carbon tax mechanism puts a price on each
tonne of the greenhouse gas (e.g., CO2) emitted [12]. Finland, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, Australia, Costa
Rica, Colorado, California, Que´bec and British Columbia are among the coun-
tries and states that have implemented a carbon tax [13]. Under the carbon cap
mechanism, firms are allocated threshold values of carbon emissions that cannot
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be exceeded over a period [14].
In addition to the practices of the governments and international organiza-
tions, some industries and organizations take initiatives so as to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions voluntarily. In the United States, companies from pri-
vate and public sectors partner with EPA to achieve emission reductions [15].
For example, Greenchill partnership, high-global-warming potential gases volun-
tary programs and methane reduction voluntary programs promote the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions [15]. Also, participants of Greenhouse Challenge in
Australia reduced their emissions 14% below the business-as-usual levels [16]. In
Japan, a voluntary emission trading scheme (Japan’s Voluntary Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme, i.e., JVETS) was launched by the Ministry of Environment in 2005
[17]. The scheme supports voluntary CO2 reduction activities by business oper-
ators to ensure their emission reduction targets with emissions trading [17].
While reducing their emissions and improving their environmental perfor-
mances, the main objective of the firms is to reduce their costs and increase their
profits. One way to achieve better economic performance is channel coordination
among supply chain members. According to Simatupang et. al [18], firms in a
supply chain collaborate to obtain mutual benefits due to increasing competition
resulting from globalization, technological improvements and product diversity.
The coordination mechanisms that are investigated most commonly include in-
formation flow among the supply chain members [19], logistics synchronization,
incentive alignment, collective learning [18] and contracts that establish trans-
fer payment schemes [20]. The accumulated research in this area suggests that
coordination improves economic performance of the supply chain. To illustrate,
Thomas et al. [21] argue that due to advances in information technology and
logistics, firms can reduce operating costs by coordinating the planning of pro-
curement, production and distribution. Similarly, Yu et al. [22] suggest that by
coordinating different parties or forming partnerships between them, the supply
chain members can benefit in terms of cost savings and inventory reductions.
Benjaafar et al. [23] suggest that emissions can be reduced by integrating
carbon footprint considerations into decisions related to production, procurement
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and inventory management without significantly increasing cost. Combining this
result with the notion of coordination provided in the previous paragraph, we
examine the coordination in a two-level supply chain under an economic objective
and carbon emissions considerations. We consider a system consisting of a buyer
(retailer) and a vendor (manufacturer). In the first part of the thesis, we extend
the EOQ model to account for this two-level supply chain (i.e., the buyer and the
vendor) and the three emission regulating mechanisms described above in order to
minimize the procurement, production and inventory holding costs. We examine
the replenishment and inventory holding decisions of the buyer, and production
and inventory holding decisions of the vendor. We propose two models (those are
decentralized and centralized) for each emission regulating mechanism to find the
order quantities that minimize the total cost of the buyer and the system.
In the second part of the thesis, we consider a two-level supply chain in which
the buyer operates under the conditions of the classical newsvendor problem. We
examine the replenishment decisions of the buyer and the system under carbon
tax, cap-and-trade and carbon cap mechanisms. Similar to the first part, two
models are proposed for each emission regulating mechanism to find the order
quantities that maximize the expected profit of the buyer and the system. In
both the first and the second parts of the thesis, we propose some coordination
strategies including quantity discounts, carbon-credit sharing, carbon credit price
discounts and fixed payments that compensate the buyer’s loss resulting from
the centralized optimal solution. Finally, we examine the impact of channel
coordination on the optimal order quantities and on the cost (or expected profit)
of the buyer, vendor, and the system under the EOQ model (or newsvendor
problem) by numerical analyses.
Hence, this study contributes to the literature by investigating coordination
issues in a two-level supply chain under emission regulating mechanisms (namely,
cap-and-trade, carbon taxes and carbon cap mechanisms) under both determinis-
tic and stochastic demand. Additionally, different from other studies, we propose
coordination mechanisms that utilize carbon credit sharing and price discounts
to compensate the buyer’s loss while the best possible economic performance of
the system is achieved.
4
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature related to this study are on carbon emissions management of a
single firm, channel coordination in supply chains and channel coordination in
supply chains with environmental efforts.
2.1 Studies on Carbon Emissions Management
of a Single Firm
In the body of literature related to carbon emissions management of a single
firm, some studies examine the decisions related to replenishment and inventory
management. The papers that focus on this issue under the deterministic setting
generally adapt the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) framework.
In Hua et al. [24], the inventory management decisions of a firm under carbon
emission trading mechanism (i.e., cap-and-trade system) and the impact of carbon
cap and carbon price on replenishment decisions are investigated. The optimal
order quantity of a single product that minimizes the total cost per unit time is
found. It is assumed that the product demand is deterministic and the firm is
allowed to change only the decisions related to replenishment. The EOQ model
is updated under the cap-and-trade system by adding the emissions restriction
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as a constraint to the model. It is found that cap-and-trade system induces the
firm to reduce its emissions and total cost simultaneously under some conditions
related to carbon cap and carbon price.
Hua et al. [25] extend the analysis of Hua et al. [24] by analyzing the impact
of carbon trade on the ordering and the pricing decisions of a firm under the
same emissions structure. The objective is to maximize total profit per unit time
where the replenishment quantity and the retail price are the decision variables.
It is assumed that the demand decreases with increasing price and the marginal
revenue is a strictly increasing function of price. Similar to [24], the EOQ model is
updated under the cap-and-trade system where the emissions restriction is added
as a constraint to the model. It is found that the optimal values of the order
quantity, retail price, and the resulting amount of carbon emissions depend on
the carbon price, but not on the carbon cap.
Different from Hua et al. [24] and Hua et al. [25], Chen et al. [26] study
the inventory management decisions of a firm under carbon cap mechanism. The
firm chooses the order quantity of a single product that minimizes the sum of
fixed and variable ordering costs and inventory holding costs while ensuring that
its emissions do not exceed the carbon cap. It is assumed that the product
demand is known and the EOQ framework is adapted. Since emissions are also
associated with procurement and inventory holding, the calculation of the amount
of emissions follows the same structure as the calculation of average cost per unit
time. It is proven that the cost function is flat while the emission function is
steep around the cost-optimal solution. Hence, the benefit of emission reduction
is greater than the relative increase in cost in this range. The study shows that
it is possible to reduce carbon emissions by operational adjustments without
significantly increasing cost in an inventory management system. The notion of
emissions reduction without increasing costs considerably, is also extended to the
facility location and newsvendor models.
Arslan and Tu¨rkay [27] extend the studies of Hua et al. [24] and Chen et
al. [26] by incorporating social criteria into replenishment decisions of a single
product under environmental criteria. The amount of greenhouse gas (GHG)
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emissions (i.e., the carbon footprint) of a firm is considered as the environmental
criterion and amount of labor hours used by a firm is considered as the social
criterion. In modeling environmental criterion, five approaches are formulated,
which are direct accounting, carbon tax, direct cap, cap-and-trade and carbon
offsets. Similar to Hua et al. [24] and Chen et al. [26], it is assumed that the
demand of the product is deterministic and the EOQ framework is adapted. The
calculation of the amount of emissions and labor hours follow the same structure
as the calculation of average cost per unit time. The results of the paper show
that cost-charging models do not give an initiative to reduce the amount of carbon
emissions and labor hours. Thus, strict control of emissions and working hours
is possible only when caps are exercised by regulatory agencies.
In Bouchery et al. [28], a multi-objective optimization model under economic
and environmental objectives is formulated. The study extends the EOQ model to
analyze the operational adjustment and the technology investment options under
carbon cap and carbon tax mechanisms (i.e., the sustainable order quantity, SOQ,
model). It is assumed that the technology investments reduce the emissions-
related parameters. The calculation of the amount of emissions has the same
structure as the calculation of average cost per unit time. It is proven that
there exist threshold values for the cap and the unit emissions tax for the carbon
cap and carbon tax mechanisms, respectively, that enable deciding between the
operational adjustment and technology investment options.
Different from [24]-[28], Song and Leng [29] examine the production decision of
a single product with stochastic demand under carbon emissions considerations.
The optimal production quantity of a perishable product with stochastic demand
is found where the objective is to maximize the total expected profits. The study
extends the single-period (newsvendor) problem under carbon cap, carbon tax
and cap-and-trade mechanisms. It is found that there are instances under cap-
and-trade system in which both the firm’s expected profits increase and its total
emissions decrease. It is also shown that the carbon tax rate of a high-margin
firm should be higher than the carbon tax rate of a low-margin firm for low-profit
products so as to decrease emissions by a certain amount. However, the carbon
tax rate of a low-margin firm should be higher than the carbon tax rate of a
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high-margin firm for high-profit products.
In literature related to carbon emissions management of a single firm, some
studies examine the operational decisions of a firm including transport mode,
route and product mix selection.
In Hoen et. al. [30], the transport mode among air, road, rail and water trans-
portation which results in the least expected penalty, holding and transportation
costs is selected to conduct all shipments of a single product with stochastic de-
mand. The problem is formulated as an infinite horizon periodic review inventory
model, where an order-up-to policy is used as the inventory policy. In order to
reduce the carbon emissions resulting from transport, two different policies are
considered. The first policy is to implement a constraint on the amount of carbon
emissions and the second is to introduce an emission cost per ton of CO2 emitted.
Emissions for each transport mode is calculated using the Network for Transport
and Environment (NTM) method. The results of the paper show that under
the second policy, emissions cost is only a small part of the total cost under the
current prices in the carbon market. Hence, road transport is selected most of
the time and the second policy does not result in significant changes in transport
mode selection. Implementing a constraint on emissions reduces the emissions by
a larger fraction.
In Letmathe and Balakrishnan [14], the optimal product mix of a firm is found
under emission regulating mechanisms using two different models. The first model
assumes that each product has one operating procedure and it is formulated using
linear programming. The second model assumes that each product has more
than one operating procedure and it is formulated using mixed integer linear
programming. The objective function of both models is to maximize profits.
Also, in both models it is assumed that the demand of each product decreases
with emissions. There can be multiple types of emissions. Emissions cap and
emissions trading policies are used as the emission regulating mechanisms. In
both of the policies, a penalty cost is paid for each unit of emission that does not
exceed the cap, which is different from the other papers in emissions management
literature.
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In Kim et al. [31], a freight network is selected among truck-only and in-
termodal freight networks for each route connecting two cities. The intermodal
freight networks are the combinations of different transport modes. The model
is represented as a hub-and-spoke network. There are two types of nodes in the
network, which are hub cities and flow cities. Also, there are two types of arcs, in-
ternal and external flows. The problem is formulated as an ideal multi-objective
optimization problem in which minimization of freight costs and minimization
of CO2 emissions are the two objectives. There is a CO2 emission quota for
each route. The results of the study show that truck only and intermodal rail
systems perform better in terms of freight costs. However, truck only system
results in the highest CO2 emissions. Rail-based intermodal and short-sea based
intermodal systems give better results in terms of CO2 emissions. Therefore,
increasing intermodal systems’ capacities would reduce emissions.
2.2 Studies on Channel Coordination in Supply
Chains
In studies related to channel coordination in supply chains, most part of the
research is built up on the single period (newsvendor) problem with two supply
chain members.
In Cachon [20], a two-level supply chain (i.e., a supplier and a retailer) is
studied where the retailer operates to meet the demand of a single product with
stochastic demand. The newsvendor problem is extended so as to study the
wholesale price contracts, buy back contracts, revenue sharing contracts, quan-
tity flexibility contracts, sales rebate contracts and quantity discount contracts
between the buyer and the vendor. It is found that the wholesale price contracts
do not coordinate the channel while the others do.
Pasternack [32] studies the single period problem in a two-level supply chain
(i.e., a manufacturer and a retailer) in which the retailer should meet the random
demand of a perishable product. Possible pricing and return policies are examined
9
so as to determine whether they provide a system optimal solution. It is proven
that policies in which the manufacturer allows no returns or unlimited returns for
full credit do not coordinate the channel. However, policies which allow unlimited
returns for partial credit coordinate the channel for specific values of unit return
credit and unit price paid by the retailer to the manufacturer.
Different from Cachon [20] and Pasternack [32], in Toptal and C¸etinkaya [33],
the single period coordination problem between a buyer and a vendor is extended
to include the transportation costs, which include the fixed costs and stepwise
freight costs. The buyer operates to meet the random demand of a single product
with short life cycle and the vendor’s production quantity is determined by the
buyer’s order quantity. Different from other studies, it is shown that the vendor’s
expected profit is not an increasing function of the buyer’s order quantity since
it also incurs the transportation costs. Also, the cases under which the vendor’s
profits increase/decrease with the buyer’s order quantity are presented. Quantity
discounts with economies and diseconomies of scale, fixed payments from the
vendor to the buyer, vendor managed delivery arrangements and combinations
of these are proposed as the coordination mechanisms. It is also analytically
and numerically shown that such contracts can lead to win-win solutions and
considerable monetary savings in terms of transportation costs and supply chain
profits.
In some studies related to the coordination under uncertain demand, the
coordination idea is extended to incorporate a second order from the retailer or
a second production run by the manufacturer.
In Zhou and Li [34], similar to [20], [32] and [33], the newsvendor problem
is extended to account for a two-level supply chain (i.e., a manufacturer and a
retailer) which operates to meet the random demand of a single item. Different
from these studies, if the demand is more than the order quantity, the retailer
may choose to place a second order from the manufacturer to satisfy the demand
depending on a breakeven quantity. Two models are proposed in which the order
quantities that maximize the expected profit of the retailer and the supply chain
are found, respectively. Full returns policy is proposed as a coordination strategy.
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It is proven that the order quantity that maximizes the retailer’s expected profit
under the once ordering strategy is greater than or equal to the order quantity
that maximizes the retailer’s expected profit under the twice ordering strategy.
It is also shown that the optimal expected profit of the retailer (system) under
the twice ordering strategy is at least as good as the optimal expected profit of
the retailer (system) under the once ordering strategy.
In Parlar and Weng [35], the coordination problem between a firm’s manu-
facturing and a supply departments is studied. The manufacturing department
operates to meet the random demand of a perishable product. Similar to Zhou
and Li [34], if the demand exceeds the amount produced, manufacturer can ini-
tiate a second product run at a higher cost. Two models are proposed which
are the models with and without coordination (i.e., with and without informa-
tion exchange), where the objective is the maximization of the expected profit.
The optimal production quantity and the amount of reserved material supplier
keeps for the possible second run are determined. It is proven that the order
quantity that maximizes the expected profit of the system does not depend on
the amount of reserved material kept by the supplier for a possible second run.
Additionally, the parameter values which lead to equal expected system profit
under coordination and under independently made decisions are investigated.
Different from [20] and [32]-[35], Chen and Chen [36] examine the problem
of coordination in a deterministic setting with multiple products. The retailer
replenishes the stocks individually or jointly from the manufacturer on an EOQ
basis. It is assumed that the production cycle of the manufacturer is an integer
multiple of the replenishment cycle of the retailer and the procurement cycle of
the manufacturer is an integer multiple of the production cycle. Four models are
developed, which are individual item non-cooperative replenishment (policy I),
joint item non-cooperative replenishment (policy II), individual item cooperative
replenishment (policy III) and joint item cooperative replenishment policies (pol-
icy IV). It is shown that policy IV results in less channel cost than the others.
Also, in some cases under policy III and policy IV, the retailer’s cost increases
when the channel cost decreases. In order to overcome this, quantity discount is
given to the retailer. It is numerically shown that both the manufacturer and the
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retailer’s costs decrease after the implementation of quantity discount mechanism.
2.3 Studies on Channel Coordination in Supply
Chains with Environmental Efforts
Since environmental issues gained more importance over the last decade, studies
related to channel coordination have been headed towards supply chains with
environmental efforts. Among these studies, some of them incorporate carbon
emissions management into decision making.
In Benjaafar et al. [23], a mixed linear integer programming model is devel-
oped that minimizes the replenishment, backorder and inventory holding costs
of a firm over multiple periods under carbon cap, carbon tax, cap-and-trade and
carbon offsets mechanisms. Also, multi-echelon extensions of the model are for-
mulated, which are the models with and without collaboration. It is numerically
observed that carbon constraints can increase the value of collaboration and the
increase depends on the type of emission regulating mechanism. The collabora-
tion is most effective under carbon cap mechanism. It is further observed that
by introducing carbon caps along the supply chain, emissions can be decreased
at lower costs. Also, it is numerically shown that if not all of the members of the
chain collaborate, the costs and the emissions of the firms that do not participate
in collaboration can increase.
Bouchery et al. [37] extend the EOQ model as an interactive multi-objective
formulation under single and two-echelon settings. The model determines the
optimal order size under economic, environmental (emissions) and social (injury
rate) objectives by defining the Pareto optimal solutions. The results of the study
indicate that operational adjustments effectively reduce emissions. It is further
discussed that under emission regulating mechanisms that put a price on car-
bon emissions, the minimum amount of emissions cannot be reached. Therefore,
imposing carbon caps is more effective in terms of reducing emissions.
12
In Jaber et al. [38], the manufacturer’s production rate and number of ship-
ments made by the manufacturer to the retailer in a production cycle are de-
termined, where the objective is to minimize the sum of procurement, inventory
holding and emission costs. The impacts of carbon taxes, cap-and-trade and
emission penalties are examined. It is assumed that an emissions penalty is a
fixed cost paid if the cap is exceeded; whereas, an emissions tax is paid per unit
of emission. It is found that imposing only emission penalties is not effective in
terms of reducing emissions and may lead to considerable amount of emissions.
Also, it is shown that emission regulating mechanisms that integrate carbon taxes
and emission penalties perform the best in terms of emissions reduction. It is fur-
ther found that coordination decreases the supply chain costs; however, it does
not decrease emission related costs.
Wahab et al. [39] extend the EOQ model to determine the optimal production-
shipment policy for items with imperfect quality for a two-level closed loop supply
chain. It is assumed that the percentage of items with imperfect quality is a
random variable. The developed model studies the following three cases. In the
first case and the second case, the buyer and the vendor are in the same and
different countries, respectively. The third case incorporates fixed and variable
carbon emission costs both for the buyer and the vendor. In the second case, the
exchange rate between the countries is analyzed using a mean-reverting process.
It is shown that including emission costs in the model decreases the optimal
frequency of shipments. In the third case, it is further observed numerically
that optimal shipment size can increase or decrease depending on the expected
percentage of defective items.
In Chan et al. [40], the EOQ framework is used as a benchmark so as to study
the coordination problem of a single vendor and multiple buyers under environ-
mental issues. The model aims to maximize the utility resulting from cost, energy
and raw materials waste for the vendor and air pollution (i.e., emissions) resulting
from vendor-buyer transportation. The utility function is evaluated under inde-
pendent optimization, synchronized cycles model and green optimization. Under
independent optimization and synchronized cycles model, the cycle times that
maximize the utility resulting from cost is found for each member of the chain and
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the whole chain, respectively. It is assumed that the cycle times of the buyers and
the vendor are integer multiples of a basic cycle time. Under green optimization,
the weighted utility resulting from cost and environmental performance measures
are maximized. It is numerically illustrated that in comparison with independent
optimization, cost utilities of the buyers and the vendor decrease and increase,
respectively; whereas, utilities related to environmental performance measures
increase under synchronized cycles model. Similarly, compared to synchronized
cycles model, cost utilities of the buyers decrease; whereas, utilities related to
environmental performance measures increase under green optimization. Cost
utility of the vendor may increase or decrease depending on the weight assigned.
Finally, in the literature related to coordination in environmental supply
chains, some studies also consider the pricing decisions where the consumers are
willing to pay more to the environmental friendly products.
In Swami and Shah [41], the pricing decisions and the greening efforts which
result in the maximum profit in a two-level supply chain are investigated. Cen-
tralized and decentralized models are developed, which maximize the profits of
the whole chain and the retailer, respectively. It is assumed that demand linearly
decreases with the retail price and linearly increases with the greening efforts of
the manufacturer and the retailer. The channel coordination is achieved by a
two-part tariff contract. Furthermore, it is analytically shown that total chain
profit increases under the centralized model by more than 33% of the decentral-
ized chain profit. It is numerically observed that the greening efforts are higher
under the centralized model. Furthermore, the prices are lower (higher) under
the centralized model for low (high) values of greening efforts.
In Zavanella et al. [42], a joint economic lot size model (JELS) that considers
replenishment and inventory holding decisions of a single product under environ-
mental considerations is developed. Similar to Swami and Shah [41], the demand
rate is a decreasing linear function of the retail price and an increasing linear
function of the product’s environmental performance. A mathematical model
that determines the vendor’s production lot size, the number of shipments to the
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buyer, the selling price, and the amount invested by the vendor to improve envi-
ronmental performance of the product is formulated. Under independent policy,
the model is solved so that the buyer and the vendor maximize their profits sep-
arately; whereas, under integrated policy, the model is solved so that the total
profit of the chain is maximized. It is numerically shown that under integrated
policy, the total profit of the chain increases, the optimal retail price decreases
and the environmental performance increases compared to independent policy.
In El Saadany et al. [43], a decision model is developed so as to examine
the performance of a supply chain in terms of various quality characteristics.
The retail price of the product, number of shipments made by the manufacturer
to the retailer in a production cycle and the quality measure of the product are
determined, where the objective is to maximize the supply chain profit. A quality
function is used to optimize the quality measure of the product. It is assumed
that quality measure is affected by product, process and environmental quality
characteristics, each of which is assigned a weight in the quality function. It
is further assumed that demand is a function of the quality and the price of
the product. It is found that investments made to reduce environmental costs
increases the total profit of the supply chain.
In Liu et al. [44], the competition between different manufacturers and be-
tween different retailers is analyzed. It is assumed the manufacturers produce
partially substitutable products. A linear demand function is used, in which con-
sumers are willing to pay higher prices for more environmental friendly products
and the consumer environmental awareness level is a random variable. Also, a
two-stage Stackelberg game is used to model the dynamics between the supply
chain members. Three settings are considered, which are one manufacturer and
one retailer, two manufacturers and one retailer, and two manufacturers and two
retailers. It is found that as the environmental sensitivity of the consumers in-
crease, the profits of the retailers and the manufacturer with more environmental
friendly products increase. The profits of the manufacturer with less environ-
mental friendly products increase if the manufacturing environment is not highly
competitive.
15
Chapter 3
Supply Chain Coordination
under Deterministic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
3.1 Problem Definition under Deterministic
Demand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
We consider a system which consists of a buyer (retailer) and a vendor (manu-
facturer). The buyer and the vendor operate to meet the deterministic demand
of a single product in the infinite horizon using a lot-for-lot policy. That is, the
quantity produced by the manufacturer at each setup is equal to the retailer’s
ordering lot size. Shortages are not allowed and the replenishment lead times are
zero (or, equivalently, deterministic in this setting). The vendor incurs a setup
cost of Kv monetary units at each production run, and the buyer incurs a fixed
cost of Kb monetary units at each ordering. The vendor and the buyer are subject
to cost rates hv and hb, respectively, for each unit held in the inventory for a unit
time. It is important to note that the joint replenishment decisions in this setting
have been previously studied by Banerjee and Burton [45] and Lu [46]. In this
paper, we model the carbon emissions of the buyer and the vendor resulting from
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production and inventory related activities, and we study how the replenishment
decisions can be coordinated under a cap-and-trade policy.
Under a cap-and-trade policy, both the buyer and the vendor have carbon
caps (i.e., carbon emission quota per unit time). They emit carbon due to pro-
duction/ordering setups, inventory holding and procurement. If the emissions per
unit time of one the parties exceeds his/her cap, then he/she buys carbon credit
at a rate of pbc monetary units for one unit carbon emission. If the emissions per
unit time is below the cap, then excess amount of carbon credit is sold at a rate
of psc monetary units for unit carbon emission (p
s
c ≤ pbc).
In order to arrive at a coordinated solution for the two-echelon system, we
study two models; the decentralized model and the centralized model. In the
decentralized model, buyer’s independent replenishment decisions to minimize
his/her cost per unit time determine the vendor’s replenishment lot size. In the
centralized model, buyer’s and vendor’s costs and constraints are simultaneously
taken into account to find a quantity that minimizes the total system cost per
unit time. Using the centralized solution as a benchmark, we develop mechanisms
that utilize price discounts and carbon credit sharing to coordinate the system.
Before introducing the buyer’s and the vendor’s cost and emission functions,
let us present the notation in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Without any loss of generality,
the time unit will be taken as a year in the rest of the thesis.
Under a cap-and-trade policy, buyer’s average annual cost is given by
BC (Q,Xb) =

BC1 (Q,Xb) if Xb 6 0
BC2 (Q,Xb) if Xb > 0,
(3.1)
where
BC1(Q,Xb) =
KbD
Q
+
hbQ
2
+ cD − pbcXb, (3.2)
and
BC2(Q,Xb) =
KbD
Q
+
hbQ
2
+ cD − pscXb. (3.3)
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Table 3.1: Problem Parameters and Decision Variables under Deterministic De-
mand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
Buyer’s Parameters
D annual demand rate
Kb fixed cost of ordering
hb cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
c unit purchasing cost
fb fixed amount of carbon emission at each ordering
gb carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
eb carbon emission amount due to unit procurement
Vendor’s Parameters
P annual production rate (P > D)
Kv fixed cost per production run
hv cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
pv unit production cost
fv fixed amount of carbon emission at each production setup
gv carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
ev carbon emission amount due to producing one unit
Policy Parameters
Cb buyer’s annual carbon emission cap
Cv vendor’s annual carbon emission cap
pbc buying price of unit carbon emission
psc selling price of unit carbon emission
Decision Variables
Q buyer’s order quantity (vendor’s production lot size)
Xb amount of carbon credit traded by the buyer
Xv amount of carbon credit traded by the vendor
Xs amount of carbon credit traded by the system in the
centralized model with carbon credit sharing
Functions and Optimal Values of Decision Variables
BC (Q,Xb) buyer’s average annual costs as a function of Q and Xb
V C (Q,Xv) vendor’s average annual costs as a function of Q and Xv
TC (Q,Xb, Xv) total average annual costs as a function of Q, Xb and Xv
(TC (Q,Xb, Xv) = BC (Q,Xb) + V C (Q,Xv))
SC (Q,Xs) total average annual costs of the buyer-vendor system in the
centralized model with carbon credit sharing
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Table 3.2: Problem Parameters and Decision Variables under Deterministic De-
mand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism (Continued)
Functions and Optimal Values of Decision Variables (Continued)
Q∗d optimal order quantity as a result of the decentralized model
Q∗c optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model
Q∗s optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model with
carbon credit sharing
If the buyer buys carbon credit (i.e., Xb is negative), his/her annual cost func-
tion is given by Expression (3.2). If the buyer sells carbon credit (i.e., Xb
is positive), his/her annual cost function is given by Expression (3.3). Note
that, if the buyer neither sells nor buys carbon credit (i.e., Xb = 0), then
BC1(Q,Xb) = BC2(Q,Xb).
Buyer’s average annual emission when Q units are ordered, amounts to
fbD
Q
+
gbQ
2
+ ebD. (3.4)
When no emission regulation policy is in place, Q0d =
√
2KbD
hb
minimizes the
buyer’s annual costs and Qˆd =
√
2fbD
gb
minimizes his/her annual emissions.
Similar to Expression (3.1), vendor’s annual cost is given by
V C (Q,Xv) =
{
V C1 (Q,Xv) if Xv 6 0
V C2 (Q,Xv) if Xv > 0,
(3.5)
where
V C1 (Q,Xv) =
KvD
Q
+
hvDQ
2P
+ cD − pbcXv, (3.6)
and
V C2 (Q,Xv) =
KvD
Q
+
hvDQ
2P
+ cD − pscXv. (3.7)
If the vendor buys carbon credit (i.e., Xv is negative), his/her annual cost can
be obtained by Expression (3.2), and if he/she sells carbon credit (i.e., Xv is
positive), it can be obtained by Expression (3.3). If Xv = 0, then V C1(Q,Xv) =
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V C2(Q,Xv).
Vendor’s average annual emission when he/she produces Q units at each setup,
is
fvD
Q
+
gvDQ
2P
+ evD. (3.8)
The decentralized model and the corresponding centralized model are then as
follows:
Decentralized Model: Centralized Model:
Min BC(Q,Xb) Min TC(Q,Xb, Xv)
s.t. fbD
Q
+ gbQ
2
+ ebD +Xb = Cb, s.t.
fbD
Q
+ gbQ
2
+ ebD +Xb = Cb,
Q ≥ 0. fvD
Q
+ gvDQ
2P
+ evD +Xv = Cv,
Q ≥ 0.
In the decentralized model presented above, buyer only considers his/her
emission constraint to minimize BC(Q,Xb). In the centralized model, the first
and the second constraints belong to the buyer and the vendor, respectively.
Since these constraints have to be satisfied at any feasible solution, with a slight
change of notation, we will refer to the buyer’s and the vendor’s traded amounts
of carbon credits for replenishing Q units by Xb(Q) and Xv(Q). Note that,
Xb(Q) = Cb − fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD and Xv(Q) = Cv − fvDQ − gvDQ2P − evD. Buyer’s
optimal order quantity in the optimal solution of the decentralized model, Q∗d,
therefore, leads to Xb(Q
∗
d) and Xv(Q
∗
d) as the traded amounts of carbon credits
by the buyer and the vendor. Similarly, in the optimal solution of the centralized
model, the traded amounts of carbon credits by the buyer and the vendor are
given by Xb(Q
∗
c) and Xv(Q
∗
c), respectively.
In order for this buyer-vendor system to achieve its maximum supply chain
profitability, we will propose coordination mechanisms that entail carbon credit
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sharing. To this end, we introduce a third model that we refer to as the “cen-
tralized model with carbon credit sharing”. In this model, it is assumed that if
one party has excess carbon allowance, he/she can make it available to the other
party who needs it. Therefore, the average annual costs of the buyer-vendor
system under carbon credit sharing are given by
SC (Q,Xs) =

SC1 (Q,Xs) if Xs 6 0
SC2 (Q,Xs) if Xs > 0,
(3.9)
where
SC1(Q,Xs) =
(Kb +Kv)D
Q
+
(hb +
hvD
P
)Q
2
+ (c+ pv)D − pbcXs, (3.10)
and
SC2(Q,Xs) =
(Kb +Kv)D
Q
+
(hb +
hvD
P
)Q
2
+ (c+ pv)D − pscXs. (3.11)
Assuming carbon credit sharing is available, the centralized model is as fol-
lows:
Centralized Model with Carbon Credit Sharing:
Min SC(Q,Xs)
s.t. (fb+fv)D
Q
+
(gb+
gvD
P
)Q
2
+ (eb + ev)D +Xs = Cb + Cv
Q ≥ 0.
If the buyer-vendor system purchases carbon credit (i.e., Xs is negative), its
annual cost function is presented in Expression (3.10). If the system sells carbon
credit (i.e., Xs is positive), its annual cost function is presented in Expression
(3.11). If the system neither purchases nor sells carbon credit (i.e., Xs = 0), then
SC1(Q,Xs) = SC2(Q,Xs).
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Average annual emission of the system when the order size is Q units is given
by
(fb + fv)D
Q
+
(gb +
gvD
P
)Q
2
+ (eb + ev)D. (3.12)
When no emission regulation policy is in place, Q0c =
√
2(Kb+Kv)D
hb+
hvD
P
minimizes the
annual cost of the system and Qˆc =
√
2(fb+fv)D
gb+
gvD
P
minimizes its annual emissions.
In addition, observe that, for any triplet (Q,Xb(Q), Xv(Q)), there exists a
feasible point (Q,Xs(Q)) for the centralized model with carbon credit sharing,
where Xs(Q) = Xb(Q) + Xv(Q). Since p
b
c ≤ psc, TC (Q,Xb(Q), Xv(Q)) may not
be equal to SC (Q,Xs(Q)). In fact, for any Q ≥ 0 we have SC (Q,Xs(Q)) ≤
TC (Q,Xb(Q), Xv(Q)). More specifically,
TC (Q,Xb(Q), Xv(Q))− SC (Q,Xs(Q)) =
(pbc − psc)min{−Xb(Q), Xv(Q)} if Xb(Q) < 0 and Xv(Q) > 0,
(pbc − psc)min{Xb(Q),−Xv(Q)} if Xb(Q) > 0 and Xv(Q) < 0,
0 o.w.
(3.13)
In the next section, we provide solution algorithms for the decentralized model
and the centralized model with carbon credit sharing. We will use the solution of
the latter as a benchmark to propose coordinated solutions based on discounting
and carbon credit sharing mechanisms.
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3.2 Analysis of the Decentralized Model and
the Centralized Model with Carbon Credit
Sharing under Deterministic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the cen-
tralized model with carbon credit sharing to find Q∗d and Q
∗
s. Since the objective
functions in the two models exhibit piecewise forms, we will propose algorithmic
solutions based on some structural properties of the two problems.
3.2.1 Analysis of the Decentralized Model under Deter-
ministic Demand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
As implied by Expression (3.1), BC(Q,Xb) is given by either BC1(Q,Xb) or
BC2(Q,Xb). In a feasible solution of the decentralized model, the buyer trades
Xb(Q) units of carbon credits. Therefore, for a feasible solution pair of Q and
Xb(Q), we have
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) =
(Kb + p
b
cfb)D
Q
+
(hb + p
b
cgb)Q
2
+ (c+ pbceb)D − pbcCb. (3.14)
Note that, BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function of Q with a unique min-
imizer at
Q∗d1 =
√
2(Kb + pbcfb)D
hb + pbcgb
. (3.15)
Likewise, for a feasible solution pair of Q and Xb(Q), BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) can be
rewritten as
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) =
(Kb + p
s
cfb)D
Q
+
(hb + p
s
cgb)Q
2
+ (c+ psceb)D − pscCb. (3.16)
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BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) is also a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer at
Q∗d2 =
√
2(Kb + pscfb)D
hb + pscgb
. (3.17)
Lemma 1 If (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD, then the buyer does not sell carbon credits
at any order quantity, that is Xb(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q, and Q∗d = Q∗d1.
Proof: Using Expression (3.4), for any order quantity Q, the amount of traded
carbon credits by the buyer is Xb(Q) = Cb − fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD. Observe that Qˆd
minimizes fbD
Q
+ gbQ
2
with a minimum function value
√
2fbgbD. That is,
fbD
Q
+
gbQ
2
≥
√
2fbgbD
for all Q ≥ 0. This implies
Xb(Q) ≤ Cb − ebD −
√
2fbgbD.
Given that (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD, it turns out that Xb(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q ≥ 0.
That is, the retailer does not sell carbon credits at any order quantity. In this
case, Expression (3.1) implies that the retailer’s inventory replenishment problem
reduces to minimizing BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) over Q ≥ 0. As given by Expression (3.15),
Q∗d1 is the optimal solution of this problem. 
Lemma 1 and its proof imply that, if the annual cap is smaller than even
the minimum annual emission possible by ordering decisions, then regardless of
what quantity is ordered, the buyer has to purchase carbon credits. As discussed
in Section 3.1, when Xb(Q) = 0, the buyer neither purchases nor sells carbon
credits. If (Cb − ebD)2 ≥ 2gbfbD, there are two order quantities, which we refer
to as Q1 and Q2, satisfying Xb(Q) = 0. In terms of the problem parameters,
these quantities are given by
Q1 =
Cb − ebD −
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
(3.18)
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and
Q2 =
Cb − ebD +
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
. (3.19)
If (Cb − ebD)2 > 2gbfbD, we take Q2 as the larger root, i.e., Q2 > Q1.
Lemma 2 The buyer sells carbon credits (i.e., Xb(Q) > 0) only when (Cb −
ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and Q1 < Q < Q2.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we know that if (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD, then the buyer
does not sell carbon credits. Therefore, selling carbon credits is possible only
when (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD. Furthermore, under this condition, Xb(Q) > 0
should be satisfied. Xb(Q) = Cb− fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD > 0 holds for order quantities
Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2. Note that, as (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, both Q1 and
Q2 are defined and Q1 < Q2. 
Lemma 2 implies that in addition to the case of (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD
suggested by Lemma 1, there are two cases that the retailer does not sell carbon
credits; if (Cb− ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and Q ≤ Q1, and if (Cb− ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and
Q ≥ Q2.
Lemma 3 Depending on how fbhb compares to Kbgb, the following ordinal rela-
tions exist between Q∗d1 and Q
∗
d2.
• If fbhb > Kbgb, then Q∗d1 > Q∗d2.
• If fbhb = Kbgb, then Q∗d1 = Q∗d2.
• If fbhb < Kbgb, then Q∗d1 < Q∗d2.
Proof: We will prove the first part of the lemma. The proofs of the remaining
two parts are similar.
Since pbc ≥ psc, fbhb > Kbgb implies that (pbc− psc)fbhb > (pbc− psc)Kbgb. Adding
Kbhb + p
b
cp
s
cfbgb to both sides of this inequality and after some rearrangement of
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terms, we have
(Kb + p
b
cfb)(hb + p
s
cgb) > (Kb + p
s
cfb)(hb + p
b
cgb).
The above expression can be rewritten as
(Kb + p
b
cfb)
(hb + pbcgb)
>
(Kb + p
s
cfb)
(hb + pscgb)
,
which further implies√
2(Kb + pbcfb)D
(hb + pbcgb)
>
√
2(Kb + pscfb)D
(hb + pscgb)
.
Observe that the left hand side of the above inequality is Q∗d1 and the right hand
side is Q∗d2, and therefore, Q
∗
d1 > Q
∗
d2. 
In the next lemma, we present further properties of the retailer’s problem in
case of (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD.
Lemma 4 When (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, the following cases cannot be observed.
• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1
• Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Proof: Let us start with the first part of the lemma. Using Expression (3.17)
and Expression (3.19), Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 implies that
Cb − ebD +
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
≤
√
2(Kb + pscfb)D
hb + pscgb
.
Since (Cb− ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, the left hand side is positive. Therefore, taking the
square of both sides leads to
(Cb − ebD)2 + (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD − gbfbD
gb
≤ (Kbgb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
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Due to Lemma 3, we know that having Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1 is possible only when
fbhb ≥ Kbgb, which implies
(fbhb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
≥ (Kbgb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
.
Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain
(Cb − ebD)2 + (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD − gbfbD
gb
≤ (fbhb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
.
Observe that, the right hand side of the above inequality reduces to fbD. Multi-
plying both sides of the above expression by gb and after some rearrangement of
terms, it follows that
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD ≤ −(Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD.
Recall that, Q1 and Q2 were formed by considering the positive square root of
the discriminant in Xb(0), and Q2 was defined as the larger root. Since (Cb −
ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, the above inequality cannot hold for the positive square root
of (Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD. Therefore, we cannot have Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1.
Now, let us continue with the second part of the lemma. Using Expression
(3.17) and Expression (3.18), Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 implies that√
2(Kb + pscfb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ Cb − ebD −
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
.
Taking the square of both sides of this inequality leads to
(Kb + p
s
cfb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD − gbfbD
(gb)2
,
which is equivalent to
(Kbgb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD − gbfbD
gb
.
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Based on Lemma 5, having Q∗d2 ≥ Q∗d1 suggests that fbhb ≤ Kbgb, which implies
(fbhb + p
s
cfbgb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD − gbfbD
gb
.
Observe that, the left hand side of the above inequality reduces to fbD. Therefore,
after some rearrangement of terms, it can be rewritten as
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD ≥ (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gbfbD.
Again, the above inequality cannot hold for the positive square root of (Cb −
ebD)
2 − 2gbfbD. Therefore, we cannot have Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2. 
The first part of Lemma 4 implies that when (Cb− ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, the case
of Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 = Q∗d1 cannot occur. Likewise, the second part implies that
when (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, the case of Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2 cannot take place.
Combining this result with Lemma 3 further leads to the following implication: If
(Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb = Kbgb, the only possible ordering of Q1, Q2, Q
∗
d1
and Q∗d2 is Q1 < Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2 < Q2. Because, having (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD implies
Q2 > Q1, and it follows due to Lemma 3 that as fbhb = Kbgb we have Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2.
Under these conditions, excluding the cases covered in Lemma 4 from further
consideration, the only possible ordering that remains is Q1 < Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2 < Q2.
Lemma 5 If (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb = Kbgb, then Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2.
Proof: Under the conditions of the lemma, the only possible ordering of Q1,
Q2, Q
∗
d1 and Q
∗
d2 is Q1 < Q
∗
d1 = Q
∗
d2 < Q2. In order to prove the lemma,
we will consider three regions of Q separately; Q ≤ Q1, Q1 < Q < Q2,
and Q ≥ Q2. Expression (3.1) and Lemma 2 together imply that if (Cb −
ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, for order quantities Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2, we have
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≤ Q1, we
have BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≥ Q2,
we have BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)).
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Let us start with Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2 and Q 6= Q∗d2. Since Q∗d2 is
the unique minimizer of BC2(Q,Xb(Q)) and BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)),
it follows that
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) = BC (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) ,
∀Q s.t. Q1 < Q < Q2 and Q 6= Q∗d2.
(3.20)
Now, let us continue with Q ≤ Q1. Recall that at Q1, we have
BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) = BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Since BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex
function with a unique minimizer Q∗d1, and Q ≤ Q1 < Q∗d1, it follows that
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥ BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) = BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) .
Using the fact that BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique
minimizer Q∗d2, and Q1 6= Q∗d2, we further have
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) .
Combining the last two inequalities leads to
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) ,
which is equivalent to
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) , ∀Q s.t. Q ≤ Q1. (3.21)
Finally, let us consider order quantities Q such that Q ≥ Q2. Recall that
at Q2, we have BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Since BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is
a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer Q∗d1, and Q
∗
d1 < Q2 ≤ Q, it
follows that
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥ BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) .
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Using the fact that BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique
minimizer Q∗d2, and Q2 6= Q∗d2, we further have
BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) .
Combining the last two inequalities leads to
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) ,
which, also, is equivalent to
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) , ∀Q s.t. Q ≥ Q2. (3.22)
Based on Expressions (3.20), (3.21) and (3.22), we conclude that Q∗ = Q∗d2. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 constitute parts of our solution algorithm for the
retailer’s decentralized replenishment problem. Lemma 1 suggests the solution
in case of (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD, and Lemma 5 provides the solution in case of
(Cb− ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb = Kbgb. At this point, there is one more case to
be considered, that is, (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb 6= Kbgb. Before proceeding
with a detailed analysis of this case, let us present a result which applies to the
case of (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD in general.
Lemma 6 When (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, we have BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≤
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q such that Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2, and BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) >
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q such that Q < Q1 or Q > Q2.
Proof: Recall that Xb(Q) = Cb− fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD, and Xb(Q) = 0 when Q = Q1
and Q = Q2. Furthermore, we have Xb(Q) > 0 for all Q s.t. Q1 < Q < Q2, and
we have Xb(Q) < 0 for all Q s.t. Q < Q1 and for all Q s.t. Q > Q2. We will
show that BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) if Q ∈ [Q1, Q2]. The proofs of the
other parts of the lemma, which will be omitted, follow in a similar fashion.
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Since pbc ≥ psc, it follows that
(pbc − psc)
(
Cb − fbD
Q
− gbQ
2
− ebD
)
≥ 0.
After adding KbD
Q
+ hbQ
2
+cD to both sides of the above inequality and rearranging
the terms, we have
KbD
Q
+ hbQ
2
+ cD − pbc
(
Cb − fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD
)
≤ KbD
Q
+ hbQ
2
+ cD
−psc
(
Cb − fbDQ − gbQ2 − ebD
)
,
which implies BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)). 
The above lemma will be used in the proofs of the next two results.
Lemma 7 When (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb < Kbgb, the following orderings
among Q1, Q2, Q
∗
d1, and Q
∗
d2 cannot take place:
• Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2,
• Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q∗d2 < Q2,
• Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Proof: We will prove the first two parts of the lemma. Note that the third part
is a special case of Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2 and is covered in Lemma 4.
Due to the strict convexity of BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) and the fact that Q
∗
d2 is its
minimizer, having Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 implies
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) .
At Q = Q1 and Q = Q2, we have BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)). Therefore,
the above inequality is equivalent to the following:
BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) . (3.23)
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However, due to the strict convexity of BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) and Q
∗
d1 being its unique
minimizer, having Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2 would imply
BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) < BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) . (3.24)
Expression (3.23) and (3.24) contradict, therefore, it is not possible to have Q∗d1 ≤
Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2.
Now, let us continue with the proof of the second part. Note that Lemma 6
and its proof imply
BC1 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) < BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2))
in case of Q1 < Q
∗
d2 < Q2. Furthermore, having Q1 < Q
∗
d2 leads
to BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) < BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) due to the strict convexity of
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) and the fact that Q
∗
d2 is its minimizer. Combining this with
the above inequality implies
BC1 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) < BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) .
At Q = Q1, we have BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) = BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Therefore, the above
expression is equivalent to
BC1 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) < BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) . (3.25)
However, due to the strict convexity of BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) and Q
∗
d1 being its
unique minimizer, having Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q∗d2 would imply
BC1 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) > BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) . (3.26)
As Expressions (3.25) and (3.26) contradict, it is not possible to have Q∗d1 ≤
Q1 < Q
∗
d2 < Q2. 
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Notice that, since (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb < Kbgb are the two condi-
tions of Lemma 7, two common properties of the cases considered are Q1 < Q2
and Q∗d1 < Q
∗
d2. Lemma 7 further leads to the result in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 When (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb < Kbgb, the following or-
derings are possible:
• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2,
• Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2,
• Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2.
Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 1 are presented in
Table 3.3. The first three examples of Table 3.3 correspond to the different cases
of the corollary in the order they are presented. In the next lemma, we provide
a similar result to Lemma 7, now for the case of (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and
fbhb > Kbgb.
Table 3.3: Numerical Illustrations of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 Given D = 50,
c = 12 and gb = 0.5
Example
Index Kb hb fb eb p
c
b p
c
s Cb Q
∗
d1 Q
∗
d2 Q1 Q2
1 900 1 40 5 7.5 6 300 158.944 168.819 55.279 144.721
2 500 1 90 5 7.5 6 350 157.28 161.245 51.676 348.324
3 900 1 40 5 7.5 6 303 158.944 168.819 49.114 162.886
4 100 1.2 90 5 2.5 2 320 115.175 112.815 100 180
5 40 3.2 90 4.5 2.5 2 304 77.169 72.375 74.549 241.451
6 40 3.2 90 4.5 2.5 2 300 77.169 72.375 82.918 217.082
Lemma 8 When (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb > Kbgb, the following orderings
among Q1, Q2, Q
∗
d1, and Q
∗
d2 cannot take place:
• Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1,
• Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1,
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• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, we will prove the first two parts of the
lemma. The third part is a special case of Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1 and is covered
in Lemma 4.
Let us assume that the ordering in the first part of the lemma takes place. Due
to Lemma 6, having Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 implies BC1 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)) ≥ BC2 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)).
Furthermore, it follows from the strict convexity of BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) that having
Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 leads to
BC2 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)) ≥ BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) > BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) ,
and hence, BC1 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)) > BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). At Q = Q1, we have
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)). Therefore, if the ordering is true as it is
assumed, it would follow that BC1 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)) > BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)), which
contradicts with Q∗d1’s being the minimizer of BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)). Therefore, it is
not possible to have Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1.
Let us continue with the proof of the second part by assuming that there
exists an instance with this ordering. Due to Lemma 6, having Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q2
implies BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) ≥ BC1 (Q∗d2, Xb(Q∗d2)). Furthermore, it follows from
the strict convexity of BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) that having Q
∗
d2 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 leads to
BC1 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) > BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) ≥ BC1 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)) ,
and hence, BC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) > BC1 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)). Using Lemma 6 once
again and the fact that Q∗d1 ≥ Q2, we must have BC1 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)) ≥
BC2 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)), which would implyBC2 (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) > BC2 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)).
However, this contradicts with the fact that Q∗d2 is the minimizer of
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)). Therefore, it is not possible to have Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1.

Note that under the two conditions of Lemma 8, two common properties of
the cases considered are Q1 < Q2 and Q
∗
d1 > Q
∗
d2. Lemma 8 further leads to the
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result in the next corollary.
Corollary 2 When (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb > Kbgb, the following or-
derings are possible:
• Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 < Q2,
• Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2,
• Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 2 are also presented in
Table 3.3. The last three examples of Table 3.3 correspond to the different cases
of the corollary in the order they are presented.
Combining our results in Lemma 1, Lemma 5, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2,
we propose the following algorithm to find the retailer’s optimal solution to the
decentralized model, i.e., Q∗d.
Algorithm 1: Solution of the Decentralized Model
1. If (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD, then set Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d1.
2. If (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD, then do the following:
(a) If fbhb = Kbgb, set Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d2.
(b) If fbhb < Kbgb, and
i. if Q2 ≤ Q∗d1, set Q∗d = Q∗d1,
ii. else,
A. if Q2 ≥ Q∗d2, set Q∗d = Q∗d2,
B. if Q2 < Q
∗
d2, set Q
∗
d = Q2.
(c) If fbhb > Kbgb, and
i. if Q∗d1 ≤ Q1, set Q∗d = Q∗d1,
ii. else,
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A. if Q∗d2 ≥ Q1, set Q∗d = Q∗d2,
B. if Q∗d2 < Q1, set Q
∗
d = Q1.
Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 gives the optimal solution to the retailer’s replenish-
ment problem formulated in the Decentralized Model.
Proof: The proof will follow based on considering the cases presented in Lemma
1, Lemma 5, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Case 1: (Cb − ebD) ≤
√
2gbfbD
It follows due to Lemma 1 that in this case Q∗d = Q
∗
d1.
Case 2: (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD
We have the following three subcases (fbhb = Kbgb, fbhb < Kbgb and
fbhb > Kbgb ):
Case 2.1: (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb = Kbgb
It follows due to Lemma 5 that in this case Q∗d = Q
∗
d2.
Case 2.2: (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb < Kbgb
Corollary 1 implies the following three subcases: Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2,
Q1 < Q
∗
d1 < Q
∗
d2 ≤ Q2, Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2. We present a detailed proof for
the first subcase. Since the proofs of the other subcases are similar, we present
sketches of proofs for the others.
• Case 2.2.1: Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 Note that the subcase of Q1 <
Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 is distinguished from the other two by the fact that
Q2 ≤ Q∗d1. The proof will follow by considering three different re-
gions of Q (those are Q > Q2, Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2, Q < Q1), and in
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each case by showing that BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)) ≤ BC (Q,Xb(Q)). Let
us start with Q values such that Q > Q2. Expression (3.1) and
Lemma 2 imply that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)). By definition,
Q∗d1 is the minimizer of BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)), therefore, BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥
BC1 (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)). Since Q
∗
d1 is also in the region of Q values consid-
ered (i.e., Q∗d1 ≥ Q2), this, in turn, is equivalent to BC (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥
BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1)). Now, let us consider Q values such that Q1 ≤
Q ≤ Q2. Expression (3.1) and Lemma 2 imply that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) =
BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)). Since BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with
a unique minimizer Q∗d2 and Q < Q
∗
d2, BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)), and hence
BC (Q,Xb(Q)), is decreasing in this region. Therefore, BC (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥
BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q such that Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2. Furthermore,
we have BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) and
BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) ≥ BC1 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)) = BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)). Hence,
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥ BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)). Finally, let us consider Q values
such that Q < Q1. Again, due to Expression (3.1) and Lemma 2, we
know that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)). Since BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is
a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer Q∗d1 and Q < Q
∗
d1,
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)), and hence BC (Q,Xb(Q)), is decreasing in this region.
Therefore, BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) for all Q such that Q < Q1.
We have discussed above that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) is decreasing over Q1 ≤ Q ≤
Q2, hence BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Combining the last two
results implies BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). We have also argued
above that BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) ≥ BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)). Therefore, we conclude
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q
∗
d1, Xb(Q
∗
d1))
• Case 2.2.2: Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2
We have BC (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥ BC (Q∗d2, Xb(Q∗d2)) for all Q ∈ [Q1, Q2], be-
cause, Q1 < Q
∗
d2 ≤ Q2 and BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) in this
region of Q values. Next, we use the facts that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) =
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q ∈ (Q2,∞), BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is increasing in
this region, and BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) to conclude that
BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). This further implies BC (Q,Xb(Q)) >
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BC (Q∗d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) for all Q ∈ (Q2,∞). Finally, using the facts
that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q such that Q < Q1,
BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is decreasing in this region, and BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) =
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) to conclude that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)).
This further implies BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q
∗
d2, Xb(Q
∗
d2)) for all Q such
that Q < Q1.
• Case 2.2.3: Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2
We have BC (Q,Xb(Q)) ≥ BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q ∈ [Q1, Q2], be-
cause, BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) and Q1 < Q2 < Q
∗
d2 (implying
that BC2 (Q,Xb(Q)) is decreasing in this region of Q values). Next, we
use the facts that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q ∈ (Q2,∞)
and Q∗d1 < Q2 (implying that BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is increasing in this region)
to conclude that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Finally, using the
facts that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q such that Q < Q1,
and Q1 < Q
∗
d1 (implying that BC1 (Q,Xb(Q)) is decreasing in this re-
gion), to conclude that BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Combining
this with the fact that BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) further leads
to BC (Q,Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q such that Q < Q1.
Case 2.3: (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gbfbD and fbhb > Kbgb
Corollary 2 implies the following three subcases: Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 < Q2,
Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q
∗
d1 < Q2, Q
∗
d2 < Q1 < Q
∗
d1 < Q2, Q
∗
d2 < Q
∗
d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2. A
detailed proof will be omitted for this case as it follows by analyzing the
different subcases as in the proof of Case 2.2. 
Finally, we present a further property of BC(Q,Xb(Q)), which is used in the
proofs in Section 3.3.
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Proposition 1 BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is a convex function of Q.
Proof: Suppose Cb − ebD ≤
√
2gbfbD. Using Expression (3.1) and Lemma
1, BC(Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) for all Q. Since BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) is a con-
vex function of Q, BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is also a convex function of Q if Cb − ebD ≤√
2gbfbD.
Suppose now that Cb − ebD >
√
2gbfbD. It suffices to show BC(αQa +
(1− α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1− α)Qb)) 6 αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1− α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb))
for all Qa > 0, Qb > 0 and α[0, 1]. Expression (3.1) and Lemma
2 imply that BC(Q,Xb(Q)) = BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q ≤ Q1 or Q ≥ Q2
and BC(Q,Xb(Q)) = BC2(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q1 < Q < Q2. Also, us-
ing Lemma 6, BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2 and
BC2(Q,Xb(Q)) > BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q < Q1 or Q > Q2. Combining the last
two results, we have BC(Q,Xb(Q)) = max{BC1(Q,Xb(Q)), BC2(Q,Xb(Q))}
when Cb − ebD >
√
2gbfbD. Since BC1(Q,Xb(Q)) and BC2(Q,Xb(Q)) are
convex functions of Q, BC1(αQa + (1 − α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1 − α)Qb)) ≤
αBC1(Qa, Xb(Qa))+(1−α)BC1(Qb, Xb(Qb)) and BC2(αQa+(1−α)Qb, Xb(αQa+
(1 − α)Qb)) ≤ αBC2(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1 − α)BC2(Qb, Xb(Qb)) for all Qa >
0, Qb > 0 and α[0, 1], when Cb − ebD >
√
2gbfbD. Combin-
ing this with BC(Q,Xb(Q)) = max{BC1(Q,Xb(Q)), BC2(Q,Xb(Q))} we
found above, we have BC1(αQa + (1 − α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1 − α)Qb)) 6
αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1− α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)) and BC2(αQa+(1−α)Qb, Xb(αQa+
(1 − α)Qb)) 6 αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1− α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)). Hence, BC(αQa +
(1− α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1− α)Qb)) = max{BC1(αQa + (1− α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1−
α)Qb)), BC2(αQa + (1− α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1− α)Qb))} ≤ αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa))
+(1− α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)). Thus, BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is also a convex function of Q if
Cb − ebD >
√
2gbfbD. 
Next, we proceed with a similar analysis for the centralized model with carbon
sharing.
39
3.2.2 Analysis of the Centralized Model with Carbon
Credit Sharing under Deterministic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
Similar to the analysis of the decentralized model, using Expression (3.9),
SC(Q,Xs) is presented as either SC1(Q,Xs) or SC2(Q,Xs). In a feasible so-
lution of the centralized model with carbon credit sharing, the system trades
Xs(Q) units of carbon credits. For any (Q,Xs(Q)) pair, it turns out that
SC1 (Q,Xs(Q)) =
(
Kb +Kv + p
b
c(fb + fv)
)
D
Q
+
(
hb +
hvD
Q
+ pbc
(
gb +
gvD
P
))
Q
2
+
(
c+ pv + p
b
c(eb + ev)
)
D − pbc(Cb + Cv). (3.27)
The above expression is strictly convex in Q with a unique minimizer at
Q∗c1 =
√
2 (Kb +Kv + pbc(fb + fv))D
hb +
hvD
P
+ pbc
(
gb +
gvD
P
) . (3.28)
A similar expression can be derived for SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) and is given by
SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) =
(Kb +Kv + p
s
c(fb + fv))D
Q
+
(
hb +
hvD
Q
+ psc
(
gb +
gvD
P
))
Q
2
+
(c+ pv + p
s
c(eb + ev))D − psc(Cb + Cv). (3.29)
SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) is also a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer at
Q∗c2 =
√
2 (Kb +Kv + psc(fb + fv))D
hb +
hvD
P
+ psc
(
gb +
gvD
P
) . (3.30)
Lemma 9 If [Cb +Cv− (eb + ev)D] ≤
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, then the buyer-
vendor system does not sell carbon credits at any order quantity, that is Xs(Q) ≤ 0
for all Q, and Q∗s = Q
∗
c1.
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Proof: From Expression (3.12), the amount of traded carbon credits by the
system after carbon credit sharing amounts to Xs(Q) = Cb + Cv − (fb+fv)DQ −
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2
−(eb+ev)D for any order quantity Q. Note that Qˆc minimizes (fb+fv)DQ +
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2
with a minimum emissions amount of
√
2(fb + fv)(gb +
gvD
P
)D, which
leads to
(fb + fv)D
Q
+
(gb +
gvD
P
)Q
2
≥
√
2(fb + fv)
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
D
for all Q ≥ 0. This implies
Xs(Q) ≤ Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D −
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D.
Since [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] ≤
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, the above expression
implies Xb(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q ≥ 0. That is, the buyer-vendor system does not sell
carbon credits at any order quantity. In this case, Expression (3.9) implies that
the inventory replenishment problem of the system after carbon credit sharing
reduces to minimizing SC1(Q,Xs(Q)) over Q ≥ 0. As given by Expression (3.28),
Q∗c1 is the optimal solution of this problem. 
Similar to the reasoning in the decentralized model, Lemma 9 and its proof
imply that, if the annual cap of the system is smaller than even the minimum
annual emission possible by ordering decisions, then the buyer-vendor system has
to purchase carbon credits independent of the order quantity. As discussed in
Section 3.1, when Xs(Q) = 0, the system neither sells nor buys carbon credits. If
[Cb +Cv − (eb + ev)D]2 ≥ 2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, there are two order quantities,
namely Q3 and Q4, that satisfy Xs(Q) = 0. These quantities are given by the
following two expressions:
Q3 =
Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D −
√
[Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D]2 − 2(gb + gvDP )(fb + fv)D
gb +
gvD
P
(3.31)
41
and
Q4 =
Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D +
√
[Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D]2 − 2(gb + gvDP )(fb + fv)D
gb +
gvD
P
.
(3.32)
If [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D]2 ≥ 2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, Q4 is the larger root, that
is, Q4 > Q3.
Lemma 10 The system sells carbon credits (i.e., Xs(Q) > 0) only when [Cb +
Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and Q3 < Q < Q4.
Proof: Using Lemma 9, we know that if [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] ≤√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, the system does not sell carbon credits. Hence,
system can sell carbon credits only when [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D. In addition, under this condition, Xs(Q) > 0 should
be satisfied. Xs(Q) = Cb + Cv − (fb+fv)DQ −
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2
− (eb + ev)D > 0 holds
for all Q such that Q3 < Q < Q4. Notice that, as [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, both Q3 and Q4 are defined and Q3 < Q4. 
Lemma 10 implies that there are two more cases that the system does not sell
carbon credits; namely if [Cb +Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and
Q ≤ Q3, and if [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and Q ≥ Q4,
in addition to the case of [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] ≤
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D
suggested by Lemma 9.
Lemma 11 Depending on how (fb+fv)(hb+
hvD
P
) compares to (Kb+Kv)(gb+
gvD
P
),
the following ordinal relations exist between Q∗c1 and Q
∗
c2.
• If (fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) > (Kb +Kv)(gb + gvDP ), then Q∗c1 > Q∗c2.
• If (fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) = (Kb +Kv)(gb + gvDP ), then Q∗c1 = Q∗c2.
• If (fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) < (Kb +Kv)(gb + gvDP ), then Q∗c1 < Q∗c2.
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Proof: We will prove the first part of the lemma. The proofs of the remaining
two parts are similar.
Since pbc ≥ psc and P > 0, multiplying both sides of the inequality (fb+fv)(hb+
hvD
P
) > (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
) with P (pbc − psc), we obtain (pbc − psc)(fb + fv)(hbP +
hvD) > (p
b
c−psc)(Kb+Kv)(gbP+gvD). Adding (Kb+Kv)(hbP+hvD)+pbcpsc(gbP+
gvD)(fb + fv) to both sides of this inequality and after some rearrangement of
terms, we have
[Kb +Kv + p
b
c(fb + fv)][hbP + hvD + p
s
c(gbP + gvD)] >
[Kb +Kv + p
s
c(fb + fv)][hbP + hvD + p
b
c(gbP + gvD)].
The above expression can be rewritten as
Kb +Kv + p
b
c(fb + fv)
hbP + hvD + pbc(gbP + gvD)
>
Kb +Kv + p
s
c(fb + fv)
hbP + hvD + psc(gbP + gvD)
,
which further implies√
2[Kb +Kv + pbc(fb + fv)]D
hb +
hvD
P
+ pbc
(
gb +
gvD
P
) >√2[Kb +Kv + psc(fb + fv)]D
hb +
hvD
P
+ pbc
(
gb +
gvD
P
) .
Notice that the left hand side of the above inequality is Q∗c1 and the right hand
side is Q∗c2, and therefore, Q
∗
c1 > Q
∗
c2. 
In Lemma 12, further properties of the system’s problem in case of ([Cb +
Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D are presented.
Lemma 12 When ([Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, the fol-
lowing cases cannot be observed.
• Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c2 ≤ Q∗c1
• Q∗c1 ≤ Q∗c2 ≤ Q3 < Q4.
Proof: The proof follows similar steps to the proof of Lemma 4 and is omitted.

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When [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, the first and sec-
ond parts of Lemma 12 imply that the cases of Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c2 = Q∗c1 and
Q∗c1 = Q
∗
c2 ≤ Q3 < Q4 cannot take place, respectively. Combining this result
with Lemma 11 leads to the following implication: If [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb+fv)(hb+
hvD
P
) = (Kb+Kv)(gb+
gvD
P
), the only
possible ordering of Q3, Q4, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2 is Q3 < Q
∗
c1 = Q
∗
c2 < Q4. This is because
having [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D implies Q4 > Q3, and
it follows due to Lemma 11 that as (fb + fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) = (Kb + Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
)
we have Q∗c1 = Q
∗
c2. Under these conditions, excluding the cases covered in
Lemma 12 from further consideration, the only possible ordering that remains is
Q3 < Q
∗
c1 = Q
∗
c2 < Q4.
Lemma 13 If [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +
fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) = (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), then Q∗s = Q
∗
c1 = Q
∗
c2.
Proof: Under the conditions of the lemma, the only possible ordering of Q3, Q4,
Q∗c1 and Q
∗
c2 is Q3 < Q
∗
c1 = Q
∗
c2 < Q4. In order to prove the lemma, we will
consider three regions of Q separately; Q ≤ Q3, Q3 < Q < Q4, and Q ≥ Q4.
Expression (3.9) and Lemma 10 together imply that if [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, for order quantities Q such that Q3 < Q < Q4, we have
SC (Q,Xb(Q)) = SC2 (Q,Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≤ Q3, we
have SC (Q,Xb(Q)) = SC1 (Q,Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≥ Q4,
we have SC (Q,Xb(Q)) = sC1 (Q,Xb(Q)). Since SC(Q,Xs(Q)) has the similar
structural properties as BC(Q,Xb(Q)), the proof follows along the same lines of
Lemma 5’s proof and is omitted. 
Lemma 9 and Lemma 13 constitute parts of our solution algorithm for the
centralized problem with carbon credit sharing. Lemma 9 suggests the solution in
case of [Cb+Cv−(eb+ev)D] ≤
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, and Lemma 13 provides
the solution in case of [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and
(fb + fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) = (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
). Additionally, we need to consider the
case of [Cb+Cv−(eb+ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb+fv)(hb+
hvD
P
) 6=
(Kb + Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
). Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of this case,
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let us present a result which applies to the case of [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D in general.
Lemma 14 When [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, we have
SC1 (Q,Xs(Q)) ≤ SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) for all Q such that Q3 ≤ Q ≤ Q4, and
SC1 (Q,Xs(Q)) > SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) for all Q such that Q < Q3 or Q > Q4.
Proof: Recall that Xs(Q) = Cb + Cv − (fb+fv)DQ −
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2
− (eb + ev)D, and
Xs(Q) = 0 when Q = Q3 and Q = Q4. Moreover, we have Xs(Q) > 0 for all Q
s.t. Q3 < Q < Q4, and we have Xs(Q) < 0 for all Q s.t. Q < Q3 and for all Q s.t.
Q > Q4. We will show that SC1 (Q,Xs(Q)) ≤ SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)) if Q ∈ [Q3, Q4].
The proofs of the other parts of the lemma, which will be omitted, follow in a
similar fashion.
Since pbc ≥ psc, it follows that
(pbc − psc)
[
Cb + Cv − (fb + fv)D
Q
−
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
Q
2
− (eb + ev)D
]
≥ 0.
After adding (Kb+Kv)D
Q
+
(hb+hvDP )Q
2
+(c+pv)D to both sides of the above inequality
and rearranging the terms, we get
(Kb+Kv)D
Q
+
(hb+hvDP )Q
2
+ (c+ pv)D − pbc[Cb + Cv − (fb+fv)DQ −
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2
−(eb + ev)D] ≤ (Kb+Kv)DQ +
(hb+hvDP )Q
2
+ (c+ pv)D − psc[Cb + Cv
− (fb+fv)D
Q
− (gb+
gvD
P )Q
2
− (eb + ev)D].
This implies SC1 (Q,Xs(Q)) ≤ SC2 (Q,Xs(Q)). 
Lemma 15 When [Cb +Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +
fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) < (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), the following orderings among Q3, Q4, Q
∗
c1,
and Q∗c2 cannot take place:
• Q∗c1 ≤ Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c2,
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• Q∗c1 ≤ Q3 < Q∗c2 < Q4,
• Q∗c1 < Q∗c2 ≤ Q3 < Q4.
Proof: Since SC(Q,Xs(Q)) has the similar structural properties as
BC(Q,Xb(Q)), the proof follows along the same lines of Lemma 7’s proof and is
omitted. 
Note that, two common properties of the cases considered are Q3 < Q4 and
Q∗c1 < Q
∗
c2 under the two conditions of Lemma 15. Lemma 15 further leads to
the result in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 When [Cb +Cv− (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +
fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) < (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), the following orderings are possible:
• Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c1 < Q∗c2,
• Q3 < Q∗c1 < Q∗c2 ≤ Q4,
• Q3 < Q∗c1 < Q4 < Q∗c2.
Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 3 are presented in
Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The first three examples of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 correspond
to the different cases of the corollary in the order they are presented.In the next
lemma, we provide a similar result to Lemma 15, now for the case of [Cb+Cv−(eb+
ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) > (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
).
Lemma 16 When [Cb +Cv − (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +
fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) > (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), the following orderings among Q3, Q4, Q
∗
c1,
and Q∗c2 cannot take place:
• Q∗c2 < Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c1,
• Q3 ≤ Q∗c2 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c1,
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Table 3.4: Numerical Illustrations of Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 Given D = 50,
c = 12, pv = 8, gb = 0.5 and gv = 0.25
Example
Index P pbc p
s
c Kb Kv hb hv fb fv eb ev Cb Cv
7 60 7.5 6.5 2000 2500 1 0.8 150 100 4.5 8 320 440
8 150 7.5 6 900 1000 1 0.5 40 135 5 7 300 450
9 150 7.5 6 4000 6000 1 0.5 40 135 5 7 303 448.2
10 150 7.5 6 20 30 1 0.5 40 135 5 7 303 400
11 55 2.5 2 40 100 3.2 3 90 95 4.5 6 304 360
12 55 2.5 2 40 100 3.2 3 90 95 4.5 6 300 350
Table 3.5: Numerical Illustrations of Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 Given D = 50,
c = 12, pv = 8, gb = 0.5 and gv = 0.25 (Continued)
Example
Index Q∗c1 Q
∗
c2 Q3 Q4
7 302.231 312.529 158.498 222.678
8 240.769 251.425 67.084 447.202
9 451.813 486.606 66.367 452.033
10 156.801 153.53 142.257 210.886
11 88.197 83.12 85.81 296.44
12 88.197 83.12 107.816 235.934
• Q3 < Q4 ≤ Q∗c2 < Q∗c1.
Proof: Since SC(Q,Xs(Q)) has the similar structural properties as
BC(Q,Xb(Q)), the proof follows along the same lines of Lemma 8’s proof and is
omitted. 
Notice that under the two conditions of Lemma 16, two common properties
of the cases considered are Q3 < Q4 and Q
∗
c1 > Q
∗
c2. Lemma 16 further leads to
the result in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4 When [Cb +Cv− (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D and (fb +
fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) > (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), the following orderings are possible:
• Q3 ≤ Q∗c2 < Q∗c1 < Q4,
• Q∗c2 < Q3 < Q∗c1 < Q4,
• Q∗c2 < Q∗c1 ≤ Q3 < Q4.
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Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 4 are also presented
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The last three examples of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 correspond
to the different cases of the corollary in the order they are presented.
Similar to Algorithm 1, we propose the following algorithm to find the optimal
solution to the centralized model with carbon credit sharing (i.e., Q∗s), using our
results in Lemma 9, Lemma 13, Corollary 3 and Corollary 4.
Algorithm 2: Solution of the Centralized Model with Carbon Credit
Sharing
1. If [Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D] ≤
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, then set Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1.
2. If [Cb +Cv− (eb + ev)D] >
√
2
(
gb +
gvD
P
)
(fb + fv)D, then do the following:
(a) If (fb + fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) = (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), set Q∗s = Q
∗
c2.
(b) If (fb + fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) < (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), and
i. if Q4 ≤ Q∗c1, set Q∗s = Q∗c1,
ii. else,
A. if Q4 ≥ Q∗c2, set Q∗s = Q∗c2,
B. if Q4 < Q
∗
c2, set Q
∗
s = Q4.
(c) If (fb + fv)(hb +
hvD
P
) > (Kb +Kv)(gb +
gvD
P
), and
i. if Q∗c1 ≤ Q3, set Q∗s = Q∗c1,
ii. else,
A. if Q∗c2 ≥ Q3, set Q∗s = Q∗c2,
B. if Q∗c2 < Q3, set Q
∗
s = Q3.
Theorem 2 Algorithm 2 gives the optimal solution to the buyer-vendor system’s
replenishment problem under carbon credit sharing formulated in the Centralized
Model with Carbon Credit Sharing.
Proof: Since SC(Q,Xs(Q)) has the similar structural properties as
BC(Q,Xb(Q)), the proof follows along the same lines of Theorem 1’s proof, and
therefore, it is omitted. 
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3.3 Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-
Echelon System under Cap-and-Trade Mech-
anism
In this section, we present coordination mechanisms that help the buyer-vendor
system to arrive at the system optimal solution by making the most efficient
use of carbon credits. These coordination mechanisms assume that vendor has
full information about the ordering behavior of the buyer, and the buyer orders
from the current vendor as long as his/her costs as a result of the coordinated
solution are not worse than those under the decentralized solution. The novelty
of the proposed coordination mechanisms is that they make use of carbon credit
sharing. Recall that in this setting, the purchasing price of one unit carbon credit
is greater than or equal to its selling price (i.e., pbc ≥ psc). In settings where pbc > psc,
and one party is selling carbon credits while the other party is purchasing them,
the system is actually loosing some opportunity due to the monetary value that
the purchasing party pays to intermediary agencies (i.e., pbc − psc per unit carbon
credit purchased). Therefore, the proposed coordination mechanisms, as part of
sharing the extra benefits of the centralized solutions, entail the party who has
extra carbon credits to pass them to the other one who would otherwise purchase
at a larger price in the market. This way, we minimize the system’s need to
purchase carbon credits, and hence, to pay to the intermediary agencies.
Let us define the following additional piece of notation:
Table 3.6: Additional Notation Used in Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-
Echelon System under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
BC(Q): Cost of the buyer after coordination if order size is Q units
V C(Q): Cost of the vendor after coordination if order size is Q units
Theorem 3 Suppose one of the following conditions holds.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) 6 0
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• Xb(Q∗s) > 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
Hence, if Q∗d < Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the
buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q < Q
∗
s
BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D if Q > Q∗s
where d =
BC(Q∗s ,Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d,Xb(Q∗d))
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to
the buyer.
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗s to the buyer, Q
∗
s coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.1 for the proof. 
Theorem 4 Suppose one of the following conditions holds.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) 6 0
• Xb(Q∗s) > 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
If Q∗d > Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s
cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D if Q 6 Q∗s
BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q > Q
∗
s
where d =
BC(Q∗s ,Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d,Xb(Q∗d))
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to
the buyer.
That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
less than or equal to Q∗s to the buyer, Q
∗
s coordinates the channel.
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Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Q∗d < Q
∗
s is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
s, Q < Q
∗
s is replaced with Q > Q
∗
s and Q > Q∗s is replaced with Q 6 Q∗s.

Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 have the following implication. If both the buyer
and the vendor buy/sell carbon credits, there cannot be carbon trade between the
two parties. Hence, the coordination is achieved by giving the buyer a quantity
discount.
Theorem 5 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
• pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} > BC(Q∗s)−BC(Q∗d)
If Q∗d < Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s
cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q < Q
∗
s
BC(Q,Xb(Q))− pbc × Y
+[BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d))−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) + pbc × Y ] if Q > Q∗s
where Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of carbon credits given for free
by the vendor to the buyer and BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + p
b
c × Y − BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) is
the amount of the fixed payment made by the buyer to the vendor.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} car-
bon credits for free to the buyer and the buyer makes a fixed payment of
BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d))−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) + pbc×Y to the vendor for order sizes greater
than or equal to Q∗s, Q
∗
s coordinates the channel.
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Proof: See Appendix A.1.2 for the proof. 
Theorem 6 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
• pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} > BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))
If Q∗d > Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s
cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q))− pbc × Y
+[BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d))−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) + pbc × Y ] if Q 6 Q∗s
BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q > Q
∗
s
where Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of carbon credits given for free
by the vendor to the buyer and BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + p
b
c × Y − BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) is
the amount of the fixed payment made by the buyer to the vendor.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} carbon
credits for free to the buyer and the buyer makes a fixed payment of BC(Q∗d) −
BC(Q∗s) + p
b
c × Y to the vendor for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗s, Q∗s
coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Q∗d < Q
∗
s is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
s, Q < Q
∗
s is replaced with Q > Q
∗
c and Q > Q∗s is replaced with Q 6 Q∗s.

Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 have the following implication. If the buyer buys
and the vendor sells carbon credits, vendor gives carbon credits for free to the
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buyer. The amount of shared credits is equal to the minimum of vendor sells
and buyer buys. If monetary amount of given credits in terms of buying price
is greater than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized solution, buyer pays the
difference to the vendor. The same amount of credit is not bought by the buyer
and not sold by the vendor. Since pbc > p
s
c, the total cost of the system decreases.
Theorem 7 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
• pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} < BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))
If Q∗d < Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s
cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q < Q
∗
s
BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D − pbc × Y if Q > Q∗s
where d = [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))−pbc×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}]/D
is the unit discount given and Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of
carbon credits given for free by the vendor to the buyer.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} carbon
credits for free and a unit discount d for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗s
to the buyer, Q∗s coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.3 for the proof. 
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Theorem 8 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗s) 6 0 and Xv(Q∗s) > 0
• pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} < BC(Q∗s)−BC(Q∗d)
If Q∗d > Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s
cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D − pbc × Y if Q 6 Q∗s
BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q > Q
∗
s
where d = [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))−pbc×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}]/D
is the unit discount given and Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of
carbon credits given for free by the vendor to the buyer.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
s, if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} carbon
credits for free and a unit discount d for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗s to
the buyer, Q∗s coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7. Q∗d < Q
∗
s is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
s, Q < Q
∗
s is replaced with Q > Q
∗
s and Q > Q∗s is replaced with Q 6 Q∗s.

Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 have the following implication. If the buyer buys
and the vendor sells carbon credits, vendor gives carbon credits for free to the
buyer. The amount of shared credits is equal to the minimum of vendor sells
and buyer buys. If monetary amount of given credits in terms of buying price is
less than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized solution, remaining loss of the
buyer is compensated by giving him/her a quantity discount. The same amount
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of credit is not bought by the buyer and not sold by the vendor. Since pbc > p
s
c,
the total cost of the system decreases.
Theorem 9 Suppose Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 and Xv(Q∗s) 6 0 holds.
Hence, if Q∗d < Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the
buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q < Q
∗
s
BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d¯×D + psc × Y if Q > Q∗s
where d¯ = [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))+psc×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}]/D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer and Y =
min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of carbon credits given for free by the
buyer to the vendor.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
s, if the buyer gives Y = min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
carbon credits for free to the vendor and the vendor gives a unit discount d¯ to the
buyer for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗s, Q
∗
s coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.4 for the proof. 
Theorem 10 Suppose Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 and Xv(Q∗s) 6 0 holds.
Hence, if Q∗d > Q
∗
s, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the
buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
s.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d¯×D + psc × Y if Q 6 Q∗s
BC(Q,Xb(Q)) if Q > Q
∗
s
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where d¯ = [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))+psc×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}]/D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer and Y =
min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)} is the amount of carbon credits given for free by the
buyer to the vendor.
The sum of the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal
to the total cost of the system resulting from the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))).
That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
s, if the buyer gives min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)} carbon
credits for free to the vendor and the vendor gives a unit discount d¯ to the buyer
for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗s, Q
∗
s coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 9. Q∗d < Q
∗
s is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
s, Q < Q
∗
s is replaced with Q > Q
∗
s and Q > Q∗s is replaced with Q 6 Q∗s.

Theorem 9 and Theorem 10 have the following implication. If the buyer sells
and the vendor buys carbon credits, buyer gives carbon credits for free to the
vendor. The amount of shared credits is equal to the minimum of vendor buys
and buyer sells. Hence, the buyer’s loss from the decentralized solution increases.
The vendor compensates the buyer’s loss by giving him/her a quantity discount.
The same amount of credit is not bought by the buyer and not sold by the vendor.
Since pbc > p
s
c, the total cost of the system decreases.
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3.4 Numerical Analysis under Deterministic
Demand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
3.4.1 Numerical Analysis of Decentralized and Central-
ized Emissions under Deterministic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the impact of channel coordination on the system’s
carbon emissions. For this purpose, let us define the following additional notation.
Table 3.7: Additional Notation Used in Numerical Analysis of Decentralized and
Centralized Emissions under Deterministic Demand and Cap-and-Trade Mecha-
nism
TE(Q): Average annual emissions of the system if order size is Q units
R: Ratio of average annual emissions of the system resulting
from the two solutions
Using Equation (3.12), the average annual emissions of the system resulting
from the optimal solutions of decentralized model and centralized model with
carbon credit sharing are respectively given by
TE(Q∗d) =
(fb + fv)D
Q∗d
+
(gb +
gvD
P
)Q∗d
2
+ (eb + ev)D (3.33)
TE(Q∗s) =
(fb + fv)D
Q∗s
+
(gb +
gvD
P
)Q∗s
2
+ (eb + ev)D (3.34)
Using Equations (3.33) and (3.34), we define the mathematical expression for
R as follows.
R =
TE(Q∗s)
TE(Q∗d)
=
(fb+fv)D
Q∗s
+
(gb+
gvD
P
)Q∗s
2
+ (eb + ev)D
(fb+fv)D
Q∗d
+
(gb+
gvD
P
)Q∗d
2
+ (eb + ev)D
(3.35)
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We use R as a performance measure on the system’s environmental quality
under the centralized model with carbon credit sharing compared to its environ-
mental performance under the decentralized model so as to determine whether
the emissions increase or decrease with coordination. A value of R > 1 would be
due to TE(Q∗s) > TE(Q
∗
d), implying that the coordinated solution is not good
for the environment. Similarly, a value of R < 1 implies that coordination is
better for the environment in contrast to the uncoordinated solution. In what
follows, we study the effect of each parameter on R under different combinations
of parameter settings. Here, since c and pv do not affect the solutions under the
optimal solutions of the decentralized model and centralized model with carbon
credit sharing (i.e., Q∗d and Q
∗
s) and average annual emissions, we do not include
them in our analysis.
The parameter settings are constructed considering the relationships between
D vs. P , pbc vs. p
s
c, Kb vs. Kv, hb vs. hv, fb vs. fv, gb vs. gv, eb vs. ev, and Cb vs.
Cv. Three scenarios are constructed for each pair. In the first scenario average
values of both parameters are considered, in the second scenario an extremely
large value for the first parameter is considered and in the third scenario an
extremely large value for the second parameter is considered (See Table 3.8).
Also, the setting that incorporates average values for both parameters (i.e., the
base parameter setting) is the same for each pair in Table 3.8. The values of
the parameters for each setting can be seen in Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. For
each combination of parameter settings, one of the parameters is changed around
its base value over a large enough interval to observe the behavior of R. Since
psc ≤ pbc, hv < hb and D < P , psc, hv and D cannot take values larger than pbc, hb
and P , respectively. In all the numerical analysis, MATLAB is used.
Our observations regarding how R changes with varying values of each pa-
rameter, are summarized below. In the figures where the pattern of R exhibit
“jumps” (i.e., where the pattern does not go smoothly), Q∗d (Q
∗
s) switches from
Q∗d1 or Q
∗
d2 (Q
∗
c1 or Q
∗
c2) to Q1 or Q2 (Q3 or Q4) or vice versa.
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Table 3.8: Construction of Parameter Settings
D vs. P Average values for D is extremely close P is extremely larger
D and P to P than D
pbc vs. p
s
c Average values for p
b
c is extremely larger p
s
c is equal to p
b
c
pbc and p
s
c than p
s
c
Kb vs. Kv Average values for Kb is extremely larger Kv is extremely larger
Kb and Kv than Kv than Kb
hb vs. hv Average values for hb is extremely larger hv is extremely close
hb and hv than hv to hb
fb vs. fv Average values for fb is extremely larger fv is extremely larger
fb and fv than fv than fb
gb vs. gv Average values for gb is extremely large gv is extremely large
gb and gv than gv than gb
eb vs. ev Average values for eb is extremely large ev is extremely large
eb and ev than ev than eb
Cb vs. Cv Average values for Cb is extremely large Cv is extremely large
Cb and Cv than Cv than Cb
The Impact of Increasing D on R
Figure 3.1: R vs. D for Base Setting Figure 3.2: R vs. D for Large hb
Since the optimal values of the unconstrained cost functions under both mod-
els (i.e., Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2), the order sizes at the boundary conditions (i.e.,
Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4) and the order quantity that minimizes the average annual
emissions of the system (i.e., the emission optimal solution, Qˆc) all depend on D,
R does not exhibit a common behavior with increasing D. That is, the behavior
of R depends on the specific parameter setting.
In the regions where Q∗d = Q
∗
d1 or Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1 or Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c2,
emissions under optimal solutions of both the decentralized model and centralized
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Table 3.9: Parameter Values of the Settings in Table 3.8
Parameters Base Large D Large P Large pbc Large p
s
c
Setting
D 30 49.99 30 30 30
P 50 50 200 50 50
pbc 2.5 2.5 2.5 20 2.5
psc 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5
Kb 40 40 40 40 40
Kv 500 500 500 500 500
hb 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
hv 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
fb 20 20 20 20 20
fv 120 120 120 120 120
gb 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
gv 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
eb 1 1 1 1 1
ev 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Cb 80 80 80 80 80
Cv 200 200 200 200 200
model with carbon credit sharing increase. This is because Q∗d, Q
∗
s and hence, the
terms (gb +
gvD
P
)
Q∗d
2
and (gb +
gvD
P
)Q
∗
s
2
increase with D. Using Equations (3.15),
(3.17), (3.28) and (3.30), we can observe that the terms (fb+fv)D
Q∗d
and (fb+fv)D
Q∗s
also
increase with D. Thus, the behavior of R depends on the amount of increase in
TE(Q∗d) and TE(Q
∗
s).
In most of our parameter settings, we observed that R increases with D (Fig-
ures 3.1 and 3.2). However, at large values of gv, R increases up to a point before
Figure 3.3: R vs. D for Large gv Figure 3.4: R vs. D for Large Kb
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Table 3.10: Parameter Values of the Settings in Table 3.8 (Continued)
Parameters Large Kb Large Kv Large hb Large hv Large fb Large fv
D 30 30 30 30 30 30
P 50 50 50 50 50 50
pbc 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
psc 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Kb 8000 40 40 40 40 40
Kv 500 8000 500 500 500 500
hb 1.5 1.5 20 1.5 1.5 1.5
hv 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.49 1.2 1.2
fb 20 20 20 20 2400 20
fv 120 120 120 120 120 1800
gb 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
gv 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
eb 1 1 1 1 1 1
ev 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Cb 80 80 80 80 80 80
Cv 200 200 200 200 200 200
it starts decreasing (Figure 3.3) as D increases. Also, at large values of Kb, R de-
creases with D (Figure 3.4). There can exist “jumps” depending on the existence
of Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 (Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we observed that coordinated solution remains to have
better environmental quality (i.e., R < 1) at all values of D. On the other
hand, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 involve cases where the environmental quality of the
coordinated solution worsens briefly (i.e., R < 1).
The Impact of Increasing P on R
Figure 3.5: R vs. P for Base Setting Figure 3.6: R vs. P for Large Kv
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Table 3.11: Parameter Values of the Settings in Table 3.8 (Continued)
Parameters Large gb Large gv Large eb Large ev Large Cb Large Cv
D 30 30 30 30 30 30
P 50 50 50 50 50 50
pbc 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
psc 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Kb 400 40 40 40 40 40
Kv 500 500 500 500 500 500
hb 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
hv 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
fb 20 20 20 20 20 20
fv 120 120 120 120 120 120
gb 12 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
gv 0.35 10 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
eb 1 1 30 1 1 1
ev 1.5 1.5 1.5 30 1.5 1.5
Cb 80 80 80 80 4000 80
Cv 200 200 200 200 200 4000
Since Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q1 and Q2 do not depend on P , Q
∗
d does not change with
increasing P . Using Equation (3.33), since the term (gb +
gvD
P
)
Q∗d
2
decreases with
P , TE(Q∗d) decreases with P . Also, Q
∗
c1, Q
∗
c2 and Qˆc increase with P . This
implies the term (fb+fv)D
Q∗s
decreases with P ; however, the term (gb +
gvD
P
)Q
∗
s
2
may
increase or decrease depending on the parameter setting. Hence, the behavior of
R depends on the specific parameter setting.
In most of our parameter settings, we observed that R decreases with P (Fig-
ures 3.5 and 3.6). However, at large values of Kb, R increases with P (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7: R vs. P for Large Kb Figure 3.8: R vs. P for Large gv
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Also, for large values of gv, R increases up to a point before it starts decreasing
with P (Figure 3.8). We further observed that the change in R decreases with P
and converges to zero (Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8).
The Impact of Increasing pbc on R
Figure 3.9: R vs. pbc for Large D Figure 3.10: R vs. p
b
c for Large gb
Figure 3.11: R vs. pbc for Large gv Figure 3.12: R vs. p
b
c for Large hb
For our parameter settings, we observed that R can exhibit an increasing
(Figure 3.9) or decreasing (Figures 3.10 and 3.11) pattern with increasing pbc.
Also, as seen in Figure 3.12, there exist parameter settings under which R is
constant.
In the figures where R is constant, we observed that Q∗d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s =
Q∗c2 for all values of p
b
c under that parameter instance. This implies that the
buyer (system) sells carbon credits under the solution of the decentralized model
(centralized model with carbon credit sharing). Hence, R is not affected by pbc.
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R can increase (decrease) under the following three cases. If Q∗d = Q
∗
d1 and
Q∗s = Q
∗
c2 for all values of p
b
c under that parameter instance, since Q
∗
c2 is not
affected by pbc, Q
∗
d1 should approach (diverge from) Qˆc in order for TE(Q
∗
d) to
decrease (increase). Similarly, if Q∗d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1 for all values of p
b
c under
that parameter instance, since Q∗d2 is not affected by p
b
c, Q
∗
c1 should diverge from
(converge to) Qˆc in order for TE(Q
∗
s) to increase (decrease). If Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d1 and
Q∗s = Q
∗
c1 for all values of p
b
c under that parameter instance, Q
∗
d1 should converge
to (diverge from) Qˆc and Q
∗
c1 should diverge from (converge to) Qˆc. If both Q
∗
d1
and Q∗c1 converge to Qˆc, the decrease in TE(Q
∗
d1) should be by a greater amount.
Similarly, if both Q∗d1 and Q
∗
c1 diverge from Qˆc, the increase in TE(Q
∗
c1) should
be by a greater amount.
The Impact of Increasing psc on R
Figure 3.13: R vs. psc for Large P Figure 3.14: R vs. p
s
c for Large Kb
Figure 3.15: R vs. psc for Large gv Figure 3.16: R vs. p
s
c for Large fb
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Similar to the analysis of increasing pbc, R can exhibit an increasing (Figure
3.13) or decreasing (Figures 3.14 and 3.15) pattern with increasing psc. Also, as
seen in Figure 3.16, there exist parameter settings under which R is constant.
The analysis under increasing psc is similar to the analysis we presented under
increasing pbc. If Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d1 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1 for all values of p
b
c under that parameter
instance (i.e., the buyer (system) buys carbon credits under the solution of the
decentralized model (centralized model with carbon credit sharing)), R is not
affected by psc. R can decrease (increase) under the following three cases. If
Q∗d = Q
∗
d1 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c2 for all values of p
s
c under that parameter instance, since
Q∗d1 is not affected by p
s
c, Q
∗
c2 should approach (diverge from) Qˆc in order for
TE(Q∗s) to decrease (increase). Similarly, if Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1 for all
values of psc under that parameter instance, since Q
∗
c1 is not affected by p
s
c, Q
∗
d2
should diverge from (converge to) Qˆc in order for TE(Q
∗
d) to increase (decrease).
If Q∗d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c2 for all values of p
s
c under that parameter instance, Q
∗
d2
should diverge from (converge to) Qˆc and Q
∗
c2 should converge to (diverge from)
Qˆc. If both Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
c2 converge to Qˆc, the decrease in TE(Q
∗
c2) should be by a
greater amount. Similarly, if both Q∗d2 and Q
∗
c2 diverge from Qˆc, the increase in
TE(Q∗d2) should be by a greater amount.
The Impact of Increasing Kb on R
Figure 3.17: R vs. Kb for Large hb Figure 3.18: R vs. Kb for Large gv
R exhibits increasing (Figure 3.17) or decreasing (Figure 3.18) patterns with
increasing Kb. Also, for some parameter settings R increases up to a point before
it starts decreasing (Figure 3.19). Here, the increasing or decreasing regions of R
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Figure 3.19: R vs. Kb for Large D
that appear to be approximately linear, one of Q∗d = Q1, Q
∗
d = Q2, Q
∗
s = Q3 and
Q∗s = Q4 holds (Figures 3.18 and 3.19). Since Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 do not depend
on Kb, either TE(Q
∗
d) or TE(Q
∗
c) is constant in these regions. Hence, R exhibits
a sudden increasing or decreasing pattern.
Note that Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2 increase with increasing Kb; whereas, Qˆc is
not affected by Kb. Under our parameter settings, we observed that R increases
in the regions where Q∗d < Qˆc and Q
∗
s > Qˆc or Q
∗
d < Qˆc and Q
∗
s < Qˆc. This is
because for most parameter values, Q∗d increases more rapidly than Q
∗
s; hence, Q
∗
d
approaches more quickly to Qˆc than Q
∗
s does. We also observed that if Q
∗
d < Qˆc
and Q∗s > Qˆc at the initial value of Kb, R does not start to decrease right after
Q∗d = Qˆc due to the strict convexity of the emission function (see Equation (3.12)).
That is, the change in total emissions is slower around Qˆc.
Similarly, we observed that R decreases in the regions where Q∗d > Qˆc and
Q∗s > Qˆc as for most parameter values, Q
∗
d increases more rapidly than Q
∗
s. Hence,
Q∗d diverges from Qˆc more rapidly than Q
∗
s does.
Finally, R converges to a value as Kb increases (Figures 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19).
This is because as Kb becomes larger, the amount of increase in Q
∗
s converges to
the amount of increase in Q∗d.
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The Impact of Increasing Kv on R
Figure 3.20: R vs. Kv for Large gv Figure 3.21: R vs. Kv for Large fv
Figure 3.22: R vs. Kv for Large D
Note that Qˆc, Q
∗
d1, Q
∗
d2, Q1 and Q2 do not depend on Kv; hence, TE(Q
∗
d) is
constant for all values of Kv. This implies that in the regions where Q
∗
s = Q3
or Q∗s = Q4, R is constant since the total emissions at Q3 and Q4 are equal to
Cb +Cv. Also, if Q
∗
s > Qˆc at the initial value of Kv, R increases with Kv (Figure
3.20). This is because as Q∗c1 and Q
∗
c2 increase with Kv, Q
∗
s diverges from Qˆc,
implying TE(Q∗s) increases. Using the same reasoning, if Q
∗
s < Qˆc at the initial
value of Kv, R decreases with Kv until Q
∗
s = Qˆc (Figures 3.21 and 3.22). After
Q∗s = Qˆc, R increases with Kv.
The Impact of Increasing hb on R
At large values of hb, R exhibits a decreasing pattern with further increasing
hb (Figures 3.23 and 3.24). Also, for some parameter settings R increases up to
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Figure 3.23: R vs. hb for Large p
s
c Figure 3.24: R vs. hb for Large gv
Figure 3.25: R vs. hb for Large Kb
a point before it starts to decrease (Figure 3.25). As in the case of increasing Kb,
the increasing or decreasing regions of R that appear to be approximately linear
represent the regions where Q∗d = Q1, Q
∗
d = Q2, Q
∗
s = Q3 or Q
∗
s = Q4 (Figures
3.24 and 3.25).
Note that Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2 decrease with increasing hb; whereas, Qˆc is
not affected by hb. Under our parameter settings, we observed that R decreases
in the regions where Q∗d < Qˆc and Q
∗
s > Qˆc or Q
∗
d < Qˆc and Q
∗
c < Qˆc. This is
because for most parameter values, Q∗d decreases more rapidly than Q
∗
s; hence,
Q∗d diverges from Qˆc more quickly than Q
∗
s does. Similarly, R increases in the
regions where Q∗d > Qˆc and Q
∗
s > Qˆc due to a similar reasoning.
We also observed that when Q∗d > Qˆc and Q
∗
s > Qˆc, R can start decreasing
before Q∗d = Qˆc due to the strict convexity of the emission function (see Equation
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(3.12)). That is, the change in total emissions is slower around Qˆc.
Finally, R converges to a value with increasing hb (Figures 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25).
This is because as Kb becomes larger, the amount of increase in Q
∗
s converges to
the amount of increase in Q∗d.
The Impact of Increasing hv on R
Figure 3.26: R vs. hv for Large fb Figure 3.27: R vs. hv for Large fv
Figure 3.28: R vs. hv for Large Kv Figure 3.29: R vs. hv for Large P
R exhibits an increasing (Figures 3.26 and 3.27) or decreasing (Figures 3.28
and 3.29) pattern with increasing hv. Note here that Qˆc, Q
∗
d1, Q
∗
d2, Q1 and Q2 do
not depend on hv, implying TE(Q
∗
d) does not change with increasing hv. Also,
Q∗c1 and Q
∗
c2 decrease with hv. Thus, if Q
∗
s < Qˆc (Q
∗
s > Qˆc) at the initial value of
hv, Q
∗
s will diverge from (converge to) Qˆc as hv increases, implying TE(Q
∗
c) will
increase (decrease). Hence, R increases (decreases) with hv if Q
∗
s < Qˆc (Q
∗
z > Qˆc)
at the beginning. Since we can increase hv up to hb, we did not observe a behavior
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under our parameter settings where R exhibits both increasing and decreasing
patterns with respect to hv over the same plot.
The Impact of Increasing fb on R
Figure 3.30: R vs. fb for Base Setting Figure 3.31: R vs. fb for Large gv
Figure 3.32: R vs. fb for Large Kb Figure 3.33: R vs. fb for Large Kv
Since the optimal values of the unconstrained cost functions under both mod-
els (i.e., Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2), the order sizes at the boundary conditions (i.e.,
Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4) and the emission optimal solution (i.e., Qˆc) all depend on fb,
R does not exhibit a common behavior with increasing fb. That is, the behavior
of R depends on the specific parameter setting. R can exhibit an increasing (Fig-
ure 3.30) or decreasing behavior (Figure 3.31) or both (Figures 3.32 and 3.33).
There can exist “jumps” depending on the existence of Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 (See
Figures 3.30, 3.31, 3.32 and 3.33).
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In our parameter settings, we observed that for smaller values of gv and Kv,
R exhibits an increasing behavior for most values of fb (Figures 3.30 and 3.32).
Also, if fb is increased to sufficiently large values, the changes in Q
∗
d, Q
∗
c and their
total emission values TE(Q∗d) and TE(Q
∗
s) get smaller. Consequently, R exhibits
a converging behavior (Figures 3.30, 3.31, 3.32 and 3.33).
The Impact of Increasing fv on R
Figure 3.34: R vs. fv for Large Cb Figure 3.35: R vs. fv for Large Kb
Since Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q1 and Q2 do not depend on fv, Q
∗
d does not change with
increasing fv. Using Equation (3.33), since the term
(fb+fv)D
Q∗d
increases with fv,
TE(Q∗d) increases with fv. Also, Q
∗
c1, Q
∗
c2 and Qˆc increase with fv. This implies
the term (gb +
gvD
P
)Q
∗
s
2
increases with fv; however, the term
(fb+fv)D
Q∗s
may increase
or decrease depending on the parameter setting. Hence, as in the case of varying
fb, the behavior of R depends on the specific parameter setting.
In most of our parameter settings, we observed that R exhibits a decreasing
behavior with increasing fv (Figure 3.34). However, for large values of Kb, R
increases up to a value before it starts decreasing with fv (Figure 3.35). The
“jumps” in the graphs occur when Q∗s = Q3 or Q
∗
s = Q4, where TE(Q
∗
s) = Cb+Cv
(Figure 3.35). Since TE(Q∗d) increases with fv, R decreases.
The Impact of Increasing gb on R
Similar to the case of increasing fb, since Q
∗
d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1, Q
∗
c2,Q1, Q2, Q3 and
Q4 and Qˆc all depend on gb, the behavior of R depends on the specific parameter
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Figure 3.36: R vs. gb for Large Kv Figure 3.37: R vs. gb for Large p
s
c
Figure 3.38: R vs. gb for Large fb Figure 3.39: R vs. gb for Large ev
setting. R can exhibit an increasing (Figures 3.36 and 3.37) or decreasing behavior
(Figure 3.38) or both (Figure 3.39). There can exist “jumps” depending on the
existence of Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 (Figure 3.39).
In most of our parameter settings, we observed that R exhibits an increasing
behavior with increasing gb (Figures 3.36 and 3.37). However, for large values
of eb, ev and fb, R decreases with gb (Figure 3.39). Also, if gb is increased to
sufficiently large values, the changes in Q∗d, Q
∗
s and their total emission values
TE(Q∗d) and TE(Q
∗
s) get smaller. Consequently, R exhibits a converging behavior
(Figures 3.36, 3.37, Figures 3.38 and 3.39).
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The Impact of Increasing gv on R
Figure 3.40: R vs. gv for Large Kb Figure 3.41: R vs. gv for Large hv
Figure 3.42: R vs. gv for Large Kv
Since Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q1 and Q2 do not depend on gv, Q
∗
d does not change with
increasing gv. Using Equation (3.33), since the term (gb +
gvD
P
)
Q∗d
2
increases with
gv, TE(Q
∗
d) increases with gv. Also, Q
∗
c1, Q
∗
c2 and Qˆc decrease with gv. This
implies the term (fb+fv)D
Q∗s
increases with gv; however, the term (gb +
gvD
P
)Q
∗
s
2
may
increase or decrease depending on the parameter setting. Hence, as in the case
of varying gb, the behavior of R depends on the specific parameter setting.
For our parameter values, we observed the following behaviors of R. R de-
creases (Figure 3.40) or it increases up to a point before it starts to decrease
(Figures 3.41 and 3.42). We observed that if Q∗d is sufficiently larger than Q
∗
d,
the term (gb +
gvD
P
)Q
∗
c
2
increases to a greater extent with gv. This results in a
decreasing R. Since gv is increased, Q
∗
d is sufficiently larger than Q
∗
s when Kb is
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large (Figure 3.40). The “jumps” in the graphs occur when Q∗s = Q3 or Q
∗
s = Q4,
where TE(Q∗s) = Cb + Cv (Figures 3.40 and 3.41). Since TE(Q
∗
d) increases with
gv, R decreases.
The Impact of Increasing eb on R
Figure 3.43: R vs. eb for Base Setting Figure 3.44: R vs. eb for Large gv
Notice that Q∗d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1, Q
∗
c2 and Qˆc do not depend on eb. In the regions
where Q∗d = Q
∗
d1 or Q
∗
d = Q
∗
d2 and Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c1 or Q
∗
s = Q
∗
c2, the emissions under
the solutions of decentralized model and the centralized model with carbon credit
sharing increase by the same amount since the terms other than (eb + ev)D of
Equation (3.12) are constant. Hence, if R < 1 (R > 1) at the beginning R
increases (decreases) with eb. Also, notice that Q1 and Q3 increase; whereas, Q2
and Q4 decrease with eb. Thus, in the regions where Q
∗
d = Q1, Q
∗
d = Q2, Q
∗
s = Q3
and Q∗s = Q4, R increases or decreases steeply. Suppose such steep increases and
decreases are not observed. Then, if R < 1 at the initial value of eb, R < 1 at
every point of the plot (Figure 3.43). Similarly, if R > 1 at the initial value of eb,
R < 1 at every point of the plot (Figure 3.44).
The Impact of Increasing ev on R
The analysis under increasing ev is similar to the analysis we presented under
increasing eb and we observe the same results (Figures 3.45 and 3.46). Notice
here that since Q1 and Q2 do not depend on ev, we observe steep increases or
decreases when Q∗s = Q3 or Q
∗
s = Q4.
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Figure 3.45: R vs. ev for Large Cv Figure 3.46: R vs. ev for Large Kv
The Impact of Increasing Cb on R
Figure 3.47: R vs. Cb for Base Setting Figure 3.48: R vs. Cb for Large fb
As seen in Figures 3.47, 3.48 and 3.49, the pattern of R with increasing Cb
exhibits “jumps”. Using Figure 3.47, we observed the following behavior of R.
Suppose one of the following conditions is observed.
• Q∗d changes from Q∗d1 to Q∗d2 or vice versa at some value of Cb.
• Q∗c changes from Q∗c1 to Q∗c2 or vice versa at some value of Cb.
Then, if Q∗d converges to (diverges from) Qˆc, R “jumps to” a higher (lower)
value. Similarly, if Q∗s converges to (diverges from) Qˆc, R “jumps to” a lower
(higher) value.
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Figure 3.49: R vs. Cb for Large fv
Using Figures 3.48 and 3.49, we observed the following behavior of R. Suppose
one of the following conditions is observed.
• Q∗d changes from Q∗d1 to Q1 or Q2 before switching to Q∗d2 or vice versa at
some value of Cb.
• Q∗c changes from Q∗c1 to Q3 or Q4 before switching to Q∗c2 or vice versa at
some value of Cb.
Under the first condition, R may increase or decrease linearly. This is because
when Q∗d = Q1 or Q
∗
d = Q2, the buyer’s emissions increase as Cb increases under
the decentralized optimal solution. However, the vendor’s emission may increase
or decrease. Under the second condition, R increases linearly. When Q∗s = Q3 or
Q∗s = Q4, the total emissions of the system is equal to Cb + Cv, which increases
with Cb. After Q
∗
d (Q
∗
s) switches from Q1 or Q2 (Q3 or Q4) to Q
∗
d1 or Q
∗
d2 (Q
∗
c1 or
Q∗c2), R is constant as Q
∗
d1, Q
∗
d2, Q
∗
c1 and Q
∗
c2 do not depend on Cb.
The Impact of Increasing Cv on R
The analysis under increasing Cv is similar to the analysis we presented under
increasing Cb and we observe similar results (Figures 3.50 and 3.51). Note here
that since Q1, Q2, Q
∗
d1 and Q
∗
d2 do not depend on Cv, Q
∗
d does not change. Hence,
the changes in R only result from the changes in Q∗s.
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Figure 3.50: R vs. Cv for Large p
b
c Figure 3.51: R vs. Cv for Large gv
From Figures 3.1-3.51, we observe that R can exhibit an increasing or de-
creasing pattern. Additionally, R can increase above or decrease below 1 during
the increase of each parameter. Therefore, we can conclude that channel coordi-
nation may not be good for the environment in terms of carbon emissions of the
buyer-vendor system.
The administrative implications of our findings can be summarized as follows.
In some parameter settings in which Kb or Kv is extremely large, R increases
above 1. Similarly, while examining the effect of Kv on R, R increases above 1
for large values of Kv. In such cases, the policy maker (i.e., the government) can
give some incentives to the supply chain members in order to decrease the cost of
initiating a replenishment order (Kb) and the production setup cost (Kv) so that
total emissions of the chain decrease with coordination. Also, while examining
the effects of fb, fv, gb and gv, we observe that R increases above 1 in some
parameter settings. The government can give incentives including environmental
investments so that the emission parameters decrease; hence, the total emissions
of the system decrease with coordination.
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3.4.2 Numerical Illustration of Coordination Mechanisms
Proposed under Deterministic Demand and Cap-
and-Trade Mechanism
In this section eight numerical examples are presented to illustrate the coordina-
tion mechanisms proposed in Section 3.3. Each example corresponds to a specific
case as seen in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Classification of the Numerical Illustrations of the Coordination
Mechanisms in Section 3.3
Example Number Q∗d vs Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) vs Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) vs Xv(Q
∗
s)
13 Q∗d < Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) < Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) < Xv(Q
∗
s)
14 Q∗d < Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) < Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) > Xv(Q
∗
s)
8 Q∗d < Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) > Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) < Xv(Q
∗
s)
15 Q∗d < Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) > Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) > Xv(Q
∗
s)
16 Q∗d > Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) < Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) < Xv(Q
∗
s)
17 Q∗d > Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) < Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) > Xv(Q
∗
s)
18 Q∗d > Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) > Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) < Xv(Q
∗
s)
19 Q∗d > Q
∗
s Xb(Q
∗
d) > Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
d) > Xv(Q
∗
s)
During the remaining of our analysis in this section, the examples are arranged
in order based on their index number. Recall that the parameter values of Ex-
ample 8 is presented in Table 3.4 in Section 3.2.2. Also, the parameter values of
Examples 13− 19 are presented in Table 3.13. The solutions of the decentralized
model and centralized model with carbon credit sharing for each example are
presented in Tables 3.14-3.17. The application of the coordination mechanisms
proposed in Section 3.3 to each example is summarized in Table A.1 in Appendix
A.2. Finally, the costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination could be
seen in Table A.2 in Appendix A.2.
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Table 3.13: Parameter Values of Examples 13 − 19 Given D = 50, c = 12 and
pv = 8
Parameter Eg 13 Eg 14 Eg 15 Eg 16 Eg 17 Eg 18 Eg 19
P 55 70 75 75 55 75 55
pcb 2.5 3 7.5 7.5 2.5 7.5 2.5
pcs 2 2.5 6 6 2 6 2
Kb 40 100 90 500 1000 185 330
Kv 100 300 1000 1000 100 300 100
hb 3.2 2 2 1 3.2 1 3.2
hv 3 0.5 0.8 0.8 3 0.8 3
fb 90 55 90 90 90 90 90
fv 95 60 60 60 95 60 95
gb 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
gv 0.25 1.75 1.75 1.75 0.25 1.75 0.25
eb 4.5 5 5 5 4.5 5 4.5
ev 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Cb 304 350 345 350 300 350 300
Cv 350 400 400 400 350 400 350
Table 3.14: Optimal Order Quantities and Carbon Transfer Amounts of Examples
8 and 13− 19 Resulting from the Decentralized Model
Example Q∗d1 Q
∗
d2 Q1 Q2 Xb(Q
∗
d) Xv(Q
∗
d)
8 158.944 168.819 55.279 144.721 −2.319 50.91
13 77.169 72.375 74.549 241.451 0 −22.188
14 87.014 85.485 29.706 370.294 46.459 11.478
15 89.736 88.741 90 100 −0.015 14.223
16 157.28 161.245 51.676 348.324 31.781 −12.665
17 165.916 167.616 82.918 217.082 6.249 2.614
18 134.556 134.629 51.676 348.324 32.918 −0.817
19 111.678 110.195 82.918 217.082 6.615 −5.628
Table 3.15: Decentralized Costs of Examples 8 and 13− 19
Example BC(Q∗d) V C(Q
∗
d) TC(Q
∗
d)
8 979.983 422.365 1402.348
13 746.107 624.197 1370.304
14 627.826 562.04 1189.866
15 739.996 895.782 1635.778
16 644.981 848.072 1493.053
17 1153.989 653.169 1807.158
18 538.516 553.447 1091.963
19 912.817 609.709 1522.526
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Table 3.16: Optimal Order Quantities and Carbon Transfer Amounts of Examples
8 and 13− 19 Resulting from the Centralized Model with Carbon Credit Sharing
Example Q∗c1 Q
∗
c2 Q3 Q4 Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
s)
8 240.769 251.425 67.084 447.202 −20.811 62.677
13 88.197 83.12 99.758 254.992 5.929 −13.879
14 98.962 101.055 33.726 194.845 47.523 7.154
15 108.593 113.186 55.694 124.306 −1.351 7.47
16 136.768 144.254 46.515 193.485 32.742 −4.945
17 142.032 141.116 107.816 235.934 7.832 0.304
18 107.111 109.584 46.515 193.485 31.54 8.7
19 107.345 104.103 107.816 235.934 6.243 −6.448
Table 3.17: Costs of Examples 8 and 13 − 19 Resulting from the Centralized
Model with Carbon Credit Sharing
Example BC(Q∗s) V C(Q
∗
s) TC(Q
∗
s) SC(Q
∗
s) TC(Q
∗
s)− SC(Q∗s)
8 1060.773 243.757 1304.531 1273.314 31.216
13 751.935 611.658 1363.592 1360.628 2.964
14 631.725 548.595 1180.32 1180.32 0
15 763.074 827.114 1590.188 1588.162 2.026
16 648.983 822.165 1471.148 1463.731 7.417
17 1164.439 627.255 1791.694 1791.694 0
18 549.964 513.905 1063.87 1063.87 0
19 912.976 609.079 1522.055 1518.934 3.121
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Chapter 4
Supply Chain Coordination
under Deterministic Demand and
Carbon Tax or Carbon Cap
Mechanisms
In this chapter, we revisit the two-echelon system introduced in Chapter 3, and
we study the different decision making approaches under the existence of either
the tax policy or the cap policy. We present our analysis and findings for the
tax policy first. We continue with a similar discussion for the cap policy in this
chapter.
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4.1 Problem Definition and Analysis under De-
terministic Demand and Carbon Tax Mech-
anism
4.1.1 Problem Definition under Deterministic Demand
and Carbon Tax Mechanism
An external carbon tax is applied by the regulatory agencies. A linear tax sched-
ule is adapted. That is, the buyer and the vendor pay a monetary amount for
each unit of carbon emitted. We consider a general case in which the buyer’s
and the vendor’s tax rates are different, allowing for settings where the parties
operate in different geographical locations (e.g., different countries) and/or in
different industries.
Two models are proposed, which are the decentralized and the centralized
models. In the decentralized model, buyer decides the order quantity that mini-
mizes his/her cost. In the centralized model, the order quantity that minimizes
the total cost of the system (i.e., the total cost of the buyer and the vendor) is
determined. The notation used in this section is summarized in Table 4.1.
In the decentralized model, buyer solves the following replenishment problem
to decide the order quantity that minimizes his/her costs:
min BC(Q) =
(Kb + tbfb)D
Q
+
(hb + tbgb)Q
2
+ (c+ tbeb)D
Q ≥ 0,
where tbfb is the emission tax paid per replenishment, tbgb is the emission tax
paid per unit held in inventory per unit time and tbeb is the emission tax paid
per unit ordered by the buyer.
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Table 4.1: Problem Parameters and Decision Variables under Deterministic De-
mand and Carbon Tax Mechanisms
Buyer’s Parameters
D annual demand rate
Kb fixed cost of ordering
hb cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
c unit purchasing cost
fb fixed amount of carbon emission at each ordering
gb carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
eb carbon emission amount due to unit procurement
Vendor’s Parameters
P annual production rate (P > D)
Kv fixed cost per production run
hv cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
pv unit production cost
fv fixed amount of carbon emission at each production setup
gv carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
ev carbon emission amount due to producing one unit
Policy Parameters
tb Cost of unit carbon emission to the buyer (i.e., carbon tax paid by
the buyer for a unit emission)
tv Cost of unit carbon emission to the vendor (i.e., carbon tax paid by
the vendor for a unit emission)
Decision Variables
Q buyer’s order quantity (vendor’s production lot size)
Functions and Optimal Values of Decision Variables
BC(Q) buyer’s average annual costs as a function of Q
V C(Q) vendor’s average annual costs as a function of Q
TC(Q) total average annual costs as a function of Q
(TC(Q) = BC(Q) + TC(Q))
Q∗d optimal order quantity as a result of the decentralized model
Q∗c optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model
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Vendor’s average annual cost as a function of Q, is given by
V C(Q) =
(Kv + tvfv)D
Q
+
(hv + tvgv)QD
2P
+ (pv + tvev)D, (4.1)
where tvfv is the emission tax paid per production run, tvgv is the emission tax
paid per unit held in inventory per unit time and tvev is the emission tax paid
per unit produced by the vendor.
In the centralized model, the order quantity that minimizes the total cost of
the system (i.e, the total cost of the buyer and the vendor) is determined. In
mathematical terms, the following problem is solved.
min TC(Q) =
(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
Q
+
[hb + tbgb +
D
P
(hv + tvgv)]Q
2
+ (c+ pv + tbeb + tvev)D
Q ≥ 0.
4.1.2 Analysis of the Decentralized and the Centralized
Models under Deterministic Demand and Carbon
Tax Mechanism
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the cen-
tralized model under carbon tax mechanism to find the cost minimizing order
quantities Q∗d and Q
∗
c , respectively. We also present some properties related to
Q∗d, Q
∗
c and average annual tax amounts of the buyer and the vendor.
Let us define the average annual tax amounts of the buyer, vendor and the
system, which are presented in Equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), and defined in
Table 4.2.
BT (Q) =
tbfbD
Q
+
tbgbQ
2
+ tbebD, (4.2)
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Table 4.2: Additional Notation for Carbon Tax Mechanism under Deterministic
Demand
BT (Q): Average annual tax paid by the buyer as a function of order
size Q
V T (Q): Average annual tax paid by the vendor as a function of order
size Q
TT (Q): Average annual tax paid by the buyer-vendor system as a
function of order size Q
V T (Q) =
tvfvD
Q
+
tvgvQD
2P
+ tvevD, (4.3)
TT (Q) =
(tbfb + tvfv)D
Q
+ (tbgb +
tvgvD
P
)
Q
2
+ (tbeb + tvev)D. (4.4)
Notice here that Equation (4.4) is obtained by summing up Equations (4.2)
and (4.3).
In Lemma 17 and Proposition 2, we present the order quantities that minimize
the buyer’s average annual taxes and costs, respectively.
Lemma 17 The order quantity that minimizes the average annual taxes of the
buyer (i.e., Qtd) is given by
Qtd =
√
2fbD
gb
. (4.5)
Proof: Since (4.2) is a strictly convex function in Q, Qtd is obtained from the
first order condition. 
As the average annual taxes are linearly proportional to average annual emis-
sions, Qtd, as given by Expression (4.5), also minimizes the latter.
Proposition 2 Buyer’s optimal order quantity resulting from the decentralized
model is given by
Q∗d =
√
2(Kb + tbfb)D
hb + tbgb
. (4.6)
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Proof: Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function in Q, Q∗d is obtained from the
first order condition. 
Observe that, as tb increases, the cost minimizing order quantity Q
∗
d ap-
proaches to the emission optimal order quantity Qtd. We use Proposition 2 to find
the minimum average annual cost of the buyer under the decentralized model and
present it in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 The average annual cost of the buyer under the optimal solution of
the decentralized model is given by
BC(Q∗d) =
√
2(Kb + tbfb)D(hb + tbgb) + (c+ tbeb)D. (4.7)
Proof: Obtained by plugging (4.6) in BC(Q). 
Similarly, the vendor’s average annual cost under the decentralized model
(V C(Q∗d)) can be found by plugging Q
∗
d in (4.1). Also, the total average annual
cost of the system under the decentralized model is TC(Q∗d) = BC(Q
∗
d)+V C(Q
∗
d).
Similar to Lemma 17, we find the order quantity that minimizes the average
annual taxes of the system and present it in the following lemma.
Lemma 18 The order quantity that minimizes the average annual taxes of the
system (i.e., Qtc) is given by
Qtc =
√
2(tbfb + tvfv)D
tbgb +
tvgvD
P
. (4.8)
Proof: Since (4.4) is a strictly convex function in Q, Qtc is obtained from the
first order condition. 
Since BC(Q) and TC(Q) follow a similar structure, the order quantity that
minimizes the average annual cost of the system is found with a similar method
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used in Proposition 2. The centralized optimal solution is presented in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 11 Buyer’s optimal order quantity resulting from the centralized model
is given by
Q∗c =
√
2(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)
D
P
. (4.9)
Proof: Since TC(Q) is a strictly convex function in Q, Q∗c is obtained from the
first order condition. 
Note that, as tv gets larger, Q
∗
c approaches to
√
2fvD
gv
, which is the minimizer
of Expression (4.3) (i.e., vendor’s emission optimal order quantity). Similarly, as
tb gets larger, Q
∗
c approaches to
√
2fbD
gb
, which is the buyer’s emission optimal
order quantity. In the next corollary, we present the average annual cost of the
system resulting from the optimal solution of the centralized model.
Corollary 6 The total average annual cost of the system under the centralized
model is given by
TC(Q∗c) =
√
2(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
[
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)
D
P
]
+ (c+ pv + tbeb + tvev)D.
(4.10)
Proof: Obtained by plugging (4.9) in TC(Q). 
Similarly, the buyer’s average annual cost (BC(Q∗c)) and the vendor’s average
annual cost (V C(Q∗c)) under the centralized model can be found by plugging Q
∗
c
in BC(Q) and (4.1), respectively.
In the next proposition, we present a further property of Q∗d and Q
∗
c .
Proposition 3 Q∗d 6 Q∗c if and only if Kb+tbfbhb+tbgb 6
Kv+tvfv
hv+tvgv
P
D
.
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Proof: Using Equations (4.6) and (4.9), we have Q∗d 6 Q∗c if and only if√
2(Kb + tbfb)D
hb + tbgb
6
√
2(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)
D
P
.
Taking the square of both sides leads to
2(Kb + tbfb)D
hb + tbgb
6 2(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)
D
P
.
This, in turn, implies
Kbhb +Kbtbgb +Kbhv
D
P
+Kbtvgv
D
P
+ tbfbhb + t
2
bfbgb + hvtbfb
D
P
+ tbfbtvgv
D
P
6 Kbhb +Kvhb + hbtbfb + hbtvfv +Kbtbgb +Kvtbgb + t2bfbgb + tbgbtvgv.
After some cancelations and rearrangement of terms, we get
(Kb + tbfb)(hv + tvgv)
D
P
6 (Kv + tvfv)(hb + tbgb).
This results in
Kb + tbfb
hb + tbgb
6 Kv + tvfv
hv + tvgv
P
D
.

Using Equations (4.2) and (4.3), we present the conditions under which the
average annual taxes of the buyer and the vendor decrease under the centralized
optimal solution in Propositions 4 and 5, respectively.
Proposition 4 BT (Q∗c) 6 BT (Q∗d) if and only if (Q∗d−Q∗c)(2fbD−gbQ∗cQ∗d) 6 0.
Proof: It follows from Equation (4.2), that BT (Q∗c) 6 BT (Q∗d) if and only if
tbfbD
Q∗c
+
tbgbQ
∗
c
2
+ tbebD 6
tbfbD
Q∗d
+
tbgbQ
∗
d
2
+ tbebD.
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After canceling some terms and taking others into common parentheses, we get
fbD(
1
Q∗c
− 1
Q∗d
) +
gb
2
(Q∗c −Q∗d) 6 0.
This, in turn, implies
1
2Q∗cQ
∗
d
(Q∗d −Q∗c)(2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d) 6 0.
Since 1
2Q∗cQ∗d
> 0, the above expression reduces to
(Q∗d −Q∗c)(2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d) 6 0.

Proposition 5 V T (Q∗d) > V T (Q∗c) if and only if (Q∗c−Q∗d)(2fvP−gvQ∗cQ∗d) > 0.
Proof: Using Equation (4.3), we have V T (Q∗d) > V T (Q∗c) if and only if
tvfvD
Q∗d
+
tvgvQ
∗
dD
2P
+ tvevD >
tvfvD
Q∗c
+
tvgvQ
∗
cD
2P
+ tvevD.
The above inequality can further be reduced to
fvD(
1
Q∗d
− 1
Q∗c
) +
gvD
2P
(Q∗d −Q∗c) > 0.
This, in turn, implies
D
2Q∗cQ
∗
d
(Q∗c −Q∗d)(2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d) > 0.
Since D
2Q∗cQ∗d
> 0, the above expression reduces to
(Q∗c −Q∗d)(2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d) > 0.

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Up until this point, we have taken the perspective of the buyer-vendor system
in comparing the different solution approaches. We have obtained results on
how the buyer’s and the vendor’s annual costs differ under the decentralized and
centralized solutions. In the next two propositions, we take the perspective of
the regulator or the government who collects taxes. We compare the average
annual amount of taxes collected by the government under the decentralized and
centralized solutions.
Proposition 6 Suppose Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
6 Kv+tvfv
hv+tvgv
P
D
.
i) If tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
6 Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
, then the government collects no less taxes in the
centralized solution than it does in the decentralized solution.
ii) If tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
> Kb+Kv+tbfb+tvfv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv)
D
P
, then the government collects no less taxes
in the decentralized solution than it does in the centralized solution.
Proof:
i) It follows from Proposition 3 that Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
6 Kv+tvfv
hv+tvgv
P
D
is equivalent to Q∗d ≤
Q∗c . Multiplying both sides of the inequality
tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
6 Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
with 2D
and taking the square root of both sides, we obtain√
2(tbfb + tvfv)D
tbgb +
tvgvD
P
6
√
2(Kb + tbfb)D
hb + tbgb
,
which implies Qtc ≤ Q∗d. Combining this result with the fact that Q∗d ≤ Q∗c
implies Qtc ≤ Q∗d ≤ Q∗c . Since Expression (4.4) is a strictly convex function,
this implies TT (Q∗c) ≥ TT (Q∗d). That is, in the centralized solution, the
government collects at least as much taxes as it collects in the decentralized
solution.
ii) Again, due to Proposition 3, we know that Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
6 Kv+tvfv
hv+tvgv
P
D
implies Q∗d ≤
Q∗c . Multiplying both sides of the inequality
tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
> Kb+Kv+tbfb+tvfv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv)
D
P
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with 2D and taking the square root of both sides, we obtain√
2(tbfb + tvfv)D
tbgb +
tvgvD
P
>
√
2(Kb +Kv + tbfb + tvfv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)
D
P
,
which is equivalent to Qtc ≥ Q∗c . Combining this result with the fact that
Q∗d ≤ Q∗c implies Qtc ≥ Q∗c ≥ Q∗d. Since Expression (4.4) is a strictly convex
function, this implies TT (Q∗d) ≥ TT (Q∗c). That is, in the decentralized
solution, the government collects at least as much taxes as it collects in the
centralized solution. 
Proposition 7 Suppose Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
> Kv+tvfv
hv+tvgv
P
D
.
i) If tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
> Kb+tbfb
hb+tbgb
, then the government collects more taxes in the cen-
tralized solution than it does in the decentralized solution.
ii) If tbfb+tvfv
tbgb+
tvgvD
P
6 Kb+Kv+tbfb+tvfv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv)
D
P
, then the government collects more taxes
in the decentralized solution than it does in the centralized solution.
Proof: The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Proposition 6 and is
omitted. 
Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 imply that there are cases in which coor-
dination of the buyer-vendor system may not be good from the perspective of
a government or a regulator who wants to increase total annual average taxes
collected. In Table 4.3, we present some numerical instances to illustrate our an-
alytical results for the buyer-vendor coordination problem under the tax policy.
In the last two columns of the table, we report the decentralized and the central-
ized optimum quantities. In Table 4.4, we present the buyer’s, vendor’s and the
system’s average annual taxes resulting from the decentralized and the centralized
solutions to the examples in Table 4.3. Examples 20, 21 and 22 are to illustrate
the first part of Proposition 6. As it can be observed from Table 4.4, in these
examples, government collects more taxes in the centralized solution than it does
in the decentralized solution (i.e., TT (Q∗c) > TT (Q
∗
d)). These examples differ in
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how the individual parties’ average annual taxes change in the two solutions. For
example, in Example 20, while BT (Q∗d) > BT (Q
∗
c) and V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c), in
Example 21, we have BT (Q∗d) < BT (Q
∗
c) and V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c). The next three
examples (those are Examples 23, 24, 25) illustrate the second part of Proposition
6. In these examples, government collects more taxes in the decentralized solution
than it does in the centralized solution. Likewise, Examples 26, 27 and 28 illus-
trate the first part of Proposition 7. As it can be seen from Table 4.4, in these
examples, government collects more taxes in the centralized solution. Finally,
the second part of Proposition 7 is illustrated with Examples 29, 30 and 31, in
which the average annual taxes collected by the government in the decentralized
solution are more.
Since the average annual taxes collected by the government is linearly propor-
tional to the total average annual emissions, the instances in which TT (Q∗c) >
TT (Q∗d) coincide with the cases where coordination is not good for the environ-
ment.
Table 4.3: Numerical Instances for Illustrating Analytical Results under the Tax
Mechanism (hv = 1.5, c = 9, pv = 6, eb = 5 and ev = 6 in all instances)
Example
Index D P Kb Kv hb fb fv gb gv tb tv Q
∗
d Q
∗
c
20 90 100 200 600 2 30 60 0.2 0.75 2 3 139.642 180.043
21 50 100 700 600 2 60 90 1 0.75 2 3 143.178 169.605
22 50 100 700 600 2 60 90 1 0.6 2 3 143.178 172.949
23 50 100 40 60 2 70 90 1 0.75 2 3 67.082 93.171
24 90 100 200 600 2 100 120 0.15 0.75 2 3 176.930 207.693
25 50 100 40 60 2 30 120 3 2 2 3 35.355 66.525
26 40 60 400 60 2 300 60 0.6 0.2 4 2 170.561 158.523
27 500 600 800 60 1.7 750 310 1 0.75 2 3 788.430 694.299
28 550 600 450 70 2 300 80 1.7 0.2 4 2 454.148 442.915
29 50 60 900 60 1.7 60 90 1 0.75 2 3 166.034 140.642
30 40 90 800 60 1.7 60 90 1 0.7 2 3 141.039 137.361
31 500 600 800 60 1.7 400 90 1 0.75 2 3 657.596 531.774
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Table 4.4: Average Annual Taxes Resulting from the Decentralized and the Cen-
tralized Solutions of Instances in Table 4.3
Example
Index BT (Q∗d) V T (Q
∗
d) TT (Q
∗
d) BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
c) TT (Q
∗
c)
20 966.599 1877.399 2843.997 966.001 1892.272 2858.274
21 685.084 1074.826 1759.91 704.982 1075 1779.981
22 685.084 1058.718 1743.802 707.642 1055.885 1763.526
23 671.432 1138.98 1810.412 668.302 1097.303 1765.605
24 1028.275 1982.265 3010.539 1017.82 1986.289 3004.109
25 690.919 1462.15 2153.069 744.670 1270.363 2015.033
26 1286.098 530.884 1816.982 1293.023 531.416 1824.439
27 6739.688 10328.93 17068.62 6774.525 10320.65 17095.17
28 13997.37 6877.03 20874.4 13996.04 6879.885 20875.92
29 702.172 1136.966 1839.138 683.304 1127.84 1811.144
30 575.072 862.393 1437.465 572.305 862.727 1435.032
31 6265.872 9281.789 16087.66 6283.973 9752.405 16036.38
4.1.3 Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Sys-
tem under Carbon Tax Mechanism
In this section, coordination mechanisms are proposed under carbon tax mecha-
nism so that the buyer’s loss from the centralized solution is compensated. Thus,
the buyer is willing to order the optimal order quantity of the centralized model.
Let us define
BC(Q): Cost of the buyer after coordination as a function of order size Q
Theorem 12 Suppose Q∗d < Q
∗
c. Also, suppose at least one of the following
conditions holds.
• 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0
• 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d 6 0
If 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0 holds, BT (Q∗c) 6 BT (Q∗d) from Proposition 4 as Q∗d <
Q∗c. Thus, the buyer’s average annual tax does not increase under centralized
solution and he/she does not need to be compensated by paying his/her taxes.
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Similarly, if 2fvP−gvQ∗cQ∗d 6 0 holds, V T (Q∗c) > V T (Q∗d) from from Proposition
5 as Q∗d < Q
∗
c. Thus, the vendor’s average annual tax does not decrease under
centralized solution and it is not plausible for the vendor to pay the buyer’s taxes
to compensate his/her loss.
Then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a
minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q) if Q < Q∗c
BC(Q)− d×D if Q > Q∗c
where d =
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer.
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
c, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer, Q
∗
c coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.1 for the proof. 
Next, we present a similar coordination mechanism, now for the case of Q∗d >
Q∗c .
Theorem 13 Suppose Q∗d > Q
∗
c. Also, suppose at least one of the following
conditions holds.
• 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 6 0
• 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0
If 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 6 0 holds, BT (Q∗c) 6 BT (Q∗d) from Proposition 4 as Q∗d >
Q∗c. Thus, the buyer’s average annual tax does not increase under centralized
solution and he/she does not need to be compensated by paying his/her taxes.
Similarly, if 2fvP−gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0 holds, V T (Q∗c) > V T (Q∗d) from from Proposition
5 as Q∗d > Q
∗
c. Thus, the vendor’s average annual tax does not decrease under
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centralized solution and it is not plausible for the vendor to pay the buyer’s taxes
to compensate his/her loss.
Then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a
minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q)− d×D if Q 6 Q∗c
BC(Q) if Q > Q∗c
where d =
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer.
That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
c, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
less than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer, Q
∗
c coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 12. Q∗d < Q
∗
c is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
c , Q < Q
∗
c is replaced with Q > Q
∗
c and Q > Q∗c is replaced with Q 6 Q∗c .

Theorem 12 and Theorem 13 have the following implication. When the buyer’s
average annual tax decreases (i.e., he/she does not need to be compensated by
tax) and/or the vendor’s average annual tax increases (i.e., it is not plausible for
the vendor to pay buyer’s tax to compensate his/her loss) under the centralized
solution, channel coordination is achieved by giving quantity discount to the
buyer.
Theorem 14 Suppose min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} > BC(Q∗c)
−BC(Q∗d). That is, buyer’s average annual tax increases and vendor’s average
annual tax decreases by an amount at least as large as the buyer’s loss from the
centralized solution.
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Hence, if Q∗d < Q
∗
c, then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the
buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q) if Q < Q∗c
BC(Q) +BC(Q∗d)−BC(Q∗c) if Q > Q∗c
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
c, if the vendor pays BC(Q
∗
C) − BC(Q∗d) amount of
buyer’s average annual tax for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, Q
∗
c coor-
dinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.2 for the proof. 
Next, we present a similar coordination mechanism, now for the case of Q∗d >
Q∗c .
Theorem 15 Suppose min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} > BC(Q∗c)
−BC(Q∗d). That is, buyer’s average annual tax increases and vendor’s average
annual tax decreases by an amount at least as large as the buyer’s loss from
the centralized solution. Hence, if Q∗d > Q
∗
c, then the following coordination
mechanism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d)
realized at Q∗c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q) +BC(Q∗d)−BC(Q∗c) if Q 6 Q∗c
BC(Q) if Q > Q∗c
That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
c, if the vendor pays BC(Q
∗
C) − BC(Q∗d) amount of
buyer’s average annual tax for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c, Q
∗
c coordinates
the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 14. Q∗d < Q
∗
c is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
c , Q < Q
∗
c is replaced with Q > Q
∗
c and Q > Q∗c is replaced with Q 6 Q∗c .

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Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 have the following implication. If the buyer’s
average annual tax increases and the vendor’s average annual tax decreases and
the decrease in the vendor’s taxes is enough to compensate the buyer’s loss from
ordering the centralized optimal quantity, the vendor pays some amount of the
buyer’s taxes. The monetary value of the payment is equal to the difference
between the buyer’s costs in the centralized and the decentralized solutions.
Theorem 16 Suppose Q∗d < Q
∗
c. Also, suppose the following conditions hold.
• 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 6 0
• 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0
• min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} < BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
If 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 6 0 and Q∗d < Q∗c, BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) from Proposi-
tion 4. Similarly, if 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0 and Q∗d < Q∗c, V T (Q∗c) 6 V T (Q∗d)
from Proposition 5. Since min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} 6
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d), either the vendor’s gain in average annual taxes is not suffi-
cient to compensate the buyer’s loss in centralized solution or the buyer’s loss is
greater than his/her loss in average annual taxes in centralized solution.
Then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a
minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q) if Q < Q∗c
BC(Q)− d¯×D −min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}
if Q > Q∗c
where d¯ = [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)−min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}]/
D is the unit discount given and min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} is
the amount of buyer’s average annual tax which is paid by the vendor.
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
c, if the vendor pays
min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} amount of vendor’s annual tax and
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gives a unit discount d¯ for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer,
Q∗c coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.3 for the proof. 
Next, we present a similar coordination mechanism, now for the case of Q∗d >
Q∗c .
Theorem 17 Suppose Q∗d > Q
∗
c. Also, suppose the following conditions hold.
• 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0
• 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d 6 0
• min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} < BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
If 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0 and Q∗d > Q∗c, BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) from Proposi-
tion 4. Similarly, if 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d 6 0 and Q∗d > Q∗c, V T (Q∗c) 6 V T (Q∗d)
from Proposition 5. Since min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} 6
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d), either the vendor’s gain in average annual taxes is not suffi-
cient to compensate the buyer’s loss in centralized solution or the buyer’s loss is
greater than his/her loss in average annual taxes in centralized solution.
Then the following coordination mechanism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a
minimum function value of BC(Q∗d) realized at Q
∗
c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q)− d¯×D −min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}
if Q 6 Q∗c
BC(Q) if Q > Q∗c
where d¯ = [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)−min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}]/
D is the unit discount given and min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} is
the amount of buyer’s average annual tax which is paid by the vendor.
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That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
c, if the vendor pays
min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} amount of vendor’s annual tax and
gives a unit discount d¯ for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer, Q
∗
c
coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 16. Q∗d < Q
∗
c is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
c , Q < Q
∗
c is replaced with Q > Q
∗
c and Q > Q∗c is replaced with Q 6 Q∗c .

Theorem 16 and Theorem 17 have the following implication. If the buyer’s
average annual tax increases and the vendor’s average annual tax decreases, the
vendor pays some amount of the buyer’s taxes. However, if the decrease in the
vendor’s taxes is not enough to compensate the buyer’s loss from ordering the cen-
tralized optimal quantity or the increase in buyer’s taxes is greater than his/her
loss in average annual taxes, the remaining loss of the buyer is satisfied by quan-
tity discount.
In Theorems 12 to 17, giving an amount more than the vendor’s gain in taxes
or the buyer’s loss in taxes from the centralized solution to the buyer is not desired
as it may not be practical in practice.
4.1.4 Numerical Analysis under Deterministic Demand
and Carbon Tax Mechanism
In this section, coordination mechanisms proposed for carbon tax mechanism in
Section 4.1.3 are illustrated with numerical examples. For this purpose, let us
define the numerical instance in Table 4.5 in addition to the ones presented in
Table 4.3. The decentralized and the centralized solutions of the instance and
their resulting average annual taxes are presented in Table 4.6.
The classification of the examples illustrated in this section and their index
numbers are presented in Table 4.7. Note here that the decentralized and the
centralized solutions of the instances 20, 21, 23, 26, 29, 30 and 31 and their
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Table 4.5: Additional Numerical Instance for Illustrating Coordination Mecha-
nisms under the Tax Mechanism
Example
Index D P tb tv Kb Kv hb hv c pv fb fv gb gv eb ev
32 50 100 2 3 40 60 2 1.5 9 60 30 60 2 3 5 6
Table 4.6: The Decentralized and the Centralized Solutions and the Resulting
Average Annual Taxes for the Instance in Table 4.5
Example
Index Q∗d BT (Q
∗
d) V T (Q
∗
d) TT (Q
∗
d)
32
35.3553 690.9188 1207.5915 1898.5103
Q∗c BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
c) TT (Q
∗
c)
53.7924 717.1471 1207.5915 1865.1456
resulting average annual taxes are presented in Table 4.4 in Section 4.1.2. During
the remaining of our analysis in this section, the examples are arranged in order
based on their index number.
Table 4.7: Classification of Examples Illustrated for Coordination Mechanisms
under Deterministic Demand and Carbon Tax Mechanism
Q∗d vs Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) vs BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) vs V T (Q
∗
c) Example Index
Q∗d < Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) > BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) > V T (Q
∗
c) 23
Q∗d > Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) > BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) > V T (Q
∗
c) 29
Q∗d < Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) > BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c) 20
Q∗d > Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) > BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c) 30
Q∗d < Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) < BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c) 21
Q∗d > Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) < BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) < V T (Q
∗
c) 26
Q∗d < Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) < BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) > V T (Q
∗
c) 32
Q∗d > Q
∗
c BT (Q
∗
d) < BT (Q
∗
c) V T (Q
∗
d) > V T (Q
∗
c) 31
The costs of the buyer, vendor and the system under centralized and the
decentralized solutions for each example illustrated in this section are presented
in Table 4.9. Also, the values of the expressions that indicate the increase or
decrease in buyer’s and vendor’s taxes can be seen in Table 4.8. The application
of coordination mechanisms proposed in Section 4.1.3 to each example is described
in Appendix A.4 and summarized in Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A.4.
100
Table 4.8: 2fbD−gbQ∗cQ∗d and 2fvP −gvQ∗cQ∗d Values of the Examples Illustrated
for Coordinated Mechanisms under Deterministic Demand and Tax Mechanism
Example 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d
20 371.6647045 −6856.257358
21 −18283.78322 −212.8374178
23 749.8936179 13312.42021
26 7777.377649 1792.459216
29 −17351.49985 −6713.624888
30 −14573.14417 2638.799083
31 50307.38886 −154269.4584
32 −2705.54042 8196.306386
Table 4.9: Costs of the Examples Illustrated for Coordinated Mechanisms under
Deterministic Demand and Tax Mechanism Resulting from the Decentralized and
Centralized Solutions
Example BC(Q∗d) V C(Q
∗
d) TC(Q
∗
d) BC(Q
∗
c) V C(Q
∗
c) TC(Q
∗
c)
20 2045.1418 2898.3592 4943.501 2056.0207 2853.7293 4909.75
21 1522.7128 1638.0468 3160.7596 1530.9483 1615.4828 3146.4311
23 1218.3282 1508.8569 2727.185 1232.9387 1464.4415 2697.3801
26 1910.4665 150.2354 2060.702 1912.4776 145.817 2058.2947
29 1564.3289 1558.8062 3123.135 1572.8104 1537.0724 3109.8828
30 1281.8429 1166.4223 2448.2652 1282.02501 1165.9859 2448.011
31 11933.105 13278.4076 25211.5126 11988.1801 13141.1793 25129.3595
32 1232.8427 1605.7025 2838.5452 1258.1194 1523.9407 2782.0601
4.2 Problem Definition and Analysis under De-
terministic Demand and Carbon Cap Mech-
anism
4.2.1 Problem Definition under Deterministic Demand
and Carbon Cap Mechanism
We consider the inventory problem introduced earlier, and now, we assume the
existence of a cap mechanism. Under the carbon cap mechanism, the buyer
and the vendor have carbon caps that are upper limits on the average annual
carbon emissions. In the decentralized model, buyer decides the order quantity
that minimizes his/her cost subject to the carbon emission constraints. In his/her
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independent decisions, if the buyer does not give any consideration to the vendor’s
emission constraint, then he/she may end up with an order quantity that is
infeasible for the vendor to supply. Since this scenario is not desirable by the
vendor, it is simply natural for the vendor to make his/her constraints be known
by the buyer. Therefore, we assume that vendor passes the information regarding
the feasible lot sizes he/she can provide to the buyer at each delivery before the
buyer makes an ordering decision. In the centralized model, the order quantity
that minimizes the total average annual cost of the system is minimized subject
to both parties’ constraints.
The notation used under carbon cap mechanism is similar to the notation
used under carbon tax policy in Section 4.1.1, which could be seen in Table 4.1.
The only difference is due to the policy parameters which are listed below.
Table 4.10: Additional Notation for Carbon Cap Mechanism under Deterministic
Demand
Policy Parameters
Cb buyer’s annual carbon emission cap
Cv vendor’s annual carbon emission cap
In the decentralized model, buyer implicitly solves the following problem:
min BC(Q) =
KbD
Q
+
hbQ
2
+ cD (4.11)
s.t.
fbD
Q
+
gbQ
2
+ ebD 6 Cb (4.12)
fvD
Q
+
gvDQ
2P
+ evD 6 Cv (4.13)
Q ≥ 0.
Expression (4.13) is, in fact, the vendor’s emission constraint. However, the
buyer in this setting does not know vendor’s specific parameters such as fv, gv,
ev, Cv. Instead, the vendor tells the buyer it is only possible for him/her to
supply Q such that Q3 ≤ Q ≤ Q4, where Q3 and Q4 are the two quantities that
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satisfy fvD
Q
+ gvDQ
2P
+ evD = Cv. Mainly, all Q within the interval [Q3, Q4] satisfy
the vendor’s emission constraint, and hence, feasible for the vendor to deliver.
Similarly, Expression (4.12) implies that it is only feasible for the buyer to order
Q, where Q ∈ [Q1, Q2]. Again, Q1 and Q2 are the two quantities that satisfy
fbD
Q
+ gbQ
2
+ ebD = Cb. Specific expressions for Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 are as given
below:
Q1 =
Cb − ebD −
√
(ebD − Cb)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
, (4.14)
Q2 =
Cb − ebD +
√
(ebD − Cb)2 − 2gbfbD
gb
, (4.15)
Q3 =
P (Cv − evD)−
√
[P (evD − Cv)]2 − 2gvfvPD2
gvD
, (4.16)
Q4 =
P (Cv − evD) +
√
[P (evD − Cv)]2 − 2gvfvPD2
gvD
. (4.17)
The decentralized model then turns out to be:
min BC(Q) =
KbD
Q
+
hbQ
2
+ cD (4.18)
s.t. Q > max {Q1, Q3} (4.19)
Q 6 min {Q2, Q4} (4.20)
Q ≥ 0.
Here, it is assumed that max {Q1, Q3} 6 min {Q2, Q4} in order for the feasible
region not to be empty.
Vendor’s average annual cost as a function of Q is given by
V C(Q) =
KvD
Q
+
hvDQ
2P
+ pvD. (4.21)
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In the centralized model, the order quantity that minimizes the total cost of
the system (i.e, the total cost of the buyer and the vendor) is determined. In
mathematical terms, the following problem is solved.
min TC(Q) =
(Kb +Kv)D
Q
+
(
hb +
hvD
P
)
Q
2
+ (pv + c)D (4.22)
s.t. Q > max {Q1, Q3} (4.23)
Q 6 min {Q2, Q4} (4.24)
Q ≥ 0.
4.2.2 Analysis of the Decentralized Model and the Cen-
tralized Model under Deterministic Demand and
Carbon Cap Mechanism
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the central-
ized model under carbon cap mechanism to find Q∗d and Q
∗
c . We further present
some properties related to Q∗d and Q
∗
c .
We know from Expression (4.11) that the optimal order quantity under the
decentralized model when the emission constraints are not considered (i.e., Q0d,
namely, “the cost optimal order quantity” under the decentralized model) is
Q0d =
√
2KbD
hb
. (4.25)
Since Expression (4.11) is a strictly convex function in Q, Q0d is obtained from
the first order condition.
Using the same reasoning, the emission optimal quantity is presented in the
next lemma.
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Lemma 19 The order quantity that minimizes the total average annual emis-
sions of the system (i.e., Qˆd, namely, “the emission optimal order quantity” under
the decentralized model) is given by
Qˆd =
√
2(fb + fv)D
gb +
gvD
P
. (4.26)
Proof: Total average annual emissions of the system is obtained by summing the
left hand sides of the Equations (4.12) and (4.13). Since the sum of two convex
functions is also a convex function, Qˆd is obtained from the first order condition.

Next, we provide the solution of the buyer’s replenishment problem under
carbon capacity constraints.
Theorem 18 The optimal order quantity resulting from the decentralized model
is given by
Q∗d =

max {Q1, Q3} if Q0d < max {Q1, Q3}
Q0d if max {Q1, Q3} 6 Q0d 6 min {Q2, Q4}
min {Q2, Q4} if Q0d > min {Q2, Q4}
(4.27)
Proof: From constraints (4.19) and (4.20), the optimal order quantity resulting
from the decentralized model (i.e., Q∗d) should satisfy max {Q1, Q3} 6 Q∗d 6
min {Q2, Q4}. Hence, if max {Q1, Q3} 6 Q0d 6 min {Q2, Q4}, Q∗d = Q0d. If
Q0d 6 max {Q1, Q3}, Q∗d = max {Q1, Q3} since Expression (4.11) is a strictly
convex function in Q and a lower value than max {Q1, Q3} will result in a higher
cost. Similarly, if Q0d > min {Q2, Q4}, Q∗d = min {Q2, Q4} since (4.11) is a strictly
convex function in Q and a higher value than min {Q2, Q4} will result in a higher
cost. 
The average annual cost of the buyer (BC(Q∗d)) and the vendor (V C(Q
∗
d))
under the optimal solution of the decentralized model are obtained by plugging
Expression (4.27) in Expressions (4.11) and (4.21), respectively. Also, the total
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average annual cost of the system under the optimal solution of the decentralized
model is TC(Q∗d) = BC(Q
∗
d) + V C(Q
∗
d).
As BC(Q) and TC(Q) have identical structural properties and the constraints
of the decentralized model and the centralized model are the same, a similar
analysis can be done for the centralized model. As a result, the cost optimal
order quantity, the emission optimal order quantity and the optimal solution
under the centralized model are presented in Lemma 20, Lemma 21 and Theorem
19, respectively.
Lemma 20 The optimal order quantity under the centralized model when emis-
sions are not considered (i.e., Q0c, namely, “the cost optimal order quantity” under
the centralized model) is given by
Q0c =
√
2(Kb +Kv)D
hb +
hvD
P
. (4.28)
Proof: Since TC(Q) is a strictly convex function in Q, Q0c is obtained from the
first order condition. 
Lemma 21 The order quantity that minimizes the total average annual emis-
sions of the system (i.e., Qˆc, namely, “the emission optimal order quantity” under
the centralized model) is given by
Qˆc =
√
2(fb + fv)D
gb +
gvD
P
. (4.29)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 19 and is omitted. 
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Theorem 19 The optimal order quantity resulting from the centralized model is
given by
Q∗c =

max {Q1, Q3} if Q0c < max {Q1, Q3}
Q0c if max {Q1, Q3} 6 Q0c 6 min {Q2, Q4}
min {Q2, Q4} if Q0c > min {Q2, Q4}
(4.30)
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 18 and is omitted. 
The average annual cost of the system under the optimal solution of the
centralized model is obtained by plugging Expression (4.30) in the expression for
TC(Q). Similarly, the average annual cost of the buyer (BC(Q∗c)) and the vendor
(V C(Q∗c)) under the optimal solution of the centralized model are obtained by
plugging Expression (4.30) in Expressions (4.11) and (4.21), respectively.
We provide a further property of Q∗d and Q
∗
c in Proposition 8 presented below.
Proposition 8 Q∗d 6 Q∗c if one of the following conditions holds:
i) Kb
Kv
≤ hbP
hvD
,
ii) Kb
Kv
> hbP
hvD
and Q0c ≥ min {Q2, Q4},
iii) Kb
Kv
> hbP
hvD
and Q0d ≤ max {Q1, Q3}.
Proof:
i) Due to the fact that Kb
Kv
≤ hbP
hvD
, Expressions (4.25) and (4.28) jointly imply
that Q0d ≤ Q0c . Now let us consider the three possible regions that Q0c could
fall into, which lead to different realizations of Q∗c , as given by Theorem
19. Let us first assume that Q0c < max {Q1, Q3}. In this case, Theorem
19 implies Q∗c = max {Q1, Q3}. Since Q0d ≤ Q0c , it follows that Q0d <
max {Q1, Q3}, which in turn leads us to conclude that Q∗d = max {Q1, Q3}
based on Theorem 18. Therefore, if Q0c < max {Q1, Q3}, we have Q∗c = Q∗d.
Now, let us consider the second possible region that Q0c could fall into; that
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is, let us assume max {Q1, Q3} ≤ Q0c ≤ min {Q2, Q4} so that Q∗c = Q0c .
Since Q0d ≤ Q0c , there are two possible realizations of Q∗d depending on
whether max {Q1, Q3} ≤ Q0d ≤ Q0c or Q0d < max {Q1, Q3}. Theorem 18
implies that Q∗d = Q
0
d in the former case, and Q
∗
d = max {Q1, Q3} in the
latter. Recall that, if max {Q1, Q3} ≤ Q0c ≤ min {Q2, Q4}, we have Q∗c =
Q0c ≥ max {Q1, Q3}. Therefore, for both realizations of Q∗d, it turns out that
Q∗c ≥ Q∗d. Lastly, let us consider the third possible region that Q0c could
fall into; that is, let us assume Q0c > min {Q2, Q4}. Theorem 19 implies
that Q∗c = min {Q2, Q4} in this case. Given Q0d ≤ Q0c , one the following can
happen: Q0c ≥ Q0d > min {Q2, Q4}, min {Q2, Q4} ≥ Q0d ≥ max {Q1, Q3},
Q0d < max {Q1, Q3}. Theorem 18 further implies that, Q∗d = min {Q2, Q4}
in the first case, Q∗d = Q
0
d in the second case, and Q
∗
d = max {Q1, Q3} in
the third case. Therefore, in all cases, it turns out that Q∗c ≥ Q∗d.
ii) Due to the fact that Kb
Kv
> hbP
hvD
, Expressions (4.25) and (4.28) jointly
imply that Q0d > Q
0
c . Since Q
0
c ≥ min {Q2, Q4}, it turns out that
Q0d > min {Q2, Q4}. When Q0c and Q0d are greater than min {Q2, Q4}, The-
orem 18 and Theorem 19 help us to conclude that Q∗c = Q
∗
d = min {Q2, Q4}.
iii) Since Kb
Kv
> hbP
hvD
, we again have Q0d > Q
0
c . In addition, due to Theorem
18, having Q0d ≤ max {Q1, Q3} implies Q∗d = max {Q1, Q3}. Combining
Q0d > Q
0
c with Q
0
d ≤ max {Q1, Q3} leads to Q0c < max {Q1, Q3}, which
further implies Q∗c = max {Q1, Q3} due to Theorem 19. Therefore, it turns
out that Q∗c = Q
∗
d.

4.2.3 Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Sys-
tem under Carbon Cap Mechanism
Similar to the coordination mechanisms proposed under carbon tax mechanism,
coordination mechanisms are proposed under carbon cap mechanism so that the
buyer’s loss from the centralized solution is compensated. Since carbon trade is
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not allowed and a carbon tax is not paid to an external authority under carbon cap
mechanism, the vendor cannot compensate the buyer’s loss under the centralized
solution by paying his/her expenses resulting from environmental regulations.
Thus, the channel coordination is achieved by quantity discounts given by the
vendor to the buyer under carbon cap mechanism. The notation used in this
section is the same as the notation used in Section 4.1.3.
Theorem 20 Suppose Q∗d < Q
∗
c holds. Then the following coordination mech-
anism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d)
realized at Q∗c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q) if Q < Q∗c
BC(Q)− d×D if Q > Q∗c
where d =
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer.
That is, when Q∗d < Q
∗
c, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer, Q
∗
c coordinates the channel.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.1 for the proof. 
Next, we present a similar coordination mechanism, now for the case of Q∗d >
Q∗c .
Theorem 21 Suppose Q∗d > Q
∗
c holds. Then the following coordination mech-
anism minimizes the buyer’s cost with a minimum function value of BC(Q∗d)
realized at Q∗c.
BC(Q) =

BC(Q)− d×D if Q 6 Q∗c
BC(Q) if Q > Q∗c
where d =
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
is the unit discount given by the vendor to the buyer.
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That is, when Q∗d > Q
∗
c, if the vendor gives a unit discount d for order sizes
less than or equal to Q∗c to the buyer, Q
∗
c coordinates the channel.
Proof: Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 20. Q∗d < Q
∗
c is replaced with
Q∗d > Q
∗
c , Q < Q
∗
c is replaced with Q > Q
∗
c and Q > Q∗c is replaced with Q 6 Q∗c .

4.2.4 Numerical Analysis under Deterministic Demand
and Carbon Cap Mechanism
In this section sixteen numerical examples are illustrated for carbon cap policy. In
each example the optimal order sizes of coordinated and uncoordinated models
are calculated and the coordination mechanisms proposed in Section 4.2.3 are
applied. Each example corresponds to a specific case as seen in Table 4.11. Let
us define Qcap1 = max {Q1, Q3} and Qcap2 = min {Q2, Q4}.
Here, in the examples where Q∗d and Q
∗
c are the same, one of Q
∗
d 6 Q∗c and
Q∗d > Q∗c is satisfied only at equality. Also, the relationships between BC(Q∗d)
and BC(Q∗c), V C(Q
∗
d) and V C(Q
∗
c), and TC(Q
∗
d) and TC(Q
∗
c) are not considered.
Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function and the constraints of the decentralized
and the centralized models are the same, we have BC(Q∗d) 6 BC(Q∗c). Also,
V C(Q∗c) 6 V C(Q∗d) as the total cost decreases and cost of the buyer does not
decrease under the centralized solution.
As stated in Section 4.2.3, since carbon trade is not allowed and a carbon
tax is not paid to an external authority under carbon cap mechanism, the ven-
dor cannot compensate the buyer’s loss under the centralized solution by paying
his/her expenses resulting from environmental regulations. Thus, the channel
coordination is achieved by quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer.
The values of the parameters are presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. Also,
the results of the centralized and the decentralized solutions for each example
are presented Tables 4.14 and 4.15. The application of coordination mechanisms
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Table 4.11: Classification of Examples for Carbon Cap Mechanism under Deter-
ministic Demand
Example Index Q∗d Q
∗
c Q
∗
d vs Q
∗
c
33 Qcap1 Qcap1 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
34 Qcap1 Q
0
c Q
∗
d < Q
∗
c
35 Qcap1 Q
0
c Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
36 Qcap1 Qcap2 Q
∗
d < Q
∗
c
37 Qcap1 Qcap2 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
38 Q0d Qcap1 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
39 Q0d Qcap1 Q
∗
d > Q
∗
c
40 Q0d Q
0
c Q
∗
d < Q
∗
c
41 Q0d Q
0
c Q
∗
d > Q
∗
c
42 Q0d Qcap2 Q
∗
d < Q
∗
c
43 Q0d Qcap2 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
44 Qcap2 Qcap1 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
45 Qcap2 Qcap1 Q
∗
d > Q
∗
c
46 Qcap2 Q
0
c Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
47 Qcap2 Q
0
c Q
∗
d > Q
∗
c
48 Qcap2 Qcap2 Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c
proposed in Section 4.2.3 to each example is described in Appendix A.6 and
summarized in Table A.5 in Appendix A.6. In examples where some fields are
marked with a minus (-) in Table A.5, the channel is already coordinated and
Q∗d = Q
∗
c as described in the previous paragraphs.
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Table 4.12: Parameter Values of Examples 33-40
Eg 33 Eg 34 Eg 35 Eg 36 Eg 37 Eg 38 Eg 39 Eg 40
D 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
P 150 150 150 150 150 55 55 150
Kb 40 40 21.25 45 45 231.05077 250 110
Kv 60 60 41.25 350 350 40 40 120
hb 2 2 2 2 2 1.2 1.2 2
hv 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1.5
c 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
pv 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
fb 50 50 50 50 50.00017 90 90 50
fv 60 60 60 70 70.00015 95 95 60
gb 1 1 1 1 1.01667 0.5 0.5 1
gv 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75415 0.25 0.25 0.75
eb 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.51667 5 5 5.5
ev 7 6 6 7 7.01376 6 6 7
Cb 350 350 350 350 349.99967 320 320 350
Cv 400 400 400 400 399.99972 350 350 400
Table 4.13: Parameter Values of Examples 41-48
Eg 41 Eg 42 Eg 43 Eg 44 Eg 45 Eg 46 Eg 47 Eg 48
D 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
P 55 150 150 96 100 55 55 150
Kb 400 200 250 150 150 492.64428 420 400
Kv 50 600 600 20 20 102.64429 30 300
hb 1 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.2 1.2 1.5
hv 0.8 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.2
c 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
pv 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
fb 40 50 50 56 56 95 95 50
fv 135 60 60 55 55 100 100 60
gb 2 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 1
gv 2.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75
eb 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5 5 5.5
ev 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7
Cb 550 350 350 350 350 320 320 360
Cv 600 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
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Table 4.14: Solutions of the Decentralized Model for Examples 33-48
Example Q0d Qcap1 Qcap2 Q
∗
d BC(Q
∗
d) V C(Q
∗
d) TC(Q
∗
d)
33 44.7214 73.5089 100 73.5089 700.7165 459.1886 1159.9051
34 44.7214 50 100 50 690 472.5 1162.5
35 32.596 50 100 50 671.25 453.75 1125
36 47.4342 90.4555 100 90.4555 715.3296 616.0792 1331.4088
37 47.4342 93.0437 93.0437 93.0437 717.2259 611.3446 1328.5705
38 138.7596 138.7596 180 138.7596 766.5115 477.486 1243.9975
39 144.3376 138.7596 180 144.3376 773.2051 479.4644 1252.6695
40 74.162 73.5089 100 74.162 748.324 499.4445 1247.7684
41 200 31.5143 188.4857 188.4857 800.3517 481.8039 1282.1555
42 89.4427 73.5089 100 89.4427 823.6068 769.6966 1593.3034
43 100 73.5089 100 100 850 738.3333 1588.3333
44 86.6025 80 80 80 773.75 450 1223.75
45 86.6025 77.556 80 80 773.75 448.5 1222.25
46 202.6171 115.5051 164.4949 164.4949 848.4415 513.4473 1361.8888
47 187.0829 115.5051 164.4949 164.4949 826.3605 491.3663 1317.7267
48 163.2993 73.5089 132.1699 132.1699 850.44781 539.9243 1390.3721
Table 4.15: Solutions of the Centralized Model for Examples 33-48
Example Q0c Qcap1 Qcap2 Q
∗
c BC(Q
∗
c) V C(Q
∗
c) TC(Q
∗
c)
33 63.2456 73.5089 100 73.5089 700.7165 459.1886 1159.9051
34 63.2456 50 100 63.2456 694.8683 463.2456 1158.1139
35 50 50 100 50 671.25 453.75 1125
36 125.6981 90.4555 100 100 722.5 600 1322.5
37 125.6981 93.0437 93.0437 93.0437 717.2259 611.3446 1328.5704
38 113.3647 138.7596 180 138.7596 766.5115 477.486 1243.9975
39 117.2604 138.7596 180 138.7596 773.3396 477.486 1250.8256
40 95.9166 73.5089 100 95.9166 753.2581 486.5335 1239.7916
41 161.4083 31.5143 188.4851 161.4083 804.6135 474.1826 1278.7961
42 156.4922 73.5089 100 100 825 738.3333 1563.3333
43 161.3084 73.5089 100 100 850 738.3333 1588.3333
44 76.0739 80 80 80 773.75 450 1223.75
45 76.5641 77.556 80 77.556 774.2603 447.7941 1222.0544
46 164.4949 115.5051 164.4949 164.4949 848.4415 513.4473 1361.8888
47 143.0194 115.5051 164.4949 143.0194 832.6449 481.9978 1314.4265
48 191.9428 73.5089 132.1699 132.1699 850.4478 539.9243 1390.3721
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Chapter 5
Problem Definition and Analysis
under Stochastic Demand
5.1 Problem Definition under Stochastic De-
mand
In this section, we consider a system which consists of a buyer (retailer) and a
vendor (manufacturer). The buyer operates to meet the random demand of a
perishable product and the vendor simply makes the single order of the buyer
available. The single period problem (i.e., the newsvendor problem) is used as
a benchmark and this model is modified under carbon tax, cap-and-trade and
carbon cap mechanisms. There is no order lead time under each policy. The buyer
earns a unit revenue per product sold and incurs a cost per product purchased.
He/she salvages each product that is not sold at a salvage value. The vendor
earns a unit revenue and incurs a manufacturing cost per product purchased by
the buyer. It is assumed that the shortage cost is incurred only by the buyer.
For ease of modeling and analysis, the emissions-related parameters of the buyer
and the vendor are measured on the product-unit basis. The notation used is
summarized in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Problem Parameters and Decision Variables under Stochastic Demand
Parameters of the Buyer and the Vendor
X: Aggregate demand, which is a random variable with probability
density function f(x) and cumulative distribution function F (x)
p: Selling price per unit at the buyer
cv: Manufacturing cost per item
cb: Price per unit paid by the buyer to the vendor
v: Salvage value per unit
s: Stockout cost incurred per unit by the buyer
eb: Variable emission amount released per unit ordered by the buyer
ev: Variable emission amount released per unit produced by the vendor
Policy Parameters
tb: Emissions tax amount paid by the buyer per item ordered
tv: Emissions tax amount paid by the vendor per item produced
tt: Total emissions tax amount per item (= tb + tv)
pc: Carbon price per unit at the market
Cb: Fixed carbon capacity of the buyer
Cv: Fixed carbon capacity of the vendor
Qb: Carbon cap of the buyer
Qv: Carbon cap of the vendor
Decision Variables
Q: Order size
Xb: Amount of carbon credits purchased/sold by the buyer
Xv: Amount of carbon credits purchased/sold by the vendor
Functions and Optimal Values of Decision Variables
Jb(Q): Expected profit of the buyer as a function of order size Q
Jv(Q): Expected profit of the vendor as a function of order size Q
Jt(Q): Total expected profit of the system as a function of order size Q
Q∗d: The optimal order quantity under the decentralized model
Q∗c : The optimal order quantity under the centralized model
Parameters Related to Coordination
d: Unit discount offered by the vendor to the buyer
dc: Unit carbon price discount offered by the vendor to the buyer
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Since the emissions-related parameters of the buyer and the vendor are mea-
sured on the product-unit basis, Qb = Cb/eb and Qv = Cv/ev correspond to the
carbon cap of the buyer and the vendor, respectively, on the product-unit basis.
In Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, we present the model formulations under
carbon tax, cap-and-trade and carbon cap mechanisms, respectively.
5.1.1 Model Formulation under Stochastic Demand and
Carbon Tax Mechanism
In this section, we use the newsvendor problem as a benchmark and update the
model to account for carbon taxes as the emission regulating mechanism.
Under carbon tax mechanism, it is assumed that the shortage cost is incurred
only by the buyer. The following properties are assumed to hold.
v < cv + tv < cb
cb + tb < p
(5.1)
In the decentralized model, the buyer decides the order quantity that maxi-
mizes his/her expected profit. Then the modified newsvendor model under the
carbon tax mechanism is given by
max Jb(Q) = −(cb+tb)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+(Q−x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ−(x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.2)
Q ≥ 0.
Similar to Expression (5.2), the decentralized expected profit of the vendor is
given by
Jv(Q) = (cb − cv − tv)Q. (5.3)
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In the centralized model, the order quantity that maximizes the total profit
of the system (i.e, the total profit of the buyer and the vendor) is determined.
Then, the modified newsvendor model under carbon tax mechanism is given by
max Jt(Q) = −(cv+tt)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+(Q−x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ−(x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.4)
Q ≥ 0.
5.1.2 Model Formulation under Stochastic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
In this section, we provide the modified newsvendor problem that incorporates
cap-and-trade system as the emission regulating mechanism. The additional no-
tation used in this section is given by
Table 5.2: Additional Notation for Cap and Trade System under Stochastic De-
mand
Jb(Q,Xb): Expected profit of the buyer as a function of order size Q
and his/her emission transfer quantity Xb
Jt(Q,Xb, Xv): Total expected profit of the system as a function of order
size Q, buyer’s emission transfer quantity Xb and vendor’s
emission transfer quantity Xv
As in carbon tax mechanism, it is assumed that the shortage cost is incurred
only by the buyer. Also, similar to the assumptions (5.1) in the carbon tax
mechanism, the following properties are assumed to hold.
v < cv + pc < cb
cb + pc < p
(5.5)
In the decentralized model, the buyer decides the order quantity that maxi-
mizes his/her expected profit. Then the modified newsvendor model under the
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cap-and-trade system is given by
max Jb(Q,Xb) = −cbQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx+ pcXb
(5.6)
s.t. Q+Xb = Qb (5.7)
Q ≥ 0.
where Expression (5.7) is the emission balance constraint of the buyer. If Xb is
positive (negative), the buyer sells (buys) carbon credit.
Similar to Expressions (5.6) and (5.7), the decentralized expected profit and
the emission balance constraint of the vendor is given by
Jv(Q,Xv) = (cb − cv)Q+ pcXv (5.8)
s.t. Q+Xv = Qv (5.9)
Q ≥ 0.
If Xv is positive (negative), the vendor sells (buys) carbon credit.
From Expression (5.7),
Xb = Qb −Q. (5.10)
If we substitute Equation (5.10) into Expression (5.6), we get the uncon-
strained model given by
max Jb(Q) = −(cb + pc)Q+ pcQb +
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.11)
Q ≥ 0.
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Similarly, the decentralized expected profit of the vendor in Equation (5.8) is
updated as
Jv(Q) = (cb − pc − cv)Q+ pcQv. (5.12)
In the centralized model, the order quantity that maximizes the total profit
of the system (i.e, the total profit of the buyer and the vendor) is determined.
Then, the modified newsvendor model under the cap-and-trade system is given
by
max Jt(Q,Xb, Xv) = −cvQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx+ pc(Xb +Xv)
(5.13)
s.t. Q+Xb = Qb (5.14)
Q+Xv = Qv (5.15)
Q ≥ 0.
where Equations (5.14) and (5.15) are the emission balance constraints of the
buyer and the vendor, respectively. If Xb is positive (negative), the buyer sells
(buys) carbon credit. Similarly, if Xv is positive (negative), the vendor sells
(buys) carbon credit.
The above model could be modified by summing Equations (5.14) and (5.15)
up as follows.
max Jt(Q,Xb, Xv) =− cvQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx+ pc(Xb +Xv)
(5.16)
s.t. 2Q+Xb +Xv = Qb +Qv (5.17)
Q ≥ 0.
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From Equation (5.17),
Xb +Xv = Qb +Qv − 2Q. (5.18)
Substituting (5.18) into (5.16), we get the unconstrained model given by
max Jt(Q) = −(cv + 2pc)Q+ pc(Qb +Qv) +
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.19)
Q ≥ 0.
5.1.3 Model Formulation under Stochastic Demand and
Carbon Cap Mechanism
Similar to Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, in this section, we use the newsvendor
problem as a benchmark and update the model to account for mandatory carbon
capacities (i.e., carbon caps).
As in carbon tax and cap-and-trade mechanisms, it is assumed that the short-
age cost is incurred only by the buyer. Also, the following property is assumed
to hold.
v < cv < cb < p (5.20)
In the decentralized model, the buyer decides the order quantity that maxi-
mizes his/her expected profit. Then the modified newsvendor model under the
carbon cap mechanism is given by
max Jb(Q) = −cbQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.21)
s.t. Q 6 Qb (5.22)
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Q 6 Qv (5.23)
Q ≥ 0.
From Expressions (5.22) and (5.23), the emission levels of the buyer and the
vendor cannot exceed the specified limits Qb and Qv, respectively.
In the centralized model, the order quantity that maximizes the total profit
of the system (i.e, the total profit of the buyer and the vendor) is determined.
Then, the modified newsvendor model under the carbon cap mechanism is given
by
max Jt(Q) = −cvQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
(5.24)
s.t. Q 6 Qb (5.25)
Q 6 Qv (5.26)
Q ≥ 0.
From Expressions (5.25) and (5.26), the emission levels of the buyer and the
vendor cannot the exceed specified limits Qb and Qv, respectively.
5.2 Analysis of the Decentralized and the Cen-
tralized Models under Stochastic Demand
5.2.1 Analysis of the Decentralized Model and the Cen-
tralized Model under Stochastic Demand and Car-
bon Tax Mechanism
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the cen-
tralized model under carbon tax mechanism to find the order quantities that
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maximize the expected profit of the buyer (i.e., Q∗d) and the system (i.e., Q
∗
c),
respectively. We further provide some properties related to Q∗d and Q
∗
c .
Theorem 22 The optimal order quantity for the decentralized model is given by
Q∗d = F
−1(
p+ s− cb − tb
p+ s− v ). (5.27)
Proof: J
′′
b (Q) = (v − p− s)f(Q) 6 0 since p > v by assumption and f(Q) > 0.
Thus, Jb(.) is a strictly concave function, implying the profit-maximizing value
of Q can be found by checking the first order condition. Then
J
′
b(Q) = −(cb + tb) + pQf(Q) +
∫ Q
0
vf(x) dx− pQf(Q) +
∫ ∞
Q
(p+ s)f(x) dx = 0.
This gives
F (Q∗d) =
p+ s− cb − tb
p+ s− v .
This, in turn, implies
Q∗d = F
−1(
p+ s− cb − tb
p+ s− v ).

Since Equations (5.2) and (5.4) follow a similar structure, we can find the
order quantity that maximizes the total expected profit of the system using the
same reasoning of Theorem 22. That is,
Theorem 23 The optimal order quantity for the centralized model is given by
Q∗c = F
−1(
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s− v ). (5.28)
Proof: J
′′
t (Q) = (v − p− s)f(Q) 6 0 since p > v by assumption and f(Q) > 0.
Thus, Jt(.) is a strictly concave function, implying the profit-maximizing value of
Q can be found by checking the first order condition. Then
J
′
t(Q) = −(cv + tt) + pQf(Q) +
∫ Q
0
vf(x) dx− pQf(Q) +
∫ ∞
Q
(p+ s)f(x) dx = 0.
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This gives
F (Q∗c) =
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s− v .
This, in turn, implies
Q∗c = F
−1(
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s− v ).

We provide a further property related to Q∗d and Q
∗
c in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 9 Under the assumptions (5.1) of the carbon tax mechanism, Q∗d <
Q∗c is always satisfied.
Proof: It follows from Equations (5.27) and (5.28) that Q∗d < Q
∗
c if and only if
F−1(
p+ s− cb − tb
p+ s− v ) < F
−1(
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s− v ).
Since F (.) is a nondecreasing function, the above expression implies
p+ s− cb − tb
p+ s− v <
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s− v .
This gives
p2 + ps− pv + ps+ ss− sv − pcb − cbs+ cbv − ptb − stb + tbv <
p2 + ps− pcv − ptt + ps+ ss− scv − stt − pv − sv + cvv + ttv.
After canceling terms out and taking common parentheses, we get
cb > cv + tv.
From assumptions (5.1), this always holds. Hence, Q∗d < Q
∗
c is always satisfied.

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5.2.2 Analysis of the Decentralized Model and the Cen-
tralized Model under Stochastic Demand and Cap-
and-Trade Mechanism
Similar to Section 5.2.1, in this section, we present an analysis of the decentralized
model and the centralized model to find Q∗d and Q
∗
c under the cap-and-trade
system. We further provide some properties related to Q∗d and Q
∗
c .
Theorem 24 The optimal order quantity for the decentralized model is given by
Q∗d = F
−1(
p+ s− cb − pc
p+ s− v ). (5.29)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 22. tb is replaced with pc.

As Equations (5.11) and (5.19) have identical structural properties, the order
quantity that maximizes the total expected profit of the system can be found
using the same reasoning of Theorem 24. That is,
Theorem 25 The optimal order quantity for the centralized model is given by
Q∗c = F
−1(
p+ s− cv − 2pc
p+ s− v ). (5.30)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 23. tb and tv are replaced
with pc. 
We provide a further property related to Q∗d and Q
∗
c in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 Under the assumptions (5.5) of the cap-and-trade mechanism,
Q∗d < Q
∗
c is always satisfied.
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Proof: It follows from Equations (5.29) and (5.30) that Q∗d < Q
∗
c if and only if
F−1(
p+ s− cb − pc
p+ s− v ) < F
−1(
p+ s− cv − 2pc
p+ s− v ).
Since F (.) is a nondecreasing function, the above expression implies
p+ s− cb − pc
p+ s− v <
p+ s− cv − 2pc
p+ s− v .
This gives
cv + pc < cb.
From assumptions (5.5), this always holds. Hence, Q∗d < Q
∗
c is always satisfied.

5.2.3 Analysis of the Decentralized Model and the Cen-
tralized Model under Stochastic Demand and Car-
bon Cap Mechanism
As in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, in this section, we present an analysis of the
decentralized model and the centralized model to find Q∗d and Q
∗
c under the
carbon cap mechanism. We further provide some properties related to Q∗d and
Q∗d.
From Expression (5.21), the optimal order quantity under the decentralized
model when the emissions are not considered, (i.e., Q0d, namely, the order quantity
that maximizes the expected profits of the buyer) is
Q0d = F
−1(
p+ s− cb
p+ s− v ). (5.31)
Since Expression (5.21) is a strictly concave function in Q, Q0d is obtained from
the first order condition.
Next, we provide the solution of the buyer’s expected profit maximization
problem under carbon capacity constraints.
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Theorem 26 The optimal order quantity for the decentralized model is given by
Q∗d = min
{
Qb, Qv, Q
0
d}. (5.32)
where Q0d is the cost optimal order quantity of the decentralized model given in
equation (5.31) and Qb and Qv are the carbon emission quotas of the buyer and
the vendor, respectively.
Proof: Since Expression (5.21) is a strictly concave function in Q, temporar-
ily ignoring the constraints (5.22) and (5.23), we get Q0d as the optimal order
quantity from the first order condition. Taking constraints (5.22) and (5.23) into
consideration, we obtain Q∗d = min {Qb, Qv, Q0d}. 
As Equations 5.21 and 5.24 have identical structural properties and the con-
straints of the decentralized model and the centralized model are the same, a
similar analysis is repeated for the centralized model. The profit maximizing or-
der quantity and the optimal solution under the centralized model are presented
in Equation (5.33) and Theorem 27, respectively.
From Expression (5.24), the optimal order quantity under the centralized
model when the emissions are not considered (i.e., Q0c , namely, the order quantity
that maximizes the expected profits of the system) is
Q0c = F
−1(
p+ s− cv
p+ s− v ). (5.33)
Since Expression (5.24) is a strictly concave function in Q, Q0c is obtained from
the first order condition.
Theorem 27 The optimal order quantity for the centralized model is given by
Q∗c = min
{
Qb, Qv, Q
0
c }. (5.34)
where Q0c is the cost optimal order quantity of the centralized model given in
Equation (5.33) and Qb and Qv are the carbon emission quotas of the buyer and
the vendor, respectively.
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Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 26 and is omitted. 
In Proposition 11, we present a property related to the order quantities that
maximize the expected profits of the buyer (i.e., Q0d) and the system (i.e., Q
0
c),
respectively. Then we use Proposition 11 to characterize a result related to Q∗d
and Q∗c .
Proposition 11 Under the assumptions (5.20) of the carbon cap mechanism,
Q0d < Q
0
c is always satisfied.
Proof: It follows from Equations (5.31) and (5.33) that Q0d < Q
0
c if and only if
F−1(
p+ s− cb
p+ s− v ) < F
−1(
p+ s− cv
p+ s− v ).
Since F (.) is a nondecreasing function, the above expression implies
p+ s− cb
p+ s− v <
p+ s− cv
p+ s− v .
This gives
cv < cb.
From assumptions (5.20), this always holds. Hence, Q0d < Q
0
c is always satisfied.

Proposition 11 will be used in the proof of the next proposition.
Proposition 12 Under the assumptions (5.20) of the carbon cap mechanism,
Q∗d 6 Q∗c is always satisfied.
Proof: Let us define Qcap = min {Qb, Qv }.
i) Suppose Q0d 6 Qcap and Q0c 6 Qcap. Then from Theorem 26, Q∗d = Q0d
and from Theorem 27, Q∗c = Q
0
c . From Proposition 11, Q
0
d < Q
0
c is always
satisfied. Hence, Q∗d = Q
0
d < Q
∗
c = Q
0
c 6 Qcap.
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ii) Suppose Q0d 6 Qcap and Q0c > Qcap. Then from Theorem 26, Q∗d = Q0d and
from Theorem 27, Q∗c = Qcap. Hence, Q
∗
d = Q
0
d 6 Q∗c = Qcap.
iii) Suppose Q0d > Qcap and Q
0
c > Qcap. Then from Theorem 26, Q
∗
d = Qcap and
from Theorem 27, Q∗c = Qcap. Hence, Q
∗
d = Q
∗
c = Qcap.

5.3 Coordination Mechanisms Proposed under
Stochastic Demand
In this section, coordination mechanisms are proposed under carbon tax, cap-and-
trade and carbon cap mechanisms so that the buyer’s loss from the centralized
solution is compensated. Thus, the buyer is willing to order the optimal order
quantity of the centralized model.
The additional notation used in this section is presented in Table 5.3 as follows.
Table 5.3: Additional Notation Used in Coordination Mechanisms Proposed un-
der Stochastic Demand
J b(Q): The expected profit of the buyer after the implementation of the
coordination strategy when the order size is Q units
Jb(Q, cb): The expected profit of the buyer when the order size is Q units
and the price per unit paid by the buyer to the vendor is cb
Qcrd: The value of the order size that maximizes the expected profit of
the buyer after coordination
Q(cb): The order size as a function of the price per unit paid by the
buyer to the vendor
Xb(Q): Amount of carbon credit bought (sold) by the buyer when the
order size is Q units
Xv(Q): Amount of carbon credit bought (sold) by the vendor when the
order size is Q units
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5.3.1 Coordination Mechanisms Proposed under Stochas-
tic Demand and Carbon Tax Mechanism
Under stochastic demand and carbon tax mechanism, channel coordination is
achieved either by quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer and a
fixed payment made by one party to the other (Theorem 28) or only quantity
discounts given by the vendor to the buyer (Theorem 29).
Theorem 28 Under a unit discount of d = cb − (cv + tv) offered by the vendor
to the buyer and a fixed payment of Jb(Q
∗
c , cb− d)− Jb(Q∗d, cb) made by the buyer
to the vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a
no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.1.1 for the proof. 
Theorem 29 Under a unit discount of d =
Jb(Q
∗
d,cb)−Jb(Q∗c ,cb)
Q∗c
offered by the vendor
to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a
no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.1.2 for the proof. 
5.3.2 Coordination Mechanisms Proposed under Stochas-
tic Demand and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
Under stochastic demand and cap-and-trade system, in addition to quantity dis-
counts, channel coordination can be achieved if the vendor gives carbon credits
or carbon price discounts to the buyer under certain conditions.
Theorem 30 Suppose one of the following conditions holds.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb > 0
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• Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv 6 0
Then under a unit discount of d = cb − (cv + pc) offered by the vendor to the
buyer and a fixed payment of Jb(Q
∗
c , cb− d)− Jb(Q∗d, cb) made by the buyer to the
vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a no
worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: Suppose Xb(Q
∗
c) > 0. Thus, the buyer sells carbon credit under the cen-
tralized solution and he/she does not need to be compensated by giving him/her
carbon credit. Suppose Xv(Q
∗
c) 6 0. Thus, the vendor buys carbon credit and
he/she does not have any carbon credit to give to the buyer to compensate his/her
loss. Hence, the channel coordination can be achieved by a quantity discount
and/or a fixed payment. The remaining steps of the proof are similar to the
proof of Theorem 28 and are omitted. 
Theorem 31 Suppose one of the following conditions holds.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb > 0
• Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv 6 0
Then under a unit discount of d =
Jb(Q
∗
d,cb)−Jb(Q∗c ,cb)
Q∗c
offered by the vendor to the
buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a no
worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: Suppose Xb(Q
∗
c) > 0. Thus, the buyer sells carbon credit under the cen-
tralized solution and he/she does not need to be compensated by giving him/her
carbon credit. Suppose Xv(Q
∗
c) 6 0. Thus, the vendor buys carbon credit and
he/she does not have any carbon credit to give to the buyer to compensate his/her
loss. Hence, the channel coordination can be achieved by a quantity discount
and/or a fixed payment. The remaining steps of the proof are similar to the
proof of Theorem 29 and are omitted. 
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Theorem 30 and Theorem 31 have the following implication. When the buyer
sells carbon credit (i.e., he does not need extra credit) or the vendor buys carbon
credit (i.e., he does not have any credit to give to the buyer to compensate his
loss), channel coordination is achieved either by quantity discounts given by the
vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment made by one party to the other (Theorem
30) or only quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer (Theorem 31).
Theorem 32 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb 6 0, Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv > 0
• pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} > Jb(Q∗d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
Then if [Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)−Jb(Q∗c , cb)]/pc amount of carbon credit is given by the vendor
to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a
no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.2.1 for the proof. 
Theorem 33 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb 6 0, Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv > 0
• pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} > Jb(Q∗d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
• [Jb(Q∗d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)]/min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} 6 pc
Then if a unit carbon price discount of dc = [Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)]/
min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} is given by the vendor to the buyer for the order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering
Q∗c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.2.2 for the proof. 
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Theorem 32 and Theorem 33 have the following implication. If the buyer
buys and the vendor sells carbon credit and if the monetary amount of the credit
sold by the vendor is enough to compensate the buyer’s loss from ordering the
centralized optimal quantity, vendor gives carbon credits for free or carbon price
discounts to the buyer. The monetary value of the given credits or carbon price
discounts is equal to the difference between the buyer’s cost in the centralized
and the decentralized solutions.
Theorem 34 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb 6 0, Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv > 0
• pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} < Jb(Q∗d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
Then if min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} amount of carbon credit and a unit discount
d = cb − (cv + pc) are given by the vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment of
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) + pc × min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} − Jb(Q∗d, cb) is made by the buyer
to the vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays in a
no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.2.3 for the proof. 
Theorem 35 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Xb(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qb 6 0, Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c −Qv > 0
• pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} < Jb(Q∗d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
Then if min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} amount of carbon credit and a unit discount
d = (Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)− pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)})/Q∗c are given by the
vendor to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c, the buyer stays
in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
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Proof: See Appendix B.2.4 for the proof. 
Theorem 34 and Theorem 35 have the following implication. If the buyer
buys and the vendor sells carbon credits, the vendor gives free carbon credits
to the buyer. However, if the monetary amount of credits the vendor sells or
buyer buys is not sufficient to compensate the buyer’s loss from ordering the
centralized optimal quantity, the remaining loss of the buyer is compensated by
quantity discounts or quantity discounts and fixed payments made by one party
to the other. Here, giving more carbon credit to the buyer than he buys is not
desired as it may not be practical in practice.
5.3.3 Coordination Mechanisms Proposed under Stochas-
tic Demand and Carbon Cap Mechanism
Under stochastic demand and carbon cap mechanism, channel coordination is
achieved either by quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer and a
fixed payment made by one party to the other (Theorem 36) or only quantity
discounts given by the vendor to the buyer (Theorems 37 and 38).
Let us define Qcap = min {Qb, Qv }.
Theorem 36 Suppose Q0d < Q
0
c 6 Qcap holds. Then if a unit discount d = cb−cv
is given by the vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment of Jb(Q
0
c , cb−d)−Jb(Q0d, cb)
made by the buyer to the vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q0c,
the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q0c units.
Proof: See Appendix B.3.1 for the proof. 
Theorem 37 Suppose Q0d < Q
0
c 6 Qcap holds. Then if a unit discount d =
[Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Q0c , cb)]/Q0c is given by the vendor to the buyer for the order sizes
greater than or equal to Q0c, the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering
Q0c units.
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Proof: See Appendix B.3.2 for the proof. 
Theorem 38 Suppose the following conditions hold.
• Q0d < Qcap
• Q0c > Qcap
Then if a unit discount d = [Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Qcap, cb)]/Qcap is given by the vendor
to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Qcap, the buyer stays in
a no worse situation by ordering Qcap units.
Proof: See Appendix B.3.3 for the proof. 
Theorem 39 Suppose Q0d > Qcap holds. Then the channel is already coordinated.
Proof: Since Q0d > Qcap, Q
∗
d = Qcap from Theorem 26. Since Q
0
d < Q
0
c always
holds from Proposition 11, Q0c > Qcap. Then Q
0
c = Qcap. Hence, the channel is
already coordinated. 
5.4 Numerical Analysis under Stochastic De-
mand
In this section numerical examples are illustrated for each emission regulating
mechanism described in Section 5.1. In each example the optimal order sizes
of coordinated and uncoordinated models are calculated and the coordination
mechanisms proposed in Section 5.3 are applied.
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5.4.1 Numerical Analysis under Stochastic Demand and
Carbon Tax Mechanism
In this section two numerical examples are presented for the carbon tax mech-
anism. Examples 49 and 50 correspond to the applications of Theorem 28 and
Theorem 29, respectively. The values of parameters and the probability distribu-
tions of demand are presented in Table 5.4. The results of the decentralized and
the centralized solutions for each example are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6,
respectively. The application of coordination mechanisms proposed in Section
5.3.1 to each example is summarized in Appendix B.4.
Table 5.4: Parameter Values of Examples 49 and 50 p = 18, cb = 13, cv = 6 and
tv = 3
Example v s tb tt X
49 5 10 2 5 U(160, 300)
50 4 8 1.8 4.8 U(120, 280)
Table 5.5: Solutions of the Decentralized Model of Examples 49 and 50
Example Q∗d Jb(Q
∗
d) Jv(Q
∗
d) Jt(Q
∗
d)
49 239.1304 294.3478 956.5217 1250.8696
50 201.4545 200.1455 805.8182 1005.9636
Table 5.6: Solutions of the Centralized Model of Examples 49 and 50
Example Q∗c Jb(Q
∗
c) Jv(Q
∗
c) Jt(Q
∗
c)
49 263.4783 245.6522 1053.913 1299.5652
50 230.5455 141.9636 922.1818 1064.1455
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5.4.2 Numerical Analysis under Stochastic Demand and
Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
In this section six numerical examples are presented for the cap-and-trade mech-
anism. Examples 51-56 correspond to the applications of Theorems 30-35, re-
spectively. The values of parameters and the probability distributions of demand
are presented in Table 5.7. The results of the decentralized and the centralized
solutions for each example are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. The
application of coordination mechanisms proposed in Section 5.3.2 to each example
is summarized in Appendix B.5
Table 5.7: Parameter Values of Examples 51-56
Example p cb cv v s pc Qb Qv X
51 18 13 6 5 10 3 2800 3000 U(1600, 3000)
52 20 14 8 6 10 3 150 180 U(45, 265)
53 18 13 6 5 10 3 200 260 U(150, 280)
54 20 15 9 6 10 4 1200 1500 U(900, 1600)
55 15 10 4 3 6 2.5 220 270 U(150, 320)
56 15 11 6 4 5.5 2.5 600 650 U(350, 800)
Table 5.8: Solutions of the Decentralized Model of Examples 51-56
Example Q∗d Xb(Q
∗
d) Xv(Q
∗
d) Jb(Q
∗
d) Jv(Q
∗
d) Jt(Q
∗
d)
51 2330.4348 469.5652 669.5652 8982.6087 9321.7391 18304.3478
52 164.1667 −14.1667 15.8333 259.5833 492.5 752.0833
53 217.826 −17.8261 42.1739 656.9565 871.3043 1528.2609
54 1220.8333 −20.8333 279.1667 3964.5833 2441.6667 6406.25
55 230.2778 −10.2778 39.7222 756.1801 805.9722 1562.1528
56 540.9091 59.0909 109.0909 1455.6818 1352.2727 2807.9545
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Table 5.9: Solutions of the Centralized Model of Examples 51-56
Example Q∗d Xb(Q
∗
d) Xv(Q
∗
d) Jb(Q
∗
d) Jv(Q
∗
d) Jt(Q
∗
d)
51 2573.913 226.087 426.087 8495.6522 10295.6522 18791.3044
52 191.6667 −41.6667 −11.6667 218.3333 575 793.3333
53 240.4348 −40.4348 19.5652 611.7391 961.7391 1573.4783
54 1279.1667 −79.1667 220.8333 3906.25 2558.3333 6464.5833
55 263.3333 −43.3333 6.6667 698.3333 921.6667 1620
56 609.0909 −9.0909 40.9091 1370.4545 1522.7273 2893.1818
5.4.3 Numerical Analysis under Stochastic Demand and
Carbon Cap Mechanism
In this section six numerical examples are presented for the carbon cap mech-
anism. Each example corresponds to a specific case in Table 5.10. The values
of parameters and the probability distributions of demand are presented in Ta-
ble 5.11. The results of the decentralized and the centralized solutions for each
example are presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13, respectively. The application of
coordination mechanisms proposed in Section 5.3.3 to each example is summa-
rized in Appendix B.6.
Table 5.10: Classification of Examples for Carbon Cap Mechanism under Stochas-
tic Demand
Example Index Qcap Q
∗
d Q
∗
c
57 Qb Q
0
d Q
0
c
58 Qv Q
0
d Q
0
c
59 Qb Q
0
d Qb
60 Qv Q
0
d Qv
61 Qb Qb Qb
62 Qv Qv Qv
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Table 5.11: Parameter Values of Examples 57-62
Example p cb cv v s Qb Qv X
57 10 8 5 4 6 200 180 U(120, 180)
58 18 12 8 3 8 160 180 U(60, 180)
59 20 15 9 6 12 170 200 U(120, 180)
60 20 15 9 6 12 1600 1400 U(900, 1500)
61 15 7.5 5 3 7 105 180 U(45, 135)
62 25 18.5 15 9 14 1600 1150 U(750, 1600)
Table 5.12: Solutions of the Decentralized Model of Examples 57-62
Example Q0d Qcap Q
∗
d Jb(Q
∗
d) Jv(Q
∗
d) Jt(Q
∗
d)
57 160 180 160 220 480 700
58 133.0435 160 133.0435 391.3043 532.1739 923.4783
59 159.2308 170 159.2308 573.4615 955.3846 1528.8462
60 1292.3077 1400 1292.3077 4234.6154 7753.8462 11988.4615
61 113.6842 105 105 512.5 262.5 775
62 1330.8333 1150 1150 4301.4706 4025 8326.4706
Table 5.13: Solutions of the Centralized Model of Examples 57-62
Example Q0c Qcap Q
∗
c Jb(Q
∗
c) Jv(Q
∗
c) Jt(Q
∗
c)
57 175 180 175 197.5 525 722.5
58 153.913 160 153.913 349.5652 615.6522 965.2174
59 173.0769 170 170 548.3333 1020 1568.3333
60 1430.7692 1400 1400 3983.3333 8400 12383.3333
61 125.5263 105 105 512.5 262.5 775
62 1430 1150 1150 4301.4706 4025 8326.4706
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we study the channel coordination problem in a supply chain with
two echelons under emission regulations. It assumed that the supply chain con-
sists of a buyer (retailer) and a vendor (manufacturer). We study three emission
regulating mechanisms, namely, cap-and-trade system, carbon tax and carbon
cap. In Chapters 3 and 4, we assume that the demand faced by the buyer is
deterministic. The buyer and the vendor operate in an infinite horizon under a
lot-for-lot policy. Similarly, in Chapter 5, we assume that the demand faced by
the buyer is stochastic and he/she operates under the conditions of the classical
newsvendor problem.
For each demand setting and emission regulating policy, we propose two mod-
els, namely, the decentralized and the centralized models. In the decentralized
model, we find the order quantity that minimizes (or maximizes) the average an-
nual costs (or expected profits) of the buyer. Similarly, in the centralized model,
we find the order quantity that minimizes (or maximizes) the average annual costs
(or expected profits) of the buyer-vendor system. Under cap-and-trade mecha-
nism, we also find the traded amount of carbon credits under the decentralized
and centralized models. We further propose some coordination strategies includ-
ing quantity discounts, carbon-credit sharing, carbon credit price discounts and
fixed payments that compensate the buyer’s loss due to ordering the centralized
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optimal order quantity. Additionally, we examine the impact of channel coordi-
nation on the optimal order quantities and on the cost (or expected profit) of the
buyer, vendor, and the system by numerical analyses for each demand setting
and emission regulating policy.
In Chapter 3, we extend the EOQ model to account for the two-level supply
chain under the cap-and-trade mechanism. We examine the buyer’s (or vendor’s)
decisions related to replenishment (or production) and inventory holding. We
model the carbon emissions of the buyer and the vendor using a similar structure
we used while modeling the costs. It is assumed that carbon credit buying price
is at least as much as its selling price (i.e. pbc ≥ psc). In addition to the decentral-
ized and centralized models we described in the previous paragraph, we further
developed the “centralized model with carbon credit sharing” as a benchmark for
coordination in order to achieve the maximum supply chain profitability. In this
model, it is assumed that if one party sells carbon credits, he/she makes it avail-
able for the other party if he/she buys carbon credits. Thus, we show that the
cost of the system under the centralized model with carbon credit sharing is less
than its cost under the centralized model. The decrease in the system’s cost is
quantified in Equation (3.13). The optimal order quantities for the decentralized
model and centralized model with carbon credit sharing under the cap-and-trade
system are presented in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively.
In Chapter 3, we further examine how replenishment decisions can be coordi-
nated under the cap-and-trade mechanism so as to compensate the buyer’s loss
under centralized optimal solution. We show that if both parties buy/sell carbon
credits, channel coordination can be achieved by quantity discounts given by the
vendor to the buyer (see Theorems 3 and 4). Similarly, if one party sells and
the other buys carbon credits, channel coordination can be achieved with a com-
bination of quantity discounts or fixed payments and carbon credit sharing (see
Theorems 5 to 10).
We further analyze the impact of coordination on average annual emissions of
the system in Chapter 3. We define R as the ratio of average annual emissions
of the system under the centralized model with carbon credit sharing and the
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decentralized model. We study the effect of each parameter on R under different
parameter settings. We observe that if a parameter is changed from its base value,
R can increase above and/or decrease below 1 (see Figures 3.1-3.51). Therefore,
we conclude that channel coordination may not be good for the environment in
terms of emission-related performance measures.
Similar to Chapter 3, we use the EOQ model as a benchmark to account for a
two-echelon setting under the carbon tax and carbon cap mechanisms in Chapter
4. Under both mechanisms, the carbon emissions of the buyer and the vendor
follow similar structures with their average annual costs. Under the carbon tax
mechanism, a monetary amount is paid to the regulatory agencies (i.e., govern-
ment) for each unit of emission. The optimal order quantities resulting from
the decentralized and the centralized model under the carbon tax mechanism are
presented in Theorem 2 and Theorem 11, respectively. We further characterize
the conditions under which the government collects more taxes under the decen-
tralized and centralized optimal solutions (see Propositions 6 and 7). Similarly,
we present the conditions under which the buyer and the vendor pay more taxes
under the decentralized and centralized optimal solutions (see Propositions 4 and
5). If the buyer’s average annual taxes decrease and the vendor’s average an-
nual taxes increase under the centralized solution, coordination is achieved by
quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer. Similarly, if the buyer’s
average annual taxes increase and the vendor’s average annual taxes decrease un-
der the centralized solution, coordination is achieved when the vendor pays some
amount of the buyer’s taxes and gives him/her additional quantity discounts (see
Theorems 12 to 17).
Also, we propose quantity discounts given by the vendor to the buyer, paying
some amount of the buyer’s taxes or combinations of these as the coordination
mechanisms to compensate the buyer’s loss under the centralized optimal solution
(see Theorems 12 to 17).
Under the carbon cap mechanism, the buyer and the vendor cannot exceed
the emission quotas allocated to them. The optimal order quantities resulting
from the decentralized and the centralized models under deterministic demand
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are presented in Theorem 18 and Theorem 19, respectively. Since the emissions
are not quantified with a monetary value, we propose quantity discounts as the
coordination strategy to compensate the buyer’s loss due to ordering the central-
ized optimal order quantity (see Theorem 20 and Theorem 21).
In Chapter 5, we extend our analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 for a perishable
product with stochastic demand. We extend the single period problem (i.e.,
the newsvendor problem) for a two-level supply chain under carbon tax, cap-
and-trade and carbon cap mechanisms. The order quantities that maximize the
expected profit of the buyer (system) under carbon tax, cap-and-trade and car-
bon cap mechanisms are presented in Theorems 22, 24 and 26 (23, 25 and 27),
respectively. In addition to quantity discounts and carbon credit sharing, we pro-
pose carbon price discounts so as to coordinate the channel (see Theorems 28 to
39).
Under the deterministic demand setting of our study, we consider the procure-
ment decisions of an item with a cost-minimizing objective. This can be extended
under the assumption that the demand is a function of the retail price. For in-
stance, demand can be formulated as a linear or iso-elastic function of the retail
price. Additionally, we investigate a single-period replenishment problem under
stochastic demand. The emissions related considerations can also be integrated
into different periodic or continuous review inventory models under stochastic de-
mand. Also, we study the procurement decisions of a single item. An extension
to our model would be to consider the joint replenishment problem of multiple
items under environmental considerations.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Applications of
Coordination Theorems under
Deterministic Demand
A.1 Proofs of Coordination Mechanisms under
Deterministic Demand and Cap-and-Trade
Mechanism
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 3
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗s.
ii) BC(Q∗s) 6 BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iii) V C(Q∗s) 6 V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s)) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
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Let Q < Q∗s. Then BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q)). Since the global optimum
of BC(Q,Xb(Q)), namely Q
∗
d, satisfies Q
∗
d < Q
∗
s, Q
∗
d is the optimal solution of
BC(Q) when Q < Q∗s.
Let Q > Q∗s. Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− BC(Q
∗
s ,Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d,Xb(Q∗d))
D
×D
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− [BC(Q∗c , Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
Since BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is a convex function of Q from Proposition 1 and the
term −[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) − BC(Q∗d), Xb(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is
also a convex function of Q. Then the global optimum of BC(Q) is Q∗d. However,
Q∗d  Q∗s, implying Q∗d is not feasible when Q > Q∗s. Since BC(Q) is a convex
function in Q, we check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗s.
The buyer’s cost at Q∗s is
BC(Q∗s) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))]
= BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) +BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)), which gives
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− V C(Q∗s) = [V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q∗d))− V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s))]
−[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
Since
BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) > BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) + V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s))
or equivalently,
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s)) ≥ BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))
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due to channel coordination principles, V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− V C(Q∗s) > 0. Hence,
the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
s since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗s is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗s.
ii) BC(Q∗s) 6 BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iii) BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))+V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))−(pbc−psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
iv) V C(Q∗s) 6 V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q∗d)) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗s. Then BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q)). Since the global optimum
of BC(Q,Xb(Q)), namely Q
∗
d, satisfies Q
∗
d < Q
∗
s, Q
∗
d is the optimal solution of
BC(Q,Xb(Q)) when Q < Q
∗
s.
Let Q > Q∗s. Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q))−pbc×Y +[BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))+pbc×Y ]
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}+BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))
−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) + pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
Since BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is a convex function of Q from Proposition 1 and the
term −[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) − BC(Q∗d), Xb(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is
also a convex function of Q. Then the global optimum of BC(Q) is Q∗d. However,
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Q∗d  Q∗s, implying Q∗d is not feasible when Q > Q∗s. Since BC(Q) is a convex
function in Q, we check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗s.
The buyer’s cost at Q∗s is
BC(Q∗s) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
= BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) + p
s
c × Y − [BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))−BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))
+pbc × Y ], which gives
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))−(pbc−psc)×Y +[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))]
= V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s))−(pbc−psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}+BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))
−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)).
The total cost of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal to
BC(Q∗s)) + V C(Q
∗
s) = BC(Q
∗
d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) +BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))
−BC(Q∗d, Xv(Q∗d))− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))
−(pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)).
Recall from Equation (3.13), SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) +
V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}. Since the total cost of
the system under centralized model with carbon credit sharing is at least as good
as the total cost of the buyer and the vendor under decentralized model, we have
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BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} 6
BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
d, Xv(Q
∗
d)), which results in
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− [V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s))− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
+BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))] > 0. Hence,
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− V C(Q∗s) > 0, implying the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
s since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗s is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 7
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗s.
ii) BC(Q∗s) 6 BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iii) BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
c) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))+V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))−(pbc−psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
iv) V C(Q∗s) 6 V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q∗d)) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗s. Then BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q)). Since the global optimum
of BC(Q,Xb(Q)), namely Q
∗
d, satisfies Q
∗
d < Q
∗
s, Q
∗
d is the optimal solution of
BC(Q) when Q < Q∗s.
Let Q > Q∗s. Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d×D − pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
− [BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))− pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}]
D
×D
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= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
Since BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is a convex function of Q from Proposition 1 and the
term −[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) − BC(Q∗d), Xb(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is
also a convex function of Q. Then the global optimum of BC(Q) is Q∗d. However,
Q∗d  Q∗s, implying Q∗d is not feasible when Q > Q∗s. Since BC(Q) is a convex
function in Q, we check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗s.
The buyer’s cost at Q∗s is
BC(Q∗s) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))]
= BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) + p
s
c × Y + d×D, which gives
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) + p
s
c ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
+
[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))− pbc ×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}]
D
×D
= V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s))− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
+ [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
The total cost of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal to
BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = BC(Q
∗
d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) +BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))
−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))
− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
= SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)).
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Recall from Equation (3.13), SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) +
V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}. Since the total cost of
the system under centralized model with carbon credit sharing is at least as good
as the total cost of the buyer and the vendor under decentralized model, we have
BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)} ≤
BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
d, Xv(Q
∗
d)), which results in
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− [V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s))− (pbc − psc)×min {−Xb(Q∗s), Xv(Q∗s)}
+BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))] > 0.
Hence, V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− V C(Q∗s) > 0, implying the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
s since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗s is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
A.1.4 Proof of Theorem 9
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗s.
ii) BC(Q∗s) 6 BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iii) BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = SC(Q
∗
s, Xs(Q
∗
s))
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))+V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))−(pbc−psc)×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
iv) V C(Q∗s) 6 V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q∗d)) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗s. Then BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q)). Since the global optimum
of BC(Q,Xb(Q)), namely Q
∗
d, satisfies Q
∗
d < Q
∗
s, Q
∗
d is the optimal solution of
BC(Q) when Q < Q∗s.
Let Q > Q∗s. Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q,Xb(Q))− d¯×D + psc ×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
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= BC(Q,Xb(Q)) + p
s
c ×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
− BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)) + psc ×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
D
×D
= BC(Q,Xb(Q))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
Since BC(Q,Xb(Q)) is a convex function of Q from Proposition 1 and the
term −[BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s)) − BC(Q∗d), Xb(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is
also a convex function of Q. Then the global optimum of BC(Q) is Q∗d. However,
Q∗d  Q∗s, implying Q∗d is not feasible when Q > Q∗s. Since BC(Q) is a convex
function in Q, we check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗s.
The buyer’s cost at Q∗s is
BC(Q∗s) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s))− [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
= BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) + d¯×D − pbc × Y , which gives
V C(Q∗s) = V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))− pbc ×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
+
BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d)) + psc ×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
D
×D
= V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s))− (pbc − psc)×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
+ [BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))].
The total cost of the buyer and the vendor after coordination is equal to
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BC(Q∗s) + V C(Q
∗
s) = BC(Q
∗
d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))
− (pbc − psc)×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}+BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q∗s))
−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))
= BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s))
− (pbc − psc)×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
= SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)).
Recall from Equation (3.13), SC(Q∗s, Xs(Q
∗
s)) = BC(Q
∗
s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) +
V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}. Since the total cost of
the system under centralized model with carbon credit sharing is at least as good
as the total cost of the buyer and the vendor under decentralized model, we have
BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s)) + V C(Q
∗
s, Xv(Q
∗
s)) − (pbc − psc) × min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)} 6
BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q
∗
d)) + V C(Q
∗
d, Xv(Q
∗
d)), which results in
V C(Q∗d, Xv(Q
∗
d))− [V C(Q∗s, Xv(Q∗s))− (pbc − psc)×min {Xb(Q∗s),−Xv(Q∗s)}
+BC(Q∗s, Xb(Q
∗
s))−BC(Q∗d, Xb(Q∗d))] > 0.
Hence, V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗s) > 0, implying the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
s since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗s is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
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A.2 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Deterministic Demand and Cap-and-
Trade Mechanism
Table A.1: Application of Coordination Mechanisms under Cap-and-Trade Sys-
tem
Example Xb(Q
∗
s) Xv(Q
∗
s) Applied Coordination
Theorem Strategy
8 Xb(Q
∗
s) < 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) > 0 Theorem Vendor gives 20.811 carbon credits
5 to the buyer and the buyer makes
a fixed payment of 75.291
to the vendor for Q > Q∗s
13 Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) < 0 Theorem Buyer gives 5.929 carbon credits
9 to the vendor and vendor gives
a quantity discount of 0.354 per
unit to the buyer for Q > Q∗s
14 Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) > 0 Theorem Vendor gives a quantity discount
3 of 0.078 per unit to the buyer
for Q > Q∗s
15 Xb(Q
∗
s) < 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) > 0 Theorem Vendor gives 1.351 carbon credits
7 and a quantity discount of
0.259 per unit to the buyer
for Q > Q∗s
16 Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) < 0 Theorem Buyer gives 4.945 carbon credits
10 to the vendor and vendor gives
a quantity discount of 0.673 per
unit to the buyer for Q 6 Q∗s
17 Xb(Q
∗
c) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
c) > 0 Theorem Vendor gives a quantity discount
4 of 0.209 per unit to the buyer
for Q 6 Q∗s
18 Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) > 0 Theorem Vendor gives a quantity discount
4 of 0.229 per unit to the buyer for
Q 6 Q∗s
19 Xb(Q
∗
s) > 0 Xv(Q
∗
s) < 0 Theorem Buyer gives 6.243 carbon credits
10 to the vendor and vendor gives
a quantity discount of 0.253 per
unit to the buyer for Q 6 Q∗s
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Table A.2: The Costs of the Buyer and the Vendor after Coordination for Exam-
ples 8 and 13− 19
Example BC(Q∗s) V C(Q
∗
s)
8 979.983 422.365
13 746.107 614.521
14 627.826 552.493
15 739.996 848.166
16 644.981 818.75
17 1153.989 637.706
18 538.516 525.353
19 912.817 606.116
A.3 Proofs of Coordination Mechanisms un-
der Deterministic Demand and Carbon Tax
Mechanism
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 12
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) Giving quantity discount to the vendor is the convenient coordination mech-
anism at Q∗c .
iii) BC(Q∗c) 6 BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iv) V C(Q∗c) 6 V C(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then BC(Q) = BC(Q). Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex
function of Q, ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q)− d×D = BC(Q)− BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
×D
= BC(Q)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
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Since the term −[BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is a strictly
convex function of Q and ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function of Q, we check the
boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗c .
Suppose 2fbD−gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0. Since Q∗d < Q∗c , BT (Q∗c) 6 BT (Q∗d) from Propo-
sition 4. Thus, the buyer’s average annual tax does not increase under centralized
solution and he/she does not need to be compensated by paying his/her taxes.
Suppose 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d 6 0. Since Q∗d < Q∗c , V T (Q∗c) > V T (Q∗d) from from
Proposition 5. Thus, the vendor’s average annual tax does not decrease under
centralized solution and it is not plausible for the vendor to pay the buyer’s taxes
to compensate his/her loss. Therefore, quantity discount should be given to the
vendor at Q∗c .
The buyer’s cost at Q∗c is
BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
c)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] = BC(Q∗d).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗c) = V C(Q
∗
c) +BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d), which gives
V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c) = [V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c)]− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
Since V C(Q∗d) − V C(Q∗c) > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor’s gain from
the centralized solution is no less than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized
solution) due to channel coordination principles, V C(Q∗d)−V C(Q∗c) > 0. Hence,
the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
c since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗c is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
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A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 14
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) Paying BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) amount of buyer’s average annual tax is the
convenient coordination mechanism at Q∗c .
iii) BC(Q∗c) 6 BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iv) V C(Q∗c) 6 V C(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then BC(Q) = BC(Q). Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex
function in Q, ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] = BC(Q) +BC(Q∗d)−BC(Q∗c).
Since the term BC(Q∗d)−BC(Q∗c) does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is a strictly
convex function of Q and ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function of Q, we check the
boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗c .
Since min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d),
BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d) > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) and V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c) > BC(Q∗c)−
BC(Q∗d). That is, buyer’s average annual tax increases and vendor’s average
annual tax decreases by an amount at least as large as the buyer’s loss from
the centralized solution. Then, the vendor can compensate the buyer by paying
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) amount of his/her average annual tax if he/she orders Q∗c .
The buyer’s cost at Q∗c is
BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
c)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] = BC(Q∗d).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
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The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗c) = V C(Q
∗
c) +BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d), which gives
V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c) = [V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c)]− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
Since V C(Q∗d) − V C(Q∗c) > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor’s gain from
the centralized solution is no less than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized
solution) due to channel coordination principles, V C(Q∗d)−V C(Q∗c) > 0. Hence,
the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
c since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗c is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
A.3.3 Proof of Theorem 16
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) The vendor pays min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} amount of
the buyer’s taxes and gives additional quantity discount at Q∗c .
iii) BC(Q∗c) 6 BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iv) V C(Q∗c) 6 V C(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then BC(Q) = BC(Q). Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex
function of Q, ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q)− d¯×D −min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}
= BC(Q)−min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}
−D × [BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d)−min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)}]
D
= BC(Q)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
162
Since the term −[BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is a
strictly convex function of Q and ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order
quantity. However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function of Q, we
check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗c .
Since 2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d 6 0 and Q∗d < Q∗c , BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) from Propo-
sition 4. Also, since 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0 and Q∗d < Q∗c , V T (Q∗c) 6 V T (Q∗d)
from Proposition 5. Since min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} 6
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d), either the vendor’s gain in average annual taxes is not suffi-
cient to compensate the buyer’s loss in centralized solution or the buyer’s loss is
greater than his/her loss in average annual taxes in centralized solution. Thus,
the buyer should pay min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} amount of
the vendor’s taxes and give additional quantity discount if the buyer orders Q∗c .
The buyer’s cost at Q∗c is
BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
c)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] = BC(Q∗d).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗c) = V C(Q
∗
c) +BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d), which gives
V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c) = [V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c)]− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
Since V C(Q∗d) − V C(Q∗c) > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor’s gain from
the centralized solution is no less than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized
solution) due to channel coordination principles, V C(Q∗d)−V C(Q∗c) > 0. Hence,
the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
c since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗c is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
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A.4 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Deterministic Demand and Carbon
Tax Mechanism
Example 20: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d > 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d < 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) >
V T (Q∗d). That is, the buyer’s average annual tax decreases and the vendor’s
average annual tax increases under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from
ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) = 10.8789. Since
BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q
∗
d), the buyer does not need to be compensated by paying his/her
taxes. Then according to Theorem 12, loss of the buyer should be compensated by
giving quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to the loss of the
buyer is 10.8789/D = 10.8789/90 = 0.1209 per unit. Hence, the corresponding
coordination strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity discount of 0.1209 per
unit for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 180.0433 to the buyer. The
costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) =
2045.1418 and V C(Q∗c) = 2864.6082.
Example 21: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d < 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d < 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) >
V T (Q∗d). That is, both the buyer and the vendor’s average annual taxes increase
under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized
optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 8.2355. Since V T (Q∗c) > V T (Q∗d), it
is not plausible for the vendor to pay the buyer’s loss in average annual taxes.
Then according to Theorem 12, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to the loss of the buyer is
8.2355/D = 8.2355/50 = 0.1647 per unit. Hence, the corresponding coordination
strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity discount of 0.1647 per unit for order
sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 169.6053 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1522.7128
and V C(Q∗c) = 1623.7183.
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Example 23: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8,
2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d > 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q∗d) and
V T (Q∗c) < V T (Q
∗
d). That is, both the buyer and the vendor’s average an-
nual taxes decrease under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from or-
dering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 14.6105. Since
BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q
∗
d), the buyer does not need to be compensated by paying
his/her taxes. Then according to Theorem 12, loss of the buyer should be com-
pensated by giving quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to
the loss of the buyer is 14.6105/D = 14.6105/50 = 0.2922 per unit. Hence,
the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity dis-
count of 0.2922 per unit for order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 93.1711
to the buyer. The costs of the buyer and the vendor after coordination are
BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1218.3282 and V C(Q
∗
c) = 1479.052.
Example 26: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d > 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) >
V T (Q∗d). That is, both the buyer and the vendor’s average annual taxes increase
under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized
optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 2.0111. Since V T (Q∗c) > V T (Q∗d), it
is not plausible for the vendor to pay the buyer’s loss in average annual taxes.
Then according to Theorem 13, loss of the buyer should be compensated by
giving quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to the loss of the
buyer is 2.0111/D = 2.0111/40 = 0.0503 per unit. Hence, the corresponding
coordination strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity discount of 0.0503 per
unit for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 158.5226 to the buyer. The costs of
the buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1910.4665
and V C(Q∗c) = 147.8282.
Example 29: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8,
2fbD − gbQ∗cQ∗d < 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d < 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q∗d) and
V T (Q∗c) < V T (Q
∗
d). That is, both the buyer and the vendor’s average an-
nual taxes decrease under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from or-
dering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 8.4815. Since
BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q
∗
d), the buyer does not need to be compensated by paying his/her
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taxes. Then according to Theorem 13, loss of the buyer should be compensated
by giving quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to the loss of
the buyer is 8.4815/D = 14.6105/50 = 0.1696 per unit. Hence, the corresponding
coordination strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity discount of 0.1696 per
unit for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 140.6422 to the buyer. The costs of
the buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1564.3289
and V C(Q∗c) = 1545.5539.
Example 30: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d < 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) >
V T (Q∗d). That is, the buyer’s average annual tax decreases and the vendor’s
average annual tax increases under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from
ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c)− BC(Q∗d) = 0.1822. Since
BT (Q∗c) < BT (Q
∗
d), the buyer does not need to be compensated by paying his/her
taxes. Then according to Theorem 13, loss of the buyer should be compensated
by giving quantity discount. The corresponding quantity discount to the loss of
the buyer is 0.1822/D = 0.1822/40 = 0.0046 per unit. Hence, the corresponding
coordination strategy of the vendor is to give a quantity discount of 0.0046 per
unit for order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 137.3606 to the buyer. The costs of
the buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1281.8429
and V C(Q∗c) = 1166.1681.
Example 31: As seen in Table 4.3, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d > 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d < 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) <
V T (Q∗d). That is, the buyer’s average annual tax increases and the vendor’s
average annual tax decreases under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c)− BC(Q∗d) = 55.0751.
However, min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} = BT (Q∗c) − BT (Q∗d) =
18.1009 < BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 55.0751. That is, paying the buyer’s loss in
average annual taxes is not sufficient to compensate his loss from ordering cen-
tralized optimal quantity. Then according to Theorem 17, the remaining loss of
the buyer should be compensated by giving quantity discount. The remaining
loss of the buyer is 55.0751− 18.1009 = 36.9742 and the corresponding quantity
166
discount is 36.9742/D = 36.9742/500 = 0.0739 per unit. Hence, the correspond-
ing coordination strategy of the vendor is to pay 18.1009 amount of the buyer’s
taxes and to give him/her a quantity discount of 0.0739 per unit for order sizes
less than or equal to Q∗c = 531.7743. The costs of the buyer and the vendor after
coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 11933.105 and V C(Q
∗
c) = 13196.2544.
Example 32: As seen in Table 4.6, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . Also, using Table 4.8, 2fbD −
gbQ
∗
cQ
∗
d < 0 and 2fvP − gvQ∗cQ∗d > 0, i.e., BT (Q∗c) > BT (Q∗d) and V T (Q∗c) <
V T (Q∗d). That is, the buyer’s average annual tax increases and the vendor’s
average annual tax decreases under the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from
ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) = 25.2767. Also,
min {BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d), V T (Q∗d)− V T (Q∗c)} = BT (Q∗c)−BT (Q∗d) = 26.2282 >
BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 25.2767. That is, the decrease in the vendor’s average
annual taxes is greater than the increase in buyer’s average annual taxes. Then
according to Theorem 14, loss of the buyer is compensated when the vendor pays
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) = 25.2767 amount of the buyer’s taxes for order sizes greater
than or equal to Q∗c = 53.7924. The costs of the buyer and the vendor after
coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 1232.8427 and V C(Q
∗
c) = 1549.2174.
Table A.3: Application of Coordination Mechanisms under Carbon Tax Mecha-
nism
Example BC(Q∗c) Applied Coordination BC(Q
∗
c) V C(Q
∗
c)
Index −BC(Q∗d) Theorem Strategy
20 10.8789 Theorem 12 Give a quantity 2045.1418 2864.6082
discount of 0.1209
per unit for Q > Q∗c
21 8.2355 Theorem 12 Give a quantity 1522.7128 1623.7183
discount of 0.1647
per unit for Q > Q∗c
23 14.6105 Theorem 12 Give a quantity 1218.3282 1479.052
discount of 0.2922
per unit for Q > Q∗c
26 2.0111 Theorem 13 Give a quantity 1910.4665 147.8282
discount of 0.0503
per unit for Q 6 Q∗c
29 8.4815 Theorem 13 Give a quantity 1564.3289 1545.5539
discount of 0.1696
per unit for Q 6 Q∗c
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Table A.4: Application of Coordination Mechanisms Proposed in Section 4.1.3
(Continued)
Example BC(Q∗c) Applied Coordination BC(Q
∗
c) V C(Q
∗
c)
Index −BC(Q∗d) Theorem Strategy
30 0.1822 Theorem 13 Give a quantity 1281.8429 1166.1681
discount of 0.0046
per unit for Q 6 Q∗c
31 55.0751 Theorem 17 Pay 18.1009 amount 11933.105 13196.2544
of the buyer’s taxes
and give a quantity
discount of 0.0739
per unit for Q 6 Q∗c
32 25.2767 Theorem 14 Pay 25.2767 amount 1232.8427 1549.2174
of the buyer’s taxes
for Q > Q∗c
A.5 Proofs of Coordination Mechanisms under
Deterministic Demand and Carbon Cap
Mechanism
A.5.1 Proof of Theorem 20
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) BC(Q∗c) 6 BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the buyer is not worse off.)
iii) V C(Q∗c) 6 V C(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor is not worse off.)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then BC(Q) = BC(Q). Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex
function of Q, ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then
BC(Q) = BC(Q)− d×D = BC(Q)− BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d)
D
×D
= BC(Q)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
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Since the term −[BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d)] does not depend on Q, BC(Q) is a
strictly convex function of Q and ∂BC(Q)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order
quantity. However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since BC(Q) is a strictly convex function of Q, we
check the boundary condition, i.e., the buyer orders Q∗c .
The buyer’s cost at Q∗c is
BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
c)− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)] = BC(Q∗d).
Hence, the buyer is not worse off.
The vendor’s cost after coordination is
V C(Q∗c) = V C(Q
∗
c) +BC(Q
∗
c)−BC(Q∗d), which gives
V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c) = [V C(Q∗d)− V C(Q∗c)]− [BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)].
Since V C(Q∗d) − V C(Q∗c) > BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d) (i.e., the vendor’s gain from
the centralized solution is no less than the buyer’s loss from the decentralized
solution) due to channel coordination principles, V C(Q∗d)−V C(Q∗c) > 0. Hence,
the vendor is not worse off.
The buyer is indifferent between ordering Q∗d and Q
∗
c since they result in the
same cost. Hence, Q∗c is the channel coordinating order quantity. 
A.6 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Deterministic Demand and Carbon
Cap Mechanism
Example 33: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 34: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 4.8683.
169
According to Theorem 20, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 4.8683/D = 4.8683/50 = 0.0974 per unit for
order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 63.2456 to the buyer. The costs of
the buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 690 and
V C(Q∗c) = 468.113883.
Example 35: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 36: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15 in, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 7.1704.
According to Theorem 20, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 7.1704/D = 7.1704/50 = 0.1434 per unit for
order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 100 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 715.3296 and
V C(Q∗c) = 607.1704.
Example 37: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 38: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 39: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 0.1345.
According to Theorem 21, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 0.1345/D = 0.1345/50 = 0.0027 per unit for
order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 138.7596 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 773.2051 and
V C(Q∗c) = 477.6205.
Example 40: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
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from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 4.9341.
According to Theorem 20, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 4.9341/D = 4.9341/50 = 0.0987 per unit for
order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 95.9166 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 748.324 and
V C(Q∗c) = 491.4676.
Example 41: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 4.2618.
According to Theorem 21, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 4.2618/D = 4.2618/50 = 0.0852 per unit for
order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 161.4083 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 800.3517 and
V C(Q∗c) = 478.4444.
Example 42: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d < Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 1.3932.
According to Theorem 20, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 1.3932/D = 1.3932/50 = 0.0852 per unit for
order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c = 100 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 823.6068 and
V C(Q∗c) = 739.7265.
Example 43: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 44: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 45: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 0.5103.
According to Theorem 21, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
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quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 0.5103/D = 0.5103/50 = 0.0852 per unit for
order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 77.556 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 773.75 and
V C(Q∗c) = 448.3044.
Example 46: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
Example 47: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d > Q
∗
c . The buyer’s loss
from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is BC(Q∗c) − BC(Q∗d) = 6.2844.
According to Theorem 21, loss of the buyer should be compensated by giving
quantity discount. Hence, the corresponding coordination strategy of the vendor
is to give a quantity discount of 6.2844/D = 6.2844/50 = 0.1257 per unit for
order sizes less than or equal to Q∗c = 143.0194 to the buyer. The costs of the
buyer and the vendor after coordination are BC(Q∗c) = BC(Q
∗
d) = 826.3605 and
V C(Q∗c) = 488.2822.
Example 48: As seen in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Q∗d = Q
∗
c . Thus, the channel is
already coordinated and there is no need to apply a coordination mechanism.
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Table A.5: Application of Coordination Mechanisms under Carbon Cap Mecha-
nism
Example BC(Q∗c) Applied Quantity BC(Q
∗
c) V C(Q
∗
c)
Index −BC(Q∗d) Theorem Discount
33 - - - 700.7165 459.1886
34 4.8683 Theorem 20 0.0974 for Q > Q∗c 690 468.1139
35 - - - 671.25 453.75
36 7.1704 Theorem 20 0.1434 for Q > Q∗c 715.3296 607.1704
37 - - - 717.2259 611.3446
38 - - - 766.5115 1477.486
39 0.1345 Theorem 21 0.0027 for Q 6 Q∗c 773.2051 477.6205
40 4.9341 Theorem 20 0.0987 for Q > Q∗c 748.324 491.4676
41 4.2618 Theorem 21 0.0852 for Q 6 Q∗c 800.3517 478.4444
42 1.3932 Theorem 20 0.0279 for Q > Q∗c 823.6068 739.7265
43 - - - 850 738.3333
44 - - - 773.75 450
45 0.5103 Theorem 21 0.0102 for Q 6 Q∗c 773.75 448.3044
46 - - - 848.4415 513.4473
47 6.2844 Theorem 21 0.1257 for Q 6 Q∗c 826.3605 488.2822
48 - - - 850.4478 539.9243
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Appendix B
Proofs and Applications of
Coordination Theorems under
Stochastic Demand
B.1 Proofs of Coordination Theorems under
Stochastic Demand and Carbon Tax Mech-
anism
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 28
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb). Since Jb(Q, cb) is a strictly concave
function in Q, ∂Jb(Q, cb)/∂Q = 0 gives Q
∗
d as the optimal order quantity.
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Let Q > Q∗c . Then the expected profit function of the buyer is
J b(Q) =− (tt + cv)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
− Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) + Jb(Q∗d, cb).
(B.1)
Since J b(.) is a strictly concave function, the maximizer of Expression (B.1)
can be found by checking the first order condition. That is,
J
′
b(Q) = −(tt + cv) + pQf(Q) +
∫ Q
0
vf(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
(p+ s)f(x) dx− pQf(Q) = 0.
This gives
F (Qcrd) =
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s+ v
.
This results in
Qcrd = F
−1(
p+ s− cv − tt
p+ s+ v
) = Q∗c .
Hence, the buyer orders Q∗c . The buyer’s expected profit after coordination is
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d)− [Jb(Q∗c , cb − d)− Jb(Q∗d, cb)] = Jb(Q∗d, cb).
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.

B.1.2 Proof of Theorem 29
It suffices to show that
i) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
ii) The buyer orders Q∗c .
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The expected profit function after coordination is given by
J b(Q) = −(cb+ tb−d)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+(Q−x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx.
This is equivalent to
J b(Q) =(v − cb − tb + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
Q∗c
)Q+ (p− v)µ
− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q
(x−Q)f(x) dx.
where µ =
∫∞
0
xf(x) dx is the expected value of the demand.
Similarly, the expected profit at Q∗c after coordination is given by
J b(Q
∗
c) =(v − cb − tb)Q∗c + (p− v)µ− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q∗c
(x−Q∗c)f(x) dx
+ Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb).
This is equivalent to
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) = Jb(Q∗d, cb). (B.2)
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
In order to show the buyer orders Q∗c units, we need to show Q
∗
d < Q
∗
d(cb−d) <
Q∗c .
Since cb − d < cb, we have F (Q∗d(cb − d)) > F (Q∗d). This implies Q∗d <
Q∗d(cb−d). We also have Jb(Q∗d, cb−d) > Jb(Q∗d, cb) since Jb(Q, cb) is a decreasing
function of cb for fixed values of Q. Since Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d) = Jb(Q∗d, cb) from Equation
(B.2), then we have Jb(Q
∗
d, cb−d) > Jb(Q∗c , cb−d). IfQ∗c > Q∗d andQ∗d < Q∗d(cb−d),
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb − d) > Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) holds if and only if Q∗d < Q∗d(cb − d) < Q∗c due to
the strict concavity of Jb(Q, cb) with respect to Q.
Hence, Jb(Q, cb − d) < J b(Q∗c) = Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) ∀Q > Q∗c . Since Q∗d is the
maximizer of Jb(Q, cb), Jb(Q, cb) < Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) ∀Q < Q∗c and
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Q 6= Q∗d.
Thus, Q∗c is the maximizer of the new pricing schedule. 
B.2 Proofs of Coordination Theorems under
Stochastic Demand and Cap-and-Trade
Mechanism
B.2.1 Proof of Theorem 32
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb). Since Jb(Q, cb) is a strictly concave
function in Q, ∂Jb(Q,cb)
∂Q
= 0 gives Q∗d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then the expected profit function of the buyer is
J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb)+pc×Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
pc
= Jb(Q, cb)+Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)−Jb(Q∗c , cb).
Since the term Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) does not depend on Q and Jb(Q, cb) is a
strictly concave function, the expected profit maximizing value of Q is Q∗d from
the first order condition. However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since J b(Q) is a strictly concave
function, we check the boundary condition. Thus, the buyer orders Q∗c .
Since Xb(Q
∗
c) = Q
∗
c − Qb 6 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c − Qv > 0, the buyer buys
and the vendor sells carbon credit at Q∗c . Also, pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} >
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb). Then, the minimum of the amount of credit buyer buys
and vendor sells is sufficient to compensate the buyer’s loss from ordering the
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centralized optimal quantity. Thus, the vendor can compensate the buyer’s loss
by giving him/her carbon credits for free.
The buyer’s expected profit at Q∗c is
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) = Jb(Q∗d, cb).
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.

B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 33
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb). Since Jb(Q, cb) is a strictly concave
function in Q, ∂Jb(Q, cb)/∂Q = 0 gives Q
∗
d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then the expected profit function of the buyer is
J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb) + min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} ×
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)
min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}
.
This is equivalent to
J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb).
Since the term Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) does not depend on Q and Jb(Q, cb) is a
strictly concave function, the expected profit maximizing value of Q is Q∗d from
the first order condition. However, Q∗d  Q∗c . Since J b(Q) is a strictly concave
function, we check the boundary condition. Thus, the buyer orders Q∗c .
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Since Xb(Q
∗
c) = Q
∗
c − Qb 6 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Q∗c − Qv > 0, the buyer buys
and the vendor sells carbon credit at Q∗c . Also, pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} >
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb). Then, the minimum of the amount of credit buyer buys
and vendor sells is sufficient to compensate the buyer’s loss from ordering the
centralized optimal quantity. Thus, the vendor can compensate the buyer’s loss
by giving him carbon credits at a discounted price.
The buyer’s expected profit at Q∗c is
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) = Jb(Q∗d, cb).
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
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B.2.3 Proof of Theorem 34
It suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q∗c .
ii) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
Let Q < Q∗c . Then J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb). Since Jb(Q, cb) is a strictly concave
function in Q, ∂Jb(Q, cb)/∂Q = 0 gives Q
∗
d as the optimal order quantity.
Let Q > Q∗c . Then the expected profit function of the buyer is
J b(Q) =− (cv + 2pc)Q+ pcQb +
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx+ pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}
− Jb(Q∗c , cb − d)− pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}+ Jb(Q∗d, cb).
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This is equivalent to
J b(Q) =− (cv + 2pc)Q+ pcQb +
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx− Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) + Jb(Q∗d, cb).
(B.3)
Since J b(.) is a strictly concave function, the maximizer of Expression (B.3)
can be found by checking the first order condition. That is,
J
′
b(Q) = −(cv + 2pc) +pQf(Q) +
∫ Q
0
vf(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
(p+s)f(x) dx−pQf(Q) = 0.
This gives
F (Qcrd) =
p+ s− cv − 2pc
p+ s+ v
.
This results in
Qcrd = F
−1(
p+ s− cv − 2pc
p+ s+ v
) = Q∗c .
Hence, the buyer orders Q∗c . The buyer’s expected profit after coordination is
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d)− [Jb(Q∗c , cb − d)− Jb(Q∗d, cb)] = Jb(Q∗d, cb).
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.

B.2.4 Proof of Theorem 35
It suffices to show that
i) J b(Q
∗
c) > Jb(Q∗d, cb)
ii) The buyer orders Q∗c .
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The expected profit function after coordination is given by
J b(Q) =− (cb + pc − d)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx+ pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}.
This is equivalent to
J b(Q) =(v − cb − pc + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb)− pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}
Q∗c
)Q
+ (p− v)µ− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q
(x−Q)f(x) dx+ pcQb
+ pc ×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}.
where µ =
∫∞
0
xf(x) dx is the expected value of the demand.
Similarly, the expected profit at Q∗c after coordination is given by
J b(Q
∗
c) =(v − cb − pc)Q∗c + (p− v)µ− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q∗c
(x−Q∗c)f(x) dx+ pcQb
+ Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb).
This is equivalent to
J b(Q
∗
c) = Jb(Q
∗
c , cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb)− Jb(Q∗c , cb) = Jb(Q∗d, cb). (B.4)
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c units.
Since the amount of carbon credit min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} given by the ven-
dor to the buyer does not depend onQ, the optimal order quantities of Jb(Q, cb−d)
and J b(Q) are the same. This implies that in order to show the buyer orders Q
∗
c
units, we need to show Q∗d < Q
∗
d(cb − d) < Q∗c .
Since cb − d < cb, we have F (Q∗d(cb − d)) > F (Q∗d). This implies Q∗d <
Q∗d(cb−d). We also have Jb(Q∗d, cb−d) > Jb(Q∗d, cb) since Jb(Q, cb) is a decreasing
function of cb for fixed values of Q. From Equation (B.4), we have J b(Q
∗
c) =
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Jb(Q
∗
c , cb− d) + pc×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} = Jb(Q∗d, cb). Then Jb(Q∗d, cb− d) >
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) + pc × min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}, which implies Jb(Q∗d, cb − d) >
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d). If Q∗c > Q∗d and Q∗d < Q∗d(cb − d), Jb(Q∗d, cb − d) > Jb(Q∗c , cb − d)
holds if and only if Q∗d < Q
∗
d(cb − d) < Q∗c due to the strict concavity of Jb(Q, cb)
with respect to Q.
Thus, Jb(Q, cb − d) < Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) ∀Q > Q∗c , which implies J b(Q) <
J b(Q
∗
c) ∀Q > Q∗c . Since Q∗d is the maximizer of Jb(Q, cb), Jb(Q, cb) <
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) = J b(Q
∗
c) ∀Q < Q∗c and Q 6= Q∗d.
Hence, Q∗c is the maximizer of the new pricing schedule. 
B.3 Proofs of Coordination Theorems under
Stochastic Demand and Carbon Cap Mech-
anism
B.3.1 Proof of Theorem 36
Since Q0d 6 Qcap, Q∗d = Q0d from Theorem 26. Similarly, since Q0c 6 Qcap, Q∗c = Q0c
from Theorem 27. Then it suffices to show that
i) The buyer orders Q0c .
ii) J b(Q
0
c) > Jb(Q0d, cb)
Let Q < Q0c . Then J b(Q) = Jb(Q, cb). Since Jb(Q, cb) is a strictly concave
function in Q, ∂Jb(Q, cb)/∂Q = 0 gives Q
0
d as the optimal order quantity.
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Let Q > Q0c . Then the expected profit function of the buyer is
J b(Q) =− cvQ+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx
− Jb(Q0c , cb − d) + Jb(Q0d, cb).
(B.5)
Since J b(.) is a strictly concave function, the maximizer of Expression (B.5)
can be found by checking the first order condition. That is,
J
′
b(Q) = −cv + pQf(Q) +
∫ Q
0
vf(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
(p+ s)f(x) dx− pQf(Q) = 0.
This gives
F (Qcrd) =
p+ s− cv
p+ s+ v
.
This results in
Qcrd = F
−1(
p+ s− cv
p+ s+ v
) = Q0c .
Since Q0c 6 Qcap, the buyer orders Q0c . The buyer’s expected profit after
coordination is
J b(Q
0
c) = Jb(Q
0
c , cb − d)− [Jb(Q0c , cb − d)− Jb(Q0d, cb)] = Jb(Q0d, cb).
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c = Q
0
c
units. 
B.3.2 Proof of Theorem 37
Since Q0d 6 Qcap, Q∗d = Q0d from Theorem 26. Similarly, since Q0c 6 Qcap, Q∗c = Q0c
from Theorem 27. Then it suffices to show that
i) J b(Q
0
c) > Jb(Q0d, cb)
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ii) The buyer orders Q0c .
The expected profit function after coordination is given by
J b(Q) = −(cb − d)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx.
This is equivalent to
J b(Q) = (v−cb+Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Q0c , cb)
Q0c
)Q+(p−v)µ−(p+s−v)
∫ ∞
Q
(x−Q)f(x) dx.
where µ =
∫∞
0
xf(x) dx is the expected value of the demand.
Similarly, the expected profit at Q0c after coordination is given by
J b(Q
0
c) =(v − cb)Q0c + (p− v)µ− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q0c
(x−Q0c)f(x) dx+ Jb(Q0d, cb)
− Jb(Q0c , cb).
This is equivalent to
J b(Q
0
c) = Jb(Q
0
c , cb) + Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Q0c , cb) = Jb(Q0d, cb). (B.6)
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Q0c units.
In order to show the buyer orders Q0c units, we need to show Q
0
d < Q
0
d(cb−d) <
Q0c .
Since cb − d < cb, we have F (Q0d(cb − d)) > F (Q0d). This implies Q0d <
Q0d(cb−d). We also have Jb(Q0d, cb−d) > Jb(Q0d, cb) since Jb(Q, cb) is a decreasing
function of cb for fixed values of Q. Since Jb(Q
0
c , cb−d) = Jb(Q0d, cb) from Equation
(B.6), then we have Jb(Q
0
d, cb−d) > Jb(Q0c , cb−d). IfQ0c > Q0d andQ0d < Q0d(cb−d),
Jb(Q
0
d, cb − d) > Jb(Q0c , cb − d) holds if and only if Q0d < Q0d(cb − d) < Q0c due to
the strict concavity of Jb(Q, cb) with respect to Q.
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Hence, Jb(Q, cb − d) < J b(Q0c) = Jb(Q0c , cb − d) ∀Q > Q0c . Since Q0d is the
maximizer of Jb(Q, cb), Jb(Q, cb) < Jb(Q
0
d, cb) = Jb(Q
0
c , cb − d) ∀Q < Q0c and
Q 6= Q0d.
Thus, Q∗c = Q
0
c is the maximizer of the new pricing schedule. 
B.3.3 Proof of Theorem 38
Since Q0d 6 Qcap, Q∗d = Q0d from Theorem 26. Similarly, since Q0c > Qcap,
Q∗c = Qcap from Theorem 27. Then it suffices to show that
i) J b(Qcap) > Jb(Q0d, cb)
ii) The buyer orders Qcap.
The expected profit function after coordination is given by
J b(Q) = −(cb − d)Q+
∫ Q
0
[px+ (Q− x)v]f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
Q
[pQ− (x−Q)s]f(x) dx.
This is equivalent to
J b(Q) =(v − cb + Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Qcap, cb)
Qcap
)Q+ (p− v)µ
− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Q
(x−Q)f(x) dx.
where µ =
∫∞
0
xf(x) dx is the expected value of the demand.
Similarly, the expected profit at Qcap after coordination is given by
J b(Qcap) =(v − cb)Qcap + (p− v)µ− (p+ s− v)
∫ ∞
Qcap
(x−Qcap)f(x) dx
+ Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Qcap, cb).
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This is equivalent to
J b(Qcap) = Jb(Qcap, cb) + Jb(Q
0
d, cb)− Jb(Qcap, cb) = Jb(Q0d, cb). (B.7)
This implies that the buyer stays in a no worse situation by ordering Qcap units.
In order to show the buyer orders Qcap units, we need to show Q
0
d < Q
0
d(cb −
d) < Qcap.
Since cb−d < cb, we have F (Q0d(cb−d)) > F (Q0d). This implies Q0d < Q0d(cb−
d). We also have Jb(Q
0
d, cb−d) > Jb(Q0d, cb) since Jb(Q, cb) is a decreasing function
of cb for fixed values of Q. Since Jb(Qcap, cb−d) = Jb(Q0d, cb) from Equation (B.7),
then we have Jb(Q
0
d, cb− d) > Jb(Qcap, cb− d). If Qcap > Q0d and Q0d < Q0d(cb− d),
Jb(Q
0
d, cb − d) > Jb(Qcap, cb − d) holds if and only if Q0d < Q0d(cb − d) < Qcap due
to the strict concavity of Jb(Q, cb) with respect to Q.
Hence, Jb(Q, cb − d) < J b(Q∗c) = J b(Qcap) = Jb(Qcap, cb − d) ∀Q > Qcap.
Since Q∗d = Q
0
d is the maximizer of Jb(Q, cb), Jb(Q, cb) < Jb(Q
0
d, cb) = Jb(Qcap, cb−
d) ∀Q < Qcap and Q 6= Q0d.
Thus, Q∗c = Qcap is the maximizer of the new pricing schedule. 
B.4 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Stochastic Demand and Carbon Tax
Mechanism
Example 49: According to Theorem 28, channel coordination can be achieved
by a quantity discount of d = cb − cv − tv given by the vendor to the buyer
and a fixed payment of amount Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb) made by the buyer
to the vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c . After receiving
a discount of d = cb − cv − tv = 4, the expected profit of the buyer becomes
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d) = 1299.565217. The buyer should make a fixed payment of amount
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 1299.565217 − 294.3478261 = 1005.217391. Thus,
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the expected profit of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb− d)− [Jb(Q∗c , cb−
d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb)] = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 294.3478261. The expected profit of the vendor
after coordination is 1005.217391.
Example 50: According to Theorem 29, channel coordination can be achieved
by a quantity discount of [Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c)]/Q∗c given by the vendor to the
buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c . Then the discount given
by the vendor to the buyer is d = [Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c)]/Q∗c = [200.1454545 −
141.9636364]/230.5454545 = 0.252365931. Thus, the expected profit of the buyer
after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 200.1454545. The expected
profit of the vendor after coordination is 864.
B.5 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Stochastic Demand and Cap-and-
Trade Mechanism
Example 51: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb−Q∗c > 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Qv−Q∗c > 0,
i.e., the buyer and the vendor both sell carbon credit under the centralized
solution. Thus, the buyer does not need extra carbon credit. According to
Theorem 30, channel coordination can be achieved by quantity discount of
d = cb− cv − pc given by the vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment of amount
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb) made by the buyer to the vendor for the order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗c . After receiving a discount of d = cb−cv−pc = 4, the
expected profit of the buyer becomes Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) = 18791.30435. The buyer
should make a fixed payment of amount Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d)−Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 18791.30435−
8982.608696 = 9808.695652 Thus, the expected profit of the buyer after coordi-
nation is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb− d)− [Jb(Q∗c , cb− d)− Jb(Q∗d, cb)] = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 8982.608696.
The expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 9808.695652.
Example 52: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb−Q∗c < 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Qv −Q∗c <
0, i.e., the buyer and the vendor both buy carbon credit under the centralized
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solution. Since Xb(Q
∗
c) < 0 and Xv(Q
∗
c) < 0, the buyer needs carbon credit
but the vendor does not have any carbon credit to give to the buyer. According
to Theorem 31, channel coordination can be achieved by a quantity discount of
[Jb(Q
∗
d)− Jb(Q∗c)]/Q∗c given by the vendor to the buyer for the order sizes greater
than or equal to Q∗c . Then the discount given by the vendor to the buyer is d =
[Jb(Q
∗
d)−Jb(Q∗c)]/Q∗c = [259.5833333−218.3333333]/191.6666667 = 0.215217391.
Thus, the expected profit of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) =
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) = 259.5833333. The expected profit of the vendor after coordination is
533.75.
Example 53: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb−Q∗c < 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Qv−Q∗c > 0,
i.e., the buyer buys and the vendor sells carbon credit under the centralized solu-
tion. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is Jb(Q
∗
d)−
Jb(Q
∗
c) = 656.9565217 − 611.7391304 = 45.2173913. min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} =
Xv(Q
∗
c) = 19.56521739 and pc×Xv(Q∗c) = 3× 19.56521739 = 58.69565217. Since
pc×Xv(Q∗c) = 58.69565217 > Jb(Q∗d)−Jb(Q∗c) = 45.2173913, giving carbon credit
for free to the buyer is sufficient to compensate his/her loss from ordering the
centralized optimal quantity. Then according to Theorem 32, channel coordina-
tion can be achieved if the vendor gives [Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c)]/pc amount of carbon
credits to the buyer for free for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c . The
amount of carbon credit corresponding to the loss of the buyer is 45.2173913/pc =
45.2173913/3 = 15.07246377. Thus, the expected profit of the buyer after coor-
dination is Jb(Q
∗
c) + pc × [Jb(Q∗d) − Jb(Q∗c)]/pc = Jb(Q∗d) = 656.9565217. The
expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 916.5217391.
Example 54: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb − Q∗c < 0 and Xv(Q∗c) =
Qv − Q∗c > 0, i.e., the buyer buys and the vendor sells carbon credit under
the centralized solution. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized op-
timal quantity is Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c) = 3964.583333 − 3906.25 = 58.33333333.
min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} = Xv(Q∗c) = 79.16666667 and pc × Xv(Q∗c) = 4 ×
79.16666667 = 316.6666667. Since pc × Xv(Q∗c) = 316.6666667 > Jb(Q∗d) −
Jb(Q
∗
c) = 58.33333333, giving carbon credits at a discounted price is suffi-
cient to compensate his/her loss from ordering the centralized optimal quan-
tity. Then according to Theorem 33, channel coordination can be achieved if
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the vendor gives Xb(Q
∗
c) amount of carbon credits to the buyer with a carbon
price discount dc = [Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c)]/min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} for the order
sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c . The corresponding carbon price discount is
[3964.583333 − 3906.25]/79.16666667 = 0.736842105. Thus, the expected profit
of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c) + min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} × [Jb(Q∗d) −
Jb(Q
∗
c)]/min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} = Jb(Q∗d) = 3964.583333. The expected profit
of the vendor after coordination is 2500.
Example 55: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb−Q∗c < 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Qv−Q∗c > 0,
i.e., the buyer buys and the vendor sells carbon credit under the centralized solu-
tion. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is Jb(Q
∗
d)−
Jb(Q
∗
c) = 756.1805556− 698.3333333 = 57.84722222. min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} =
Xv(Q
∗
c) = 6.666666667 and pc×Xv(Q∗c) = 2.5×6.666666667 = 16.66666667. Since
pc×Xb(Q∗c) = 16.66666667 < Jb(Q∗d)−Jb(Q∗c) = 57.84722222, giving carbon cred-
its for free is not sufficient to compensate his/her loss from ordering the centralized
optimal quantity. Then according to Theorem 34, channel coordination can be
achieved if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} amount of carbon credits for
free and a quantity discount of d = cb−cv−pc to the buyer and the buyer makes a
fixed payment of amount Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d)+pc×min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}−Jb(Q∗d, cb)
for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c . Then the amount of carbon
credits given by the vendor to the buyer for free is Xv(Q
∗
c) = 6.666666667
and the quantity discount offered is d = 3.5. After receiving the carbon
credits and the quantity discount, the expected profit of the buyer becomes
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) + pc × Xv(Q∗c) = 1620 + 16.66666667 = 1636.666667 The fixed
payment made by the buyer to the vendor is 1636.666667 − 756.1805556 =
880.4861111. Thus, the expected profit of the buyer after coordination is
Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − [Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb)] = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 756.1805556. The
expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 863.8194444.
Example 56: From Table 5.9, Xb(Q
∗
c) = Qb−Q∗c < 0 and Xv(Q∗c) = Qv−Q∗c > 0,
i.e., the buyer buys and the vendor sells carbon credit under the centralized solu-
tion. The buyer’s loss from ordering the centralized optimal quantity is Jb(Q
∗
d)−
Jb(Q
∗
c) = 1455.681818− 1370.454545 = 85.22727273. min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} =
−Xb(Q∗c) = 9.090909091 and −pc ×Xb(Q∗c) = 2.5× 9.090909091 = 22.72727273.
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Since −pc × Xb(Q∗c) = 22.72727273 < Jb(Q∗d) − Jb(Q∗c) = 85.22727273, giving
carbon credits for free is not sufficient to compensate his/her loss from ordering
the centralized optimal quantity. Then according to Theorem 35, channel co-
ordination can be achieved if the vendor gives min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)} amount
of carbon credits for free and a quantity discount of d = [Jb(Q
∗
d) − Jb(Q∗c) −
pc × min {−Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)}]/Q∗c to the buyer for the order sizes greater than
or equal to Q∗c . Then the amount of carbon credits given by the vendor to the
buyer for free is −Xb(Q∗c) = 9.090909091 and the quantity discount offered is
d = (85.22727273−22.72727273)/609.0909091 = 0.10261194. Thus, the expected
profit of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb) + Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) − Jb(Q∗c , cb) =
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) = 1455.681818. The expected profit of the vendor after coordination is
1437.5.
B.6 Application of Coordination Mechanisms
under Stochastic Demand and Carbon Cap
Mechanism
Example 57: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qv = 180. From
Tables 5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 160 and Q
0
c = 175. Since Q
0
d = 160 < Qcap = 180,
Q∗d = Q
0
d = 160 from Theorem 26. Similarly, since Q
0
c = 175 < Qcap = 180,
Q∗c = Q
0
c = 175 from Theorem 27. Then according to Theorem 36, channel
coordination can be achieved by a quantity discount of d = cb − cv given by the
vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment of amount Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb)
made by the buyer to the vendor for the order sizes greater than or equal to
Q∗c . After receiving a discount of d = cb − cv = 3, the expected profit of the
buyer becomes Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d) = 722.5. The buyer should make a fixed payment of
amount Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d)−Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 722.5−220 = 502.5. Thus, the expected profit
of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb − d) − [Jb(Q∗c , cb − d) − Jb(Q∗d, cb)] =
Jb(Q
∗
d, cb) = 220. The expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 502.5.
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Example 58: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qb = 160. From
Tables 5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 133.0434783 and Q
0
c = 153.9130435. Since
Q0d = 133.0434783 < Qcap = 160, Q
∗
d = Q
0
d = 133.0434783 from Theorem 26.
Similarly, since Q0c = 153.9130435 < Qcap = 160, Q
∗
c = Q
0
c = 153.9130435
from Theorem 27. Then according to Theorem 37, channel coordination can
be achieved by a quantity discount of [Jb(Q
0
d) − Jb(Q0c)]/Q0c given by the ven-
dor to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Q0c . Then the
discount given by the vendor to the buyer is d = [Jb(Q
0
d) − Jb(Q0c)]/Q0c =
[391.3043478 − 349.5652174]/153.9130435 = 0.271186441. Thus, the expected
profit of the buyer after coordination is Jb(Q
∗
c , cb−d) = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 391.3043478.
The expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 573.9130435.
Example 59: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qb = 170. From
Tables 5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 159.2307692 and Q
0
c = 173.0769231. Since
Q0d = 159.2307692 < Qcap = 170, Q
∗
d = Q
0
d = 159.2307692 from Theorem
26. Similarly, since Q0c = 173.0769231 > Qcap = 170, Q
∗
c = Qcap = 170
from Theorem 27. Then according to Theorem 38, channel coordination can
be achieved by a quantity discount of [Jb(Q
0
d)− Jb(Qcap)]/Qcap given by the ven-
dor to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Qcap. Then the
discount given by the vendor to the buyer is d = [Jb(Q
0
d) − Jb(Qcap)]/Qcap =
[573.4615385 − 548.3333333]/170 = 0.147812971. Thus, the expected profit of
the buyer after coordination is Jb(Qcap, cb − d) = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 573.4615385. The
expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 994.8717949.
Example 60: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qv = 1400. From
Tables 5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 1292.307692 and Q
0
c = 1430.769231. Since
Q0d = 1292.307692 < Qcap = 1400, Q
∗
d = Q
0
d = 1292.307692 from Theorem
26. Similarly, since Q0c = 1430.769231 > Qcap = 1400, Q
∗
c = Qcap = 1400
from Theorem 27. Then according to Theorem 38, channel coordination can be
achieved by a quantity discount of [Jb(Q
0
d) − Jb(Qcap)]/Qcap given by the ven-
dor to the buyer for the order sizes greater than or equal to Qcap. Then the
discount given by the vendor to the buyer is d = [Jb(Q
0
d) − Jb(Qcap)]/Qcap =
[4234.615385 − 3983.333333]/1400 = 0.179487179. Thus, the expected profit of
the buyer after coordination is Jb(Qcap, cb − d) = Jb(Q∗d, cb) = 4234.615385. The
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expected profit of the vendor after coordination is 8148.717949.
Example 61: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qb = 105. From
Tables 5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 113.6842105 and Q
0
c = 125.5263158. Since Q
0
d =
113.6842105 > Qcap = 105, Q
∗
d = Qcap = 105 from Theorem 26. Similarly, since
Q0c = 125.5263158 > Qcap = 105, Q
∗
c = Qcap = 105 from Theorem 27. Thus,
the channel is already coordinated from Theorem 39. The expected profit of the
buyer is 512.5 and the expected profit of the vendor is 262.5.
Example 62: From Table 5.11, Qcap = min {Qb, Qv } = Qv = 1150. From Tables
5.12 and 5.13, Q0d = 1330.833333 and Q
0
c = 1430. Since Q
0
d = 1330.833333 >
Qcap = 1150, Q
∗
d = Qcap = 1150 from Theorem 26. Similarly, since Q
0
c = 1430 >
Qcap = 1150, Q
∗
c = Qcap = 1150 from Theorem 27. Thus, the channel is already
coordinated from Theorem 39. The expected profit of the buyer is 4301.470588
and the expected profit of the vendor is 4025.
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